SENEGA9 SU;-REGIONA9 CONF9ICT ASSESS@ENT !"#$"%&"' )**+ This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by @anagement Systems International. 1 Senegal Sub-Regional Conflict Assessment SENEGA9 SU;-REGIONA9 CONF9ICT ASSESS@ENT %,-,./0/-1 !231/03 4-1/5-,167-,8 975:75,1/ ;<<6=/3 J00 Water Street, SW Washington, DC 2002O Contracted under DFD-I-00-0P-002P10-00 Senegal Sub-Regional Conflict Assessment >4!9?@4%"' The authorQs views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government. 9;A$"A$! @=57-203 ,-B @CC5/D6,167-3EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE66 "F/=G16D/ !G00,52EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE6D 4E 4-157BG=167-H ;CI/=16D/3 ,-B %/1J7B787.2EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE K A. Assessment Objectives ................................................................................................................. 1 ;. @ethodology .................................................................................................................................... 1 C. ;ackground and Context ............................................................................................................. O 44E L6-B6-.3EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE + A. Core Grievances and Social and Institutional Resilience...................................................... 9 ;. Drivers of Conflict and @itigating Factors..............................................................................1V C. Windows of Vulnerability and Windows of Opportunity..................................................1X D. @apping the Analytic Narrative................................................................................................22 444E 40:86=,167-3 L75 #57.5,006-. ,-B '/=700/-B,167-3 EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE )M @AA"N 4E 49@L @-,82363 7< 1J/ 9,3,0,-=/ EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE O) @AA"N 44E 4#! L5,0/P75Q @::86/B 17 1J/ 9,3,0,-=/ EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE OR @AA"N 444E 4#! @-,82363 7< '/.67-,8 A,5=7S$5,<<6=Q6-. EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE TT @AA"N 4UE 49@L %/1J7B787.2EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE TR @AA"N UE !=7:/ 7< V75QEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE T+ @AA"N U4E '/</5/-=/3 EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE WT @AA"N U44E 97-1,=13EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEE WM Senegal Sub-Regional Conflict Assessment i @9';AX%! @A> @&&'"U4@$4;A! ACI Africa Consultants International ADRA Adventist Agency for Resource Assistance AN Assisses Nationales ANOCI Agence Nationale pour l’Organisation de la Conférence Islamique APAC Alliance pour la Paix en Casamance APE Association des Parents-Eléves APRAN Association pour la Promotion de l’Arrondissement de Nyasia BSS Benno Siggil Sénégal CAF Conflict Assessment Framework CBO Community Based Organization CL Convention Locale CMM Conflict Mitigation and Management CNCR Conseil National de Concertation des Ruraux CNES Conseil National des Employeurs du Sénégal CONGAD Conseil des Organisations Non-Gouvernementales d’Appui au Développement CR Conseil Rural DCHA Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance DEA Drug Enforcement Agency DG Democracy and Governance DoD Department of Defense DoJ Department of Justice ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States EU European Union FONGS Féderation des ONGs du Sénégal GB Guinea Bissau GDC Groupe de Contact GOANA Grande Offensive Agricole pour la Nourriture et l’Abondance GOS Government of Senegal ICAF Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework ICG International Crisis Group Senegal Sub-Regional Conflict Assessment ii ICS Industries Chimiques du Sénégal IPS Illicit Power Structures KOEH Kédougou Encadrement et Orientation autour de l’Homme MC Mouvement Citoyen MCC Millenium Challenge Corporation MDL Mineral Deposit Limited MFDC Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance NGO Non-Governmental Organization PADER Programme d’Action pour un Développement Juste et Durable PASMI Programme d’Appui au Sous-Secteur Miniér PDS Parti Démocratique Sénégalais PINORD Plateforme des Initiatives du Nord POAS Plan d’Occupation et de l’ Affectation des Sols PS Parti Socialiste RADDHO Rencontre pour la Defense des Droits de l’Homme SAABA Synergies des Acteurs pour l’Assainissement de la Banlieu S/CRS Secretary’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization SO Strategic Objective SOW Scope of Work SSR Security Sector Reform UNCAD Cheikh Anta Diop University UNACOIS Union Nationale des Commerçants et Industriels du Sénégal UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime USAID United States Agency for International Development USG United States Government WARP West Africa Research Program WANEP West Africa Network for Peacebuilding WN Wula Naafa Senegal Sub-Regional Conflict Assessment iii "N"9Y$4U" !Y%%@'X This assessment is designed to help USAID/Senegal understand a range of conflict dynamics affecting Senegal and the sub-region and to provide guidance in designing appropriate interventions to manage conflict and reduce the potential for violence. It uses the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) and Illicit Power Structures (IPS) frameworks as the principle tools of analysis. While recognizing the Casamance region as currently the main conflict prone area in Senegal, the assessment looks at drivers of conflict and violence in other parts of the country and the interaction between political, economic, and social factors. The team found that while an increase in violent conflict is a present danger that must be addressed, Senegal is a resilient society that has the capacity to avoid widespread violent conflict through systemic recalibration, including significant political and economic reforms, as it has done in the past. Senegal is the only West African country that has not experienced a military coup and has been considered a model for democracy and political stability. Abdoulaye Wade’s victory in the 2000 presidential election marked the end of forty years of Socialist Party domination. Many hoped that Wade’s victory would usher in a new era in which democratization processes begun in the 1970s would be fully consolidated. However, many Senegalese feel as though their expectations have not been met and that democratic values have weakened over the course of Wade’s Presidency. Frequent constitutional changes, cronyism and corruption, efforts to intimidate the media, censorship, and harsh treatment of political opponents have tarnished the reputation that President Wade once enjoyed as an apostle of democracy. Senegalese place a high value on strong, but benevolent leaders who provide public goods through policies that are responsive to the needs of the people. These expectations have been reinforced through the internalization of democratic norms. The government’s failure to use public resources equitably and to provide for public welfare in times of economic hardship violates these expectations and has become a major source of grievance. Senegalese citizens are especially upset by patron/client politics focused on the distribution of “rents,” the flaunting of wealth by political elites, the growing gap between rich and poor, and the apparent insensitivity to the impact of deepening poverty on people’s lives. In many of the interviews conducted for this assessment, the refrain “enough is enough” was repeated consistently across various segments of society. Population growth and a diminishing natural resource base have increased competition for access to farm land, pastures, forests, and fisheries throughout the country. Conflicts between competing parties are becoming more frequent and less amenable to traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. Government expropriation of large tracts of land and their redistribution to foreigners and well-connected Senegalese is yet another major source of grievance. To survive and escape poverty, many young men seek to migrate to Europe and North America. A small percentage are increasingly participating in criminal activities—e.g. drug trafficking, street crime, cattle rustling, and banditry. With regard to Casamance, President Wade promised a peaceful resolution to the conflict in the first one hundred days of his administration, but has shown little progress to achieve a negotiated settlement with the !ou$ement des Forces D0mocrati3ues de la Casamance (MFDC). The disbursement of government funds to various elements of the MFDC has exacerbated fractionalization and radicalized younger combatants who are challenging the moderate leadership to resume hostilities. The current escalation of rebel attacks on army convoys and increased banditry indicate that the rebellion is far from over. A renewal of the insurgency has the potential to merge with other regional trends to destabilize the entire the sub-region, even if it is unlikely to threaten stability at the national level. Narco-trafficking has increasingly become a major factor in the region. Shiploads of