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RAND reprints have been formally reviewed in accordance with the publisher’s editorial policy, and are compliant with RAND’s rigorous quality assurance standards for quality and objectivity. 2 Military Transformation? Which Transformation, and What Lies Ahead? Paul K. Davis The term “military transformation” should simply be understood to mean “profound change” in military affairs.1 It need not imply rapid or across-the-board change, nor the discarding of that which continues to work well. The changes, however, should be dramatic rather than mere improvements on the margin such as modestly better aircraft, tanks, or ships. Transformation is a process with no simple end point.2 Military transformations are only sometimes successful; they can even be dis- tinctly counterproductive because militaries often embrace concepts too strongly and uncritically.3 Since mistakes are to be expected, hedging and course correction are basic ingredients in successful transformation. This chapter discusses military transformation across the eight years of the George W. Bush administration, particularly those in which Donald Rumsfeld was secretary of defense. The chapter begins with the 1990s for context and ends with thoughts on what lies ahead. Substantial further transformation will be essential in the years ahead, although perhaps under a different name and with a different character from that anticipated at the turn of the century. BACKGROUND Origins of the Transformation Concept The origins of recent U.S. military transformation are decades in the past. The tech- nologies underlying precision weapons and stealth, and the emphasis on rapidly deployable expeditionary forces, trace back to the late 1970s. The potential of new 11 12 n The George W. Bush Defense Program technology was a major theme in the Iklé-Wohlstetter Discriminate Deterrence study of 1988.4 The transformation-related developments between 1975 and 2008 occurred across nine different defense secretaries and five presidents. Discussion of military transformation per se began in the mid- to late 1990s, following debate about an impending revolution in military affairs (RMA). The Department of Defense’s (DoD) director of Net Assessment Andrew Marshall and his staff nurtured much of the RMA work. As of 1994, Secretary William Perry and Vice Chairman Adm. William Owens also championed RMA thinking. The idea of an RMA is that technological developments sometimes make possible a qualitative change in the nature of warfare. Examples include the advents of air- craft carriers, blitzkrieg warfare, and nuclear weapons. An RMA usually involves major changes in technology, doctrine, and organization. RMAs often render obsolete some previous forms of warfare, as when aircraft carriers supplanted battleships.5 In the context of the early 1990s, it seemed evident to some of us that profound changes were possible because of precision fires, stealth technology, and information systems. All of this may seem banal today, but as of 1990, airpower was treated by most officers and analysts as valuable but not decisive. Very few aircraft had pre- cision weapons, even though laser-guided bombs had been developed during the Vietnam War. The army had not yet demonstrated the large-scale maneuver operations developed under the AirLand Battle doctrine of the 1980s, and most ground force analysis still used models of pure head-on-head attrition warfare. The new stealthy aircraft (F-117s) had not seen combat, and unmanned aerial vehicles were not yet in play (except by Israel). Computers, communications, and information displays were still primitive. The first Internet browser (Mosaic) would not appear until 1992, and military information technology would lag that of the civilian world by years. Bullish Views as of the Early 1990s RMA discussion was a way to pull together a picture of what was happening or should happen to give it some coherence, historical context, and drama. Many of those doing the innovating, however, seldom used the terms “RMA” or “trans- formation.” They were intent on creative but pragmatic problem solving. So, also, analysts tended to avoid overstatement. A RAND compendium in 1994 reflected Military Transformation? n 13 on what was in the air for future defense planning.6 Although avoiding the language of revolution, it explicitly challenged DoD’s then-current planning approach,7 which seemed cold-warish in its constructs and insufficiently appreciative of technological change. Drawing on research sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, air force, and army, the book recommended: • Capabilities-Based Planning (CBP). DoD should move away from planning for specific threat scenarios (with, for example, specified adversaries, allies, time lines, strategies). Given inherent uncertainties, planning should focus on providing the capabilities needed for adaptiveness in real crises and conflicts. • Exploit Airpower’s Potential. Airpower was coming into its own by virtue of precision weapons and stealth technology, but achieving the potential would require major investments in modern precision weapons, stealth, and suppression of air defenses, and fundamental changes of attitude and doctrine. • Restructure the Force Units. DoD should rethink all “major formations” (divisions, carrier battle groups, air wings, and Marine amphibious groups) with an eye on smaller building-block units exploiting modern technology. • Plan Expeditionary Forces. A focus in planning should be rapid expeditionary capability and a generic campaign plan that would be distinctly joint, would exploit airpower early, would include a ground campaign, and would then have a stabilization campaign demanding large numbers of ground forces. • Pursue Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). Despite the challenges, BMDs, both global and tactical, should be pursued through research, development, and in some cases deployment. • Anticipate Adversary Tactics. The United States should anticipate that its adversaries would seek to avoid direct engagements, offset U.S. strengths, and deter U.S. action. These efforts, which later came to be called asymmetric strategies, would include: making access difficult; avoiding road marches in favor of using infantry in cities, mountains, and forests; attacking the U.S. homeland; using influence operations to manipulate the strategic context; and adopting irregular warfare. All of this would occur in the shadow of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). • Operations Other than War. The United States should be prepared for possible operations other than war, including insurgencies. 14 n The George W. Bush Defense Program Looking back at this snapshot of early-1990s’ thinking, and despite the prescient observations, some embarrassing omissions are obvious—a reminder of how think tanks get only some things right. In particular, the book had nothing to say about (1) networking, (2) netwar, (3) the potential for a large terrorist attack on the United States, (4) a “long war” against international Islamist extremists, or (5) what is now called hybrid warfare. Despite the omissions, the above list demonstrates how long the roots of much transformation have been. THE LATTER PART OF THE DECADe: 1995–2000 Joint Vision 2010 and the First Quadrennial Defense Review By 1996 the Joint Staff under Gen. John Shalikashvilli and Adm. William Owens was urging the embrace of RMA-type ideas. Its Joint Vision 2010 made a world- wide stir because of its ambitiousness.8 The other principal champion was Secretary of Defense William Perry (1994–1997). By 1997 the new name “transformation” merited an entire chapter in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) issued under the new defense secretary, William Cohen.9 The chapter, however, was clearly somewhat of a “placeholder”: although the administration wanted to acknowledge the new ideas, it was not yet ready to truly embrace them. Some key elements of that first QDR (see figure 2.1) included shifting from the Cold War “strategy” to one that highlighted environment shaping, as well as ensuring the capability to fight major theater wars and laying the basis for future capability.10 The strategy was called Shape, Respond, Prepare Now. Force sizing was still based on being able to deal with two concurrent regional conflicts, but Cohen emphasized (often to deaf ears) that this was a force-size criterion, not a strategy. The transformation activities were guided by “bumper stickers” called information superiority, dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full- dimensional protection, and focused logistics (see figure 2.2). The National Defense