Phillips, J. (2014) Containing, isolating, and defeating the miners: The UK Cabinet Ministerial Group on Coal and the three phases of the 1984-85 strike. Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, 35, pp. 117-141. Copyright © 2014 Liverpool University Press A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge Content must not be changed in any way or reproduced in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holder(s) When referring to this work, full bibliographic details must be given http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/104494 Deposited on: 27 March 2015 Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow http://eprints.gla.ac.uk 1 Jim Phillips, ‘Containing, Isolating and Defeating the Miners: the UK Cabinet Ministerial Group on Coal and the three phases of the 1984–5 Strike’, Historical Studies in Industrial Relations, 35 (2014), 117-141 The thirtieth anniversary of the start of the 1984–5 miners’ strike in Britain coincided with the release of various UK government archive papers under the 30-year rule. Media and press coverage of this release concentrated on two issues. First, Arthur Scargill, president of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), was broadly right when he argued before and during the strike that there was a secret Conservative government and National Coal Board (NCB) ‘hit list’, framing the closure over a three-year period of roughly seventy five pits with the loss of perhaps 64,000 of the industry’s 200,000 jobs. Margaret Thatcher, the Prime Minister, discussed this list in a meeting on 15 September 1983 with Nigel Lawson, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Peter Walker, Secretary of State for Energy, and Norman Tebbit, Secretary of State for Employment, together with various officials, yet the government consistently claimed in public that a much smaller programme of shrinkage, possibly extending only to twenty pits, was being contemplated. Second, in July 1984 the government examined declaring a State of Emergency to allow military personnel to move coal imports and other materials through the ports to break a short-lived but economically- damaging strike by dock workers. This private discussion jarred with the government’s public insistence that neither the actions of the striking miners or any other group of unionized workers were disturbing the normalcy of economic and industrial life in Britain. Media analysis in 2014 of this latter and vital episode in the strike was truncated, dwelling on the details of troop numbers, and evading the complex industrial and political issues,1 summarized by this author in a letter published by The Guardian. The dock workers had withdrawn their labour in a dispute over the handling of coal imports by British Steel Corporation (BSC) employees at Immingham on the Humber. This appeared to threaten the National Dock Labour Scheme, which provided registered dock workers with employment, income security, and an element of joint industrial regulation, and itself a component of the 1 N. Higham, ‘Cabinet papers reveal “secret coal pits closure plan”’, BBC News, 3 January 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-25549596; A. Travis, ‘Thatcher had secret plan to use army at height of miners’ strike’, The Guardian, 3 January 2014. 2 wider social-democratic legacy of the 1940s which Thatcher and her ministers were dismantling. Thatcher’s Secretary of State for Transport, Nicholas Ridley, pledged in the House of Commons that his government had no plans to abolish the Scheme. The dockers returned to work, although some with major misgivings, and the government’s immediate economic difficulties were resolved.2 The Dock Labour Scheme was abolished in 1989, by a Conservative administration reconstituted after the 1987 General Election, but only in this narrow sense had Ridley – speaking about the existing government’s plans in 1984 – not misled Parliament. This article develops analysis of these two headline issues. With the closure programme it is argued that Ministers were determined to ensure that the NCB could shut pits unilaterally, without the agreement of the NUM and other industry unions. This marked a major rupture with the nationalized coal industry’s system of joint regulation and its related ‘moral economy’, where significant changes were reached only with the agreement of unions and where the economic security of coalfield communities was preserved. With the July episode the scale of the Prime Minister’s antipathy to the Dock Labour Scheme is demonstrated, along with the duplicity of her ministers in ensuring that dockers ended their stoppage so that the striking miners remained isolated. Huw Beynon, in a recent lecture to the Manchester Industrial Relations Society, argued that there were three phases to the strike: initial division of the coalfields, between working areas and striking areas; followed by a ‘face off’ between striking miners and the government; and then the long ‘entrenchment’, with divisions in communities in all coalfields as striking miners slowly returned to work.3 In this analysis a three-phased model is also adopted. Initially, from March to May, the government sought to contain the scale of the strike and its economic and political effects; then, roughly from May to October, the striking miners were isolated from other groups of unionized workers and inhibited in their construction of broader social and political anti-government alliances; and thereafter Thatcher and her ministers moved to secure the unconditional defeat of the strikers and the NUM. These phases – or the strategic priorities pursued by the government within these phases – overlapped to an extent. So in the opening weeks the government worked to contain the strike in part by isolating the 2 The Guardian, Letters, 4 January 2014. 3 H. Beynon, ‘The Great Miners’ Strike, 1984-5: Reflections and Legacies’, Lecture, Manchester Industrial Relations Society, Manchester Metropolitan University Business School, 20 March 2014. 3 miners; and in the isolation phase ministers were already working – from June onwards – to inflict defeat on the NUM, chiefly through the NCB’s ‘back to work’ campaign. The article is based on the 350-plus pages of minutes of the Cabinet Ministerial Group on Coal (CMGC) which were also released on 1 January.4 These provide a detailed record of government thinking and action. Meetings took place usually twice a week from the start of the strike in March until the end of October, when NACODS, the union of pit deputies and safety officers, agreed a revised system for consultation and agreement on pit closures with the NCB. This lifted the threat of a complete stoppage of work in the coalfields and was the government’s second and final crisis of 1984–5 after the docks episode in July. The CMGC met just once a week thereafter. The personnel of the Ministerial Group further under-lines the centrality of its work. The Prime Minister usually chaired its meetings, which were attended by core Cabinet figures in Walker, Lawson, Tebbit, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry by this point, plus Ridley, Tom King, Secretary of State for Employment, Leon Brittan, Home Secretary, Michael Heseltine, Secretary of State for Defence, and Michael Havers, Attorney General. George Younger, Secretary of State for Scotland, was either present or represented by one of his Ministers of State. Peter Dorey has pointed out that while each of these figures served on this Group because of ‘functional’ or departmental role, Lawson, Tebbit, King and Ridley were all key Thatcher supporters; Walker, Heseltine and Younger were not Thatcherites, but unyielding all the same in criticizing the NUM and the strike.5 The general thrust of existing literature is that Thatcher and her ministers were determined to defeat the NUM, and covertly intervened in the strike in a number of ways.6 This is broadly confirmed by the CMGC minutes, which show the extent of government micro-management in three crucial areas: NCB strategy and negotiations with the NUM and other industry unions, plus the ‘back to work’ campaign; the handling of related disputes, 4 Cabinet Ministerial Group on Coal (hereafter CMGC), CAB 130/1268, The National Archives, Kew (hereafter TNA). 5 P.Dorey, ‘“It was Just Like Arming to Face the Threat of Hitler in the late 1930s”. The Ridley Report and the Conservative Party’s Preparations for the 1984–85 Miners’ Strike’, Historical Studies in Industrial Relations (HSIR) 34 (2013), pp. 173–214. 6 T. Brotherstone and S.Pirani, ‘Were There Alternatives? Movements from Below in the Scottish Coalfield, the Communist Party, and Thatcherism, 1981–1985’, Critique 36–7 (2005), pp. 99–124; A. Richards, Miners on Strike. Class Solidarity and Division in Britain (Berg, Oxford: 1996); R. Samuel, B. Bloomfield and G. Bonas (eds), The Enemies Within: Pit Villages and the Miners’ Strike of 1984–5 (Routledge and Kegan Paul: 1986). 4 such as that in the docks; and the conduct of policing, ensuring that striking miners were prevented from mustering at power stations, steel works, and other pressure points. More significantly, the CMGC files also provide unambiguous evidence that the government’s chief goal in the strike was the removal of effective union representation from the coal industry, with important demonstration effects across the economy more generally. This was hinted at by Martin Adeney and John Lloyd, writing in 1986,7 and represented one of the main conclusions of Seumas Milne’s analysis of the British state’s determined campaign against the NUM and its leadership, originally published in 1994.8 It was also the core theme of Beynon’s recent Manchester lecture, but more broadly has been absent from the main body of literature on the strike, both contemporaneous and historical, and whether focusing on high politics,9 operational details,10 or the community and social effects.11 Dismantling the right of workers to meaningful voice, in the workplace and in the boardroom on higher level strategic questions, including disinvestment, was arguably more important than closing inefficient or ‘uneconomic’ collieries.