After you have read this research report, please give us your frank opinion on the contents. All comments––large or small, complimentary or caustic––will be gratefully appreciated. Mail them to CADRE/AR, Building 1400, 401 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112–6428. What Happened to Battlefield McCaffrey Air Interdiction? Army and Air Force Battlefield Doctrine Development from Pre–Desert Storm to 2001 Cut along dotted line Thank you for your assistance. ............................................................................................... ......... COLLEGE OF AEROSPACE DOCTRINE, RESEARCH AND EDUCATION AIR UNIVERSITY What Happened to Battlefield Air Interdiction? Army and Air Force Battlefield Doctrine Development from Pre–Desert Storm to 2001 TERRANCE J. MCCAFFREY III Lieutenant Colonel, USAF CADRE Paper No. 17 Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6615 September 2004 Air University Library Cataloging Data McCaffrey, Terrance J. III, What happened to battlefield air interdiction? : Army and Air Force battlefield doc- trine development from pre–Desert Storm to 2001 / Terrance J. McCaffrey III. p. ; cm.––(CADRE paper, 1537–3371) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 1-58566-129-5 1. Close air support. 2. Air interdiction. 3. Military doctrine––United States. 4. Operation Desert Storm––Aerial operations, American. I. Title. 358.4/142––dc22 Disclaimer Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public re- lease: distribution unlimited. This CADRE Paper and others in the series are available electronically at the Air University Research Web site http://research.maxwell.af.mil and the AU Press Web site http://aupress.maxwell.af.mil. ii CADRE Papers CADRE Papers are occasional publications sponsored by the Airpower Research Institute of Air University’s College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education (CADRE). Dedi- cated to promoting the understanding of air and space power theory and application, these studies are published by Air University Press and broadly distributed to the US Air Force, the Department of Defense and other governmental organiza- tions, leading scholars, selected institutions of higher learn- ing, public-policy institutes, and the media. All military members and civilian employees assigned to Air University are invited to contribute unclassified manuscripts that deal with air and/or space power history, theory, doctrine or strategy, or with joint or combined service matters bearing on the application of air and/or space power. Authors should submit three copies of a double-spaced, typed manuscript and an electronic version of the manuscript on removable media along with a brief (200-word maximum) abstract. The electronic file should be compatible with Microsoft Windows and Microsoft Word—Air University Press uses Word as its standard word-processing program. Please send inquiries or comments to Chief of Research Airpower Research Institute CADRE 401 Chennault Circle Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428 Tel: (334) 953-5508 DSN 493-5508 Fax: (334) 953-6739 DSN 493-6739 E-mail: [email protected] iii Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER . ii FOREWORD . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . xi 1 INTRODUCTION . 1 Notes . 5 2 ORIGINS OF BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION . 7 Notes . 28 3 WHERE WAS BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION IN DESERT STORM? . 33 Notes . 49 4 WAS BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION A VICTIM OF SUCCESS? . 55 Notes . 71 5 IS BATTLEFIELD AIR INTERDICTION BACK? . 75 Notes . 93 6 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS . 97 Notes . 104 GLOSSARY . 107 ABBREVIATIONS . 111 BIBLIOGRAPHY . 115 v Illustrations Figure Page 1 Concepts of operations depiction . 39 2 Operation Desert Storm apportionment . 47 3 Tactical air support missions . 64 4 Linear and nonlinear battlefield operations . 80 vi Foreword The ground and air forces have strong interlocking connec- tions in the battlefield operations known as close air support (CAS). In the 1970s the Army and Air Force began to develop a shared battlefield doctrine known as battlefield air interdic- tion (BAI) that was concerned with a class of targets that lay out a fair distance from the front lines. These targets were be- yond the capability and immediate tactical concern of the ground commander, beyond the area that required detailed co- ordination of each individual CAS mission, but were close enough to have a near-term effect upon surface operation and required a general coordination of both air and ground opera- tions. These became known as “intermediate” targets, and often considered “shallow interdiction” targets closer to the front lines than the traditional “interdiction” targets commonly tasked by and under the control of the air forces. The Air Force and Army worked hand in glove through the seventies to refine and publish battlefield doctrine, best recog- nized under its Army label, AirLand Battle. Through the eighties Gen Wilbur L. “Bill” Creech, Tactical Air Command commander, Gen Donald Starry, chief of Army Training and Doctrine Com- mand, and other service leaders worked on a series of his- torical compromises pertaining to all aspects of the Army–Air Force operations. Not more than 10 years later, on the battlefields of Desert Storm, the Air Force excluded BAI from its tasking orders, al- though some claimed interdiction missions of this nature were carried out under different names. Indeed, the term BAI was removed from doctrinal manuals written after 1990. Was it considered irrelevant or useful doctrine? Did the heightened self-interest of the services explain its removal? Or was the removal a victim of bureaucratic inertia or unique doctrinal presentations? Lt Col Terrance J. McCaffrey III answers these questions in What Happened to BAI? Army and Air Force Battlefield Doctrine Development from Pre–Desert Storm to 2001. He traces air- ground doctrine and operational practices relative to battle- field interdiction from World War I to Operation Desert Storm vii and suggests at one point that even the flank support for Pat- ton was, in effect, BAI. The author carries the discussion through the decade after Desert Storm and shows how the issue is too important to be dropped by either service, even as technology provides new weapons for both services. Colonel McCaffrey concludes that there is still need for a BAI- type mission. Both services are searching for an answer to the doctrinal void. Development is being impeded by a lively trend to speak in the self-interest of one’s service. This study illuminates the process that will lead to renew BAI even as the struggle for service missions continue to cause self-interested debate. What Happened to Battlefield Air Interdiction? was written as a master’s thesis in the 2001–2 class for the Air University’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies—renamed School of Ad- vanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS) in September 2002— Maxwell AFB, Alabama. Colonel McCaffrey’s very thoughtful study was chosen as one of the best of its group. The College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education (CADRE) is pleased to publish this SAASS research as a CADRE Paper and thereby make it available to a wider audience within the US Air Force and beyond. DANIEL R. MORTENSEN Chief of Research Airpower Research Institute, CADRE viii About the Author Lt Col Terrance J. McCaffrey (BS, United States Air Force Academy; MA, Midwestern State University) is chief, Policy and Strategy Branch, North American Aerospace Defense Command, Peterson AFB, Colorado. After completing pilot training at Williams AFB, Arizona, he went to Royal Air Force Upper Heyford to fly the F-111E with the 79th Fighter Squadron (FS). While there, Colonel McCaffrey deployed to Operation Desert Shield and Desert Storm to fly combat mis- sions over Iraq with the 7440th Composite Combat Wing from Incirlik AB, Turkey. Next he instructed in the AT-38B at Hol- loman AFB, New Mexico, and Sheppard AFB, Texas. In 1996 Colonel McCaffrey moved to the F-15C and the 390th FS at Mountain Home AFB, Idaho, and led combat missions over Iraq during Operation Southern Watch and Air Expeditionary Force deployments V and VII. In 1999 he served as an F-15 joint bilateral air operations officer at Headquarters Fifth Air Force, Yokota AB, Japan. He is a distinguished graduate of Squadron Officer School and the Air Command and Staff Col- lege and a graduate of the School of Advanced Airpower Stud- ies (renamed School of Advanced Air and Space Studies in 2002)—all based at Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He is a graduate of the Joint Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia, where he won the MacArthur Foundation Award for excellence in writ- ing. Colonel McCaffrey is married to the former Lisa K. Mul- Holland of Colorado Springs, Colorado. They have three chil- dren—Garrett, Trevor, and Mallory. ix Acknowledgments It was Spring 1999 at the Joint Air Command and Control Course (JAC2C) where the inspiration for this study began. During a planning exercise, it occurred to my instructor that I had placed no air interdiction sorties against the enemy ground force’s rear echelon inside the land component com- mander’s area of operation. I quipped that if he apportioned me some battlefield air interdiction (BAI) sorties, I would be glad to help. That is when I learned BAI was gone. I have to thank the Air Force for sending me to JAC2C to locate the problem and then to the School for Advanced Airpower Stud- ies to find the time to study it. I appreciate the staffs at the Air University Library and the Air Force Historical Research Agency for help uncovering a mountain of documents invalu- able to this study. I also thank Dr. Harold R. Winton and Dr. James S. Corum for their unending patience in reviewing drafts that were much rougher than they needed to be. I am most grateful to my wife, Lisa, and our children, Garrett, Trevor, and Mallory, for the love and support required to com- plete this task—I could not have done it without you.