The Conceptual Approach to Talmud Study and Rav Lichtenstein’s Method Class 4 Thought of Rav Aharon Lichtenstein 02.05.18 1. Avraham Walfish, “The Brisker Method and Close Reading,” in The Conceptual Approach to Jewish Learning, pp. 299-300 (summarizing Elyakim Krumbein, “The Evolution of a Tradition of Learning”) The first two generations of Soloveitchiks focused heavily on “secondary” questions, regarding the conceptual method as a tool for resolving textual issues. Analysis of the Rav’s shi’urim, mostly drawn from Shi’urim le- Zekher Abba Mari, leads RK to the conclusion that the Rav transferred the focus of learning from resolution of textual issues to the search for a complete conceptual mapping of the sugya. (pp. 299-300) 2. Zerah Warhaftig, Hamishim Shanah ve-Shanah: Pirkei Zikhronot (Jerusalem: Yad Shapira, 1998), 153. [He brought] a new style of learning: clarifying sugyot in depth in an orderly and precise way. 3. Shalom Carmy, “Something New in the Beit Hamidrash," Jewish Action 64:3 (2004), Special Section. In Rav Lichtenstein’s analysis, the student encounters the potential plurality of approaches to the sugya, not consecutively, but in immediate simultaneity. ,)שיעורי הרב אהרן ליכטנשטיין: טהרות, אלון שבות, הקשנ"ז) Editors’ Introduction to RAL volume on Taharot .4 בשיעורים מודגשת ההסתכלות על עולם ההלכה הרחב כמכלול אחד שכל פרט בו אחוז ושלוב בפרטים האחרים. לא לקט של 'וורטים' או אוסף של הברקות מקומיות לפנינו, אלא מבנה מגובש ומעוצב... These shiurim emphasize a view of the broader world of Halakha as a single composition in which every detail is integrated with the other details. Before us is not a collection of “vorts” or a collection of episodic insights, but a solidified and solid structure… 5. Ron Kleinman, “The Approach to Study of Gemara and ‘Talmudic Method’ Classes of Rav Aharon Lichtenstein, ztz”l” (Hebrew), Tzohar 40 (2016), pp. 51-76, at pp. 55-56 כידוע, בדרך כלל הסוגיות אינן מציגות נושא בשלמותו. הרא"ל עמל למצות כל סוגיה בפני עצמה ולהגיע מכל הסוגיות הרלוונטיות לראייה כוללת של הנושא תוך כדי תשומת לב לפרטיו. 12 הרב הדגיש את הצורך לברר את היסוד למחלוקת שבין מקורות או שבין ההווא אמינא בסוגיה לבין המסקנה. 13 בניגוד לאחרים, לימודו לא התרכז ב"חידושים" או בתירוץ קושיות בסוגיה או ברמב"ם. הוא התמקד בנושא ולא בטקסט. 14 לכן, לעתים לא לימד את המסכת כסדרה, אלא התמקד בסוגיות מרכזיות בנושא, תוך דילוג או היפוך הסדר. 15 שיטתו החדירה בתלמידיו שאיפה ללימוד עיוני ברמה גבוהה. דרך לימודו צמחה מתוך תורת רבו הגדול וחותנו, הגרי"ד, אך הוא פיתח מאוד את הלמדנות הבריסקאית. As is known, in general Talmudic sugyot do not present a topic in full. Rav Lichtenstein toiled to exhaust each sugya in itself and to reach, among all relevant sugyot, to a general view of the overall topic, while paying attention to its details. Rav [Lichtenstein] emphasized the need to clarify the basis of a dispute between two sources or between the hava amina of a sugya and its conclusion. As opposed to others, his learning did not focus on hiddushim [novelties], or with answering a question on the sugya or the Rambam. He focused on the topic and not the text. Thus, at times he did not teach the tractate in its order, but focused on central sugyot on the topic, while skipping or inverting the order. His approach instilled in his students an aspiration for analytic study at a high level. His approach to learning grew out of the teaching of his great Rav and father-in-law, Rabbi Soloveitchik, but he very much developed the Brisker approach. 6. Daniel Wolf, “Hiddush within the Beit Midrash: R. Aharon Lichtenstein’s Appraoch to Lomdus as an Adaptive Improvement to the Brisker Derekh,” Tradition 47:4 (2015), 113-125, at 123 R. Lichtenstein’s self-effacing manner and humility might serve as a deterrent to originality and hiddush. The ability to find support for a novel approach in the words of any Rishon at any stage of discussion provided abundant pegs on which the hiddush could be hung and subsequently analyzed. This method allowed R. Lichtenstein’s originality to flourish without his appearing brash. 1 [email protected] 7. “The Conceptual Approach to Torah Learning: The Method and its Prospects,” in Lomdus: The Conceptual Approach to Jewish Learning (ed. Yosef Blau; New York: YU Press, 2006), pp. 1-44 We are charged with learning a daf, on the one hand, and a sugya, on the other. Or to put it differently, we wish to learn the text and the subject-matter of the text. (p. 6) This [conceptual] approach, virtually by definition, is oriented to working around the exposition of themes rather than the explication of texts; and it does so with an eye to probing their ideational content rather than limning their bare presentation, even if systematic and comprehensive. (p. 7) From Hazal down, the Torah world has concerned itself with two kinds of questions that, for our purposes, I will designate as primary and secondary. The first category consists of points to be determined as part of any attempt to acquire the relevant data, raw or sophisticated, requisite for knowing a given phenomenon. These include issues of source… of scope as regards persons, objects, or circumstances; of rationale in light of general principles… or of definition, not simply lexicographic but jurisprudential. And it includes, further, their interaction – source, scope, and character often being closely and functionally related. Such questions are sometimes difficult to answer, but fundamentally they do not constitute difficulties. They are not conceived as problematic, nor are they generated by accident or crisis. They are intrinsic, an immanent aspect of any serious learning endeavor, and neglecting them reflects superficiality and sloth. Concurrently, the student of Torah expends much energy upon a second set of questions, which do arise as a matter of accident. These revolve around contradictions, and they occupy a prominent place – far greater than in most comparable disciplines, in the world of talmud Torah. Perceived contradiction is, to be sure, the stuff of which much intellectual discourse, legal or philosophic, is made…. In all these cases, however, one is not dealing with intrinsic tasks but with accidents; more with clearing a minefield than with erecting a structure. Precisely for this reason, the conceptual approach to learning is relatively less concerned with secondary questions than more textually or technically oriented approaches. Its thrust is overwhelmingly tilted toward fundamentals – above all, to the most basic of intellectual chores: definition. Armed with sets of categories, the conceptualist strives, first and foremost, to grasp the essential character of a particular element and, hence, to classify it. He seeks both to map a given subject and to probe it. (p. 8-9) The process of definition entails recourse to a set of keys – some master, others individual. Among the former, probably the most familiar is the distinction between subject and object, person and datum; but a number of others recur and figure prominently. Of virtually every de-rabbanan innovation, one will ask whether and how it is subsumed under a de-Oraita. With respect to positive and negative mizvot equally, one will often ask what is the prescribed or proscribed act and what the quintessential fulfillment or contravention of the divine will. (p. 10) while Abbaye and Rava rejoin , גו זמניה חזקה לא עביד איניש דפרע Resh Lakish holding that he was not, inasmuch as the lamdan will abjure focusing the debate upon the – איניש דפרע גו זמניה 16 עביד that his claim is valid, as evaluative description of debtor psychology and will direct it to the legal sphere. The issue is not what percentage of debtors might indeed prepay, but how high the number needs to be in order to establish the validity of a claim; and this, in turn, may depend upon halakhic considerations regarding the relation between debtors and creditors or the general level of probability needed to extract assets. (p. 12) דבר :With reference to a mahloket concerning the edibility of certain vegetables, Rav Binyamin bar Levi asks Something that it is possible for you to determine yourself, the sages ?שאפשר לך לעמוד עליו חכמים חלוקים עליו dispute over? (p. 12) The acquisition of keys and their proper use is the staple of the ordinary lamdan. At its highest plane, however, the conceptual approach finds expression in the cutting of new keys – some analogous to existing ones and extrapolated by transference, others perhaps wholly novel. These, in turn, enter the world of learning and enrich 2 [email protected] its vocabulary, providing fresh implements and fresh impetus for those engaged in the perpetual quest lehavin u-lehaskil. (pp. 15-16) The conceptual approach, as has been suggested, is inherently oriented to dealing with primary issues. Obviously, however, its practitioners can hardly be oblivious to secondary questions; and with regard to them, too, they are animated by a clear predilection. Contradictions between two authoritative texts can be resolved in several ways. One possibility is the emendation, where soundly based and legitimate, of either text. A second is the acknowledgement that the conflict is irreconcilable, but that both sources can be sustained by ascription to different persons or traditions. The third is the neutralization of one or the other text by confining it to a given case, either by recourse to previous knowledge or by the creative invention of a fresh limitation, suggested for the express purpose of resolving the difficulty at hand… None [of these resolutions], however, relates to the world of ideas. Hence, the conceptualist’s initial and instinctive thrust is in yet another direction. He will strive, wherever possible, to disarm the contradiction by portraying it as illusory.