PSSXXX10.1177/0956797620971653Ferrigno et al.Reasoning Through the Disjunctive Syllogism in Monkeys 971653research-article2021 ASSOCIATION FOR Short Report PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE Psychological Science 1 –9 Reasoning Through the Disjunctive © The Author(s) 2021 Article reuse guidelines: sagepub.com/journals-permissions Syllogism in Monkeys DOI:https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797620971653 10.1177/0956797620971653 www.psychologicalscience.org/PS Stephen Ferrigno1,2 , Yiyun Huang2,3, and Jessica F. Cantlon2,4 1Department of Psychology, Harvard University; 2Seneca Park Zoo, Rochester, NY; 3Department of Psychology, Yale University; and 4Department of Psychology, Carnegie Mellon University Abstract The capacity for logical inference is a critical aspect of human learning, reasoning, and decision-making. One important logical inference is the disjunctive syllogism: given A or B, if not A, then B. Although the explicit formation of this logic requires symbolic thought, previous work has shown that nonhuman animals are capable of reasoning by exclusion, one aspect of the disjunctive syllogism (e.g., not A = avoid empty). However, it is unknown whether nonhuman animals are capable of the deductive aspects of a disjunctive syllogism (the dependent relation between A and B and the inference that “if not A, then B” must be true). Here, we used a food-choice task to test whether monkeys can reason through an entire disjunctive syllogism. Our results show that monkeys do have this capacity. Therefore, the capacity is not unique to humans and does not require language. Keywords reasoning, inference, logic, disjunctive syllogism, comparative cognition, primates Received 11/19/18; Revision accepted 8/5/20 Logical reasoning is an important aspect of human & Roeder, 2012; birds: Pepperberg et al., 2013; Schloegl learning, reasoning, and decision-making (Rips, 1994). et al., 2009). Logical reasoning could be an ancient evolutionary Although these results are sometimes taken as evi- capacity that facilitates effective foraging (Völter & Call, dence for inferential reasoning through disjunctive syl- 2017). However, whether logical reasoning is unique logism, there are alternative explanations. Participants to humans has been debated for hundreds of years may just be avoiding the empty cup or treating the cups (Descartes, 1637/1985). Comparative- and developmen- as if the probability of each of them containing a treat tal-cognition researchers have attempted to address the is independent. Instead of representing the dependent question of whether nonhuman animals and young “or” in “if A or B,” subjects may represent the task as children are capable of the type of logic needed for “maybe A and maybe B” (Mody & Carey, 2016). One logical inference (Beran & Washburn, 2002; Call, 2004; recent study in children used a novel four-cup hidden- Premack & Premack, 1994). Comparative researchers item paradigm that allowed them to rule out these have largely used the two-cup hidden-item paradigm alternative strategies (Mody & Carey, 2016). The cups (Call, 2004). In this task, a participant is presented with were baited in two sets of two (for a similar baiting two empty cups. A researcher then hides an item in procedure, see Fig. 1). One of the cups was then shown one of the cups so that the participant does not know to be empty, and thus the other cup in that set could which cup it is in. The researcher then shows the par- be inferred to contain the item. However, this task can- ticipant that one of the cups is empty and tests whether not be successfully completed without representing the the participant searches for the item in the remaining dependent relationship between the cups within a set. cup. Children as young as 2 years old and a variety of animal species successfully look in the remaining cup (children: Hill et al., 2012; Mody & Carey, 2016; apes: Corresponding Author: Call, 2004; Hill et al., 2011; olive baboons and macaques: Stephen Ferrigno, Harvard University, Department of Psychology Petit et al., 2015; Schmitt & Fischer, 2009; lemurs: Maille E-mail: [email protected] 2 Ferrigno et al. They found that 3- to 5-year-olds were successful at this task, whereas 2.5-year-olds were not. Statement of Relevance This work converges with a variety of other research showing that children cannot reason through alternative Which cognitive capacities are unique to humans possibilities before the age of 3 or 4 years (Leahy & and which are shared with nonhuman primates? Carey, 2020; Redshaw et al., 2018; Redshaw & Suddendorf, Humans have been pondering this question for 2020; Rohwer et al., 2012). One recent study found centuries. One potentially unique domain is logical looking-time evidence consistent with preverbal infants reasoning—for example, solving disjunctive syllogisms: reasoning through a disjunctive syllogism (Cesana- Given that A or B is true, if not A is true, then B Arlotti et al., 2018). However, the many failures of chil- is true. If this form of reasoning is dependent on dren until the age of 3 years suggest that this early verbal labels for logical operators, it should not be success might be due to the use of an alternative, non- possible in nonhuman animals. We gave nonhuman inferential mechanism, such as early object-tracking abili- primates disjunctive syllogism problems that they ties (Jasbi et al., 2019; for a review, see Leahy & Carey, could solve to earn a favored food, grapes. A 2020). The difference seen between 2.5- and 3-year-old subset of the animals was quite successful at the children on these other tasks could be due to the devel- task, earning grapes almost 75% of the time. How opment of the verbal label “or” (which develops between widespread this ability is at the population level the ages of 2.5 and 3 years old; French & Nelson, 1985), is unknown. However, the observation that even due to a slow-developing nonverbal system, or driven one nonhuman primate can engage in this logical by domain-general development such as increased operation is proof of the existence of the cognitive short-term-memory capacity (Mody & Carey, 2016). capacity in nonverbal, nonhuman primates. This Although these possibilities are hard to disentangle finding adds to the growing body of research showing in children, nonhuman animals offer a unique oppor- what types of logic are possible in the absence of tunity to differentiate between them. Monkeys have language. been shown to have short-term visuospatial memory abilities similar to or better than those of 4- to 5-year-old children (spatial span of monkeys is three to four items, Apparatus see Fagot & De Lillo, 2011; spatial span of 4- to 5-year- old children is ~3 items, see Orsini et al., 1987); how- The apparatus consisted of a short rectangular table ever, monkeys will never acquire verbal labels for the (75-cm long × 35-cm deep × 17-cm high) that was a logical operators “or” and “not.” If monkeys can use comfortable height for a seated baboon. The front of disjunctive syllogism to find hidden objects instead of the apparatus was shielded Plexiglas and had five simpler alternative strategies, this would suggest that equally spaced ports for subjects to indicate their verbal labels are not needed to represent these logical choice. Experimental manipulations were conducted operators in a flexible and abstract way. on a sliding panel (75-cm long × 17-cm deep) that sat atop the table. When the sliding panel was pushed forward, subjects could reach through a port in the Method Plexiglas and indicate their choice. Four identical, Participants opaque, polyvinyl-chloride cylinders were placed on the sliding board in front of corresponding ports. To Nine adult baboons (Papio anubis; mean age = 10 occlude which of the two cylinders in each set was years, range = 7–14 years) participated in the training baited, we used a piece of corrugated plastic that phase of the study; however, only four subjects passed blocked the subject’s sight of the two cylinders from all of the training phases (see below). All subjects were both the front and sides. After items were dropped into socially housed at the Seneca Park Zoo in Rochester, the cylinders, the items were hidden from the subject. New York. All of the animals that were willing to sit throughout the testing procedure were tested. Thus, the Familiarization training maximum number of subjects possible was tested. Because this study is about the existence of a cognitive To familiarize subjects with the testing procedure, we capacity in a nonhuman animal, showing that even one first tested them with the two-cup task (Call, 2004). For animal has this capacity is sufficient evidence (i.e., an this task, two baiting cylinders were placed on the test- existence proof). Animals received primate chow, fruits, ing apparatus. At the beginning of each trial, the experi- and vegetables every morning, and water was available menter placed the occluder in front of the baiting ad libitum. All procedures were approved by the Seneca cylinders. The experimenter then showed a grape above Park Zoo Research Committee. the occluder in the center between the two baiting Reasoning Through the Disjunctive Syllogism in Monkeys 3 a If Initial Choice Was Empty 100% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 0% 50% 50% If Initial Choice Was Baited b c d e f g Fig. 1. A schematic of the testing procedure and a sample trial sequence. On each trial (a), there were two sets of two baiting cylinders each. The experimenter placed an occluder in front of one of the sets and then showed a grape above it before placing the grape in one of the two occluded cylinders. This process was repeated for the other two baiting cylinders, and then the occluder was removed. The monkey could then select any of the cylinders, after which the experimenter revealed whether the monkey had found a grape.