Dr. Dino Falaschetti Web: http://www.doctorfal.com Through 20 years of experience in business, policy, and inter-disciplinary research and teaching, Dino Falaschetti (PhD, MBA, CPA) has managed Fortune 100 audit-engagements and corporate finance operations, created insightful business analytics and litigation support strategies, and helped develop productive policies for the White House and state legislatures. Dr. Falaschetti is Associate Professor of Law and Economics at the Florida State University College of Law (with tenure), Professor (by courtesy) in the Departments of Economics and Political Science, and Special Consultant to Economists Incorporated, a premier economic consulting firm in the fields of law and economics, public policy, and business strategy. From 2010-12, he is also serving as the Thomas F. Gleed Endowed Chair in Business Administration, Visiting Professor of Finance and Business Law, and Adjunct Professor of Law at Seattle University. Starting in the summer of 2012, he will become the next Executive Director of the Property & Environment Research Center in Bozeman, MT. Dr. Falaschetti shares his opinions on politics, law, and economic performance through public and professional speeches, radio and television interviews, and other news and policy media. He previously served the Executive Office of the President as Senior Economist for the Council of Economic Advisers (under President George W. Bush and Chairmen Ben Bernanke and Edward Lazear), held academic appointments at Stanford University, Montana State University, University of California at Berkeley, University of Tennessee, and Washington University in St. Louis, and managed a $1 billion money market portfolio for a Fortune 100 conglomerate. Dr. Falaschetti earned a PhD in economics from Washington University in St. Louis (with fields in political economy, economic theory, and industrial organization), an MBA with high honors from the University of Chicago Booth School of Business (with concentrations in economics and finance), and a BS with distinction from the Indiana University Kelley School of Business (with a major in accounting and work-in-depth in philosophy). Dino Falaschetti EDUCATION AND CERTIFICATION • PhD - Washington University in St. Louis (Economics, December 1999) • AM - Washington University in St. Louis (Economics, 1996) • MBA with High Honors - University of Chicago (Economics and Finance, 1994) • Certified Public Accountant (Illinois, certificate no. 52,878, first sitting, 1990) • BS with Distinction - Indiana University (Business, 1989) CURRENT POSITIONS • Property & Environment Research Center, Executive Director (Summer 2012) • Seattle University, Albers School of Business and Economics, Thomas F. Gleed Endowed Chair, Visiting Professor of Finance and Business Law, and Adjunct Professor of Law (2010 – present) • Economists Incorporated, Special Consultant (2010 – present) • Florida State University, College of Law, Associate Professor of Law & Economics (2007 – present, tenured), and Professor of Economics and Political Science (courtesy) PAST POSITIONS • Stanford University, Hoover Institution, Campbell National Fellow (2007–09) • Montana State University, Department of Agricultural Economics and Economics, Associate Professor (2006–07, tenured), Assistant Professor (2002–06) • Executive Office of the President, Council of Economic Advisers (President George W. Bush, Chairmen Ben Bernanke and Edward Lazear), Senior Economist for Financial Services and Regulation (2005–06) • University of California at Berkeley, School of Public Health, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Scholar in Health Policy Research (2001–03) • University of Tennessee, Department of Economics, Assistant Professor and member of the Ph.D. and Physician Executive MBA faculties (2000–02) • Washington University in St. Louis, Center in Political Economy, Fellow (2000) • INDETEC International, Litigation Support Group, Economist (1996–99) • Whitman Corporation, Manager of Corporate Finance for Fortune 100 conglomerate (1991–93), In-Charge and Staff for Financial Audits (1990–91), Intern (1988) OTHER EXPERIENCE • Expert Witness: SEC, Holland & Knight, Lorenz Law Firm, Montpelier & Young • Data and Policy Analytics: Bloomberg Government, eBay, Florida Legislature, JMI • Top Secret Security Clearance (2005–06) • Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Beige Book Contact (2003–06) • Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Visiting Co-Author (2002–04) Dino Falaschetti Page 2 4/18/12 BOOKS AND ARTICLES TOP 2% AUTHOR: Social Science Research Network, http://ssrn.com/author=301243 INTERESTS: Politics, law, and economic performance; corporate governance; business regulation and non-market strategy Books 1. Political Economy: Critical Concepts (2011). London: Routledge Major Works Series (edited with Andrew Rutten and Norman Schofield). • Vol 1. Theory: Social Choice and Elections • Vol 2. Elections and Institutions • Vol 3. Politics, Law, and Economic Performance • Vol 4. Governance 2. Democratic Governance and Economic Performance: How Accountability can go too far in Politics, Law, and Business (2009). New York: Springer-Verlag. 3. Money, Financial Intermediation, and Governance (2008). Edward Elgar Publishing (with Michael J. Orlando, and foreword by Antoine Martin). 4. Constraining Rational Choice: Allocation Versus Efficiency and the Origin of Commitment Problems (2004). In Irwin Morris, Joe Oppenheimer, and Karol Soltan (editors) Politics from Anarchy to Democracy (pp. 110-131). Palo Alto: Stanford Law and Politics (with Gary Miller). 5. Contributions to the Encyclopedia of Healthcare Management (2004). Michael J. Stahl (editor). Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: Sage Publications (with Steve Parsons). Articles 6. A Sex-Difference in Risk-Taking and Promotions in Hierarchies: Evidence from Females in Legislatures (2012). Forthcoming (August) in the Journal of Law and Economics. 7. Dodd-Frank Puts New Risk in Business, Fed Decision-Making (2011). Bloomberg Government, January 31. 8. Dodd-Frank Financial Reform: Will Increased Accountability at Corporations and the Fed Weaken Business Judgments and Price Stability? (2011). InSights, Center for Leadership Formation, Albers School of Business, Winter. 9. Dodd-Frank Financial Reform: Non-Market Risks and Strategies (2010). Economists Ink: A Brief Analysis of Policy and Litigation, Fall. Dino Falaschetti Page 3 4/18/12 10. Dodd-Frank and Board Governance: New Political-Legal Risks to Monetary Policy and Business Judgments? (2010). Banking and Financial Services Policy Report 29(12):1-7 (with Richard Fidei and Fred Karlinsky). 11. An Information Market Proposal for Regulating Systemic Risk (2010). University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 12(3): 849-98 (with Matthew Beville and Michael J. Orlando). 12. SEC v. Goldman Sachs: Political-Legal Risks and Economic Strategies for Litigators and Transaction Planners (2010). Economists Ink: A Brief Analysis of Policy and Litigation, Spring. 13. Auditor Independence and the Quality of Information in Financial Disclosures: Evidence for Market Discipline vs. Sarbanes-Oxley Proscriptions (2010). American Law and Economics Review 12(1):39-68 (with James Brown and Michael J. Orlando). 14. Shareholder Democracy and Corporate Governance (2009). Review of Banking and Financial Law (Boston University School of Law) 28:553-80. 15. If We Want Low-Priced Homeowners Insurance, We Need Political Risk Insurance (2009). Orlando Sentinel, January 29 (with Christopher Douglass). 16. Can Lobbying Prevent Anticompetitive Outcomes? Evidence on Consumer Monopsony in Telecommunications (2008). Journal of Competition Law and Economics 4(4):1065- 96. 17. Rocking the Fed’s Boat (2008). Hoover Digest (4):47-52 (with Michael J. Orlando). 18. When Deficits Make Sense (2008). Hoover Digest (3):72-5. 19. Does a Hospital’s Profit Status Affect its Operational Scope? (2008). Review of Industrial Organization 33(2):129-59. Awarded Best Paper by a Junior Author by the Industrial Organization Society (with Marco Castañeda). 20. Aggregate Health Expenditures, National Income, and Institutions for Private Property (2005). Economics & Politics 17(3):391-429. 21. Cutting the Dividends Tax…and Corporate Governance Too? (2005). Corporate Ownership & Control 3(2):31-4 (with Michael J. Orlando). 22. Optimization in the Production of Governance Services: Lessons for the Regulation of Auditor Independence (2004). Financiële Studievereniging Rotterdam (FSR) Forum 6(2):16-23 (with Michael J. Orlando). 23. Credible Commitments and Investment: Do Checks on the Ability or Incentive for Opportunism Matter? (2003). Economic Inquiry 41(4):660-74. Dino Falaschetti Page 4 4/18/12 24. Is Auditor Independence Endogenous? Evidence and Implications for Public Policy (2003). Research Division Working Paper 03-13, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (with Michael J. Orlando). 25. Can Theoretically Latent Groups Influence Policy Decisions? The Case of Telecommunications Policy (2003). Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 19(1):83-105. 26. Golden Parachutes: Credible Commitments or Evidence of Shirking? (2002). Journal of Corporate Finance 8(2):159-78. 27. Does Partisan Heritage Matter? The Case of the Federal Reserve (2002). Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 18(2):488-510. 28. Book review of Usha Haley’s (2001) Multinational Corporations in Political Environments. New Jersey, London, Singapore, and Hong Kong: World Scientific. Published in the 2002 International Journal of Organizational Analysis 10(3):290-2. 29. Constraining