Notes Introduction 1. For a discussion of the emergence of new social groups, see Michael J. Piore, Beyond Individualism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). 2. See e.g., Falling Down (1993, dir. Joel Schumacher, with Michael Douglas). 3. Rodney Barker, “A Future for Liberalism or a Liberal Future?” in The Liberal Political Tradition, ed. James Meadowcroft (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996), 181. 4. For a summary statement, see Gray’s review article “Autonomy is not the Only Good,” The Times Literary Supplement ( June 13, 1997), 30. This debate is well rehearsed in the issue of Social Research devoted to replies to Gray’s charge that Rawlsian liberalism “at no point touches the real dilemmas of liberal society.” Gray also responds to his critics. Social Research 61, 3 (Fall 1994). Amy Gutmann also refers to the need to write political philosophy for a less than ideal society in “Responding to Racial Injustice,” in K. Anthony Appiah and Amy Gutmann, Color Conscious: The Political Morality of Race (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 109. 5. This is also the theme of Glen Newey’s After Politics: The Rejection of Politics in Contemporary Liberal Philosophy (New York: Palgrave, 2001). Newey argues that contemporary political philosophers have been more concerned with for- mulating ideal prescriptions than with describing actual politics, as a result chiefly of their preoccupation with normative theorizing and applied ethics. 6. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Toward a Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 1985). See also the collected essays in Mouffe (ed.), Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community (London: Verso, 1992), and Mouffe, ed., The Return of the Political (London: Verso, 1993). 7. Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). Young differentiates between claims for recognition of group identity, and claims to remedy structural disadvantage in Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 102–7. 8. For a sympathetic discussion of postmodernism and political theory, see Stephen K. White, Political Theory and Postmodernism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 9. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 45–6. 10. As Will Kymlicka has pointed out in his response to the separate line of attack taken by communitarians, this is to some extent a “straw person” version of 150 / notes liberalism. Historically, in fact, liberal thinkers such as John Stuart Mill have always assumed that individuals are embedded in and shaped by the social context in which they live, and that a certain kind of identity is required for the formation of the liberal state. Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 207–9. I discuss Kymlicka’s arguments in more detail in chapter 3. 11. See e.g., Chandran Kukathas, “Are There Any Cultural Rights?” Political Theory 20 (1992): 105–39. 12. Brian Barry, Culture and Equality (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001). Nancy Fraser addresses the relationship between redistribution and recognition from a different perspective in “From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a ‘Post-Socialist’ Age,” in Cynthia Willett, ed., Theorizing Multiculturalism: A Guide to the Current Debate (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), 19–49. 13. John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Charles Larmore, The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); J. Donald Moon, Constructing Community: Moral Pluralism and Tragic Conflicts (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). 14. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 303. 15. It is at this point that the “imagined community,” as Benedict Anderson calls the modern nation, arises. See Anderson, Imagined Communities, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991), ch. 3. What is also significant in its emergence is that people from different classes, increasingly educated and literate, are able to read the same newspapers and popular literature, and thus to imagine the same community. 16. For the classic statement, see Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961). Dahl restates and clarifies his views in Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). 17. Paul Hirst, Associative Democracy: New Forms of Economic and Social Governance (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 1994). 18. Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) and Liberalism, Community and Culture; Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 19. Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 20. David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 4–6. 21. Ibid., 193. 22. Ibid., 120. 23. Miller argues that “the principle of nationality supports equal citizenship rather than a form of politics that is fragmented along group lines.” See On Nationality, 153. But his charge that identity politics leads to social fragmenta- tion is unsupported by evidence. Moreover, he oscillates between seeing nation- alism as a deep source of identity on the one hand, and formal common citizenship on the other. 24. For example, Melissa Williams, whose work I discuss in chapter 5, admits the difficulty in doing this—and does not pursue it. See Williams, Voice, Trust and notes / 151 Memory: Marginalized Groups and the Failings of Liberal Representation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 220. Chapter One Identity Politics and the Limits of Moral Pluralism 1. Amy Gutmann, Identity in Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), 30. 2. Paul Hirst distinguishes these “communities of fate” from voluntary associa- tions in Associative Democracy: New Forms of Economic and Social Governance (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1994), 49–56. I discuss Hirst’s work in detail in chapter 3. I should note here that “fate” in the sense I am using it refers to the fate of ascription—and nothing either more metaphysical or natural. Further, it is not always impossible to leave communities of fate: people can sometimes move between classes, occasionally “pass” as members of another race or ethnic group, conceal a religious identity and even change sex. But exit is not a simple matter of deciding no longer to belong, as it is from voluntary associations. 3. Gutmann, Identity in Democracy, 13. 4. Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 44. Young provides an extended definition of the con- cept of a social group, on which I draw, at 42–5. There does exist nevertheless a closer relationship between social group and associational membership than theorists of each, such as Young and Hirst, admit. I explore the importance of this for liberalism in my conclusion. 5. K. Anthony Appiah, “Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections,” Color Conscious: The Political Morality of Race, K. Anthony Appiah and Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 30–105. 6. Ian Hacking discusses the process by which types of individuals or groups are brought into existence by our naming of them, which he terms “dynamic nomi- nalism,” in “Making Up People,” in Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality and the Self in Western Thought, ed. Thomas C. Heller, Morton Sosna, and David E. Wellbery (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), 222–36. 7. For an exploration of this see: The Making of the Modern Homosexual, ed. Kenneth Plummer (London: Hutchinson, 1981). 8. Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 43. 9. Two important examples in a large body of work are: Sara Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Towards a Politics of Peace (Boston: Beacon, 1989) and Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982). 10. I borrow this term from Appiah, who distinguishes it from race as a biological category. Appiah, “Race, Culture, Identity,” 32. 11. W.E.B. DuBois, Dusk of Dawn: An Essay Toward an Autobiography Of a Race Concept (Milwood: Kraus-Thomson, 1975), 116–17, cited in Appiah, “Race, Culture, Identity,” 75. 12. John D’Emilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual Communities: The Making of a Homosexual Minority in the United States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983). 152 / notes 13. Stephen Cornell, The Return of the Native: American Indian Political Resurgence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 72. 14. Susan Wolf, “Comment,” in Multiculturalism, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 76. 15. See John C. Turner et al., Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987). 16. K. Anthony Appiah, “Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction,” in Multiculturalism, ed. Gutmann, 160. 17. Hacking, “Making Up People,” 230. 18. Appiah, “Race, Culture, Identity,” 78. 19. See e.g., Will Kymlicka: a culture “provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational and economic life, encompassing both public and private spheres.” Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 76. Gutmann