NECESSARY ERROR: JOSIAH ROYCE, COMMUNAL INQUIRY, AND FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY by KARA E. BARNETTE A DISSERTATION Presented to the Department of Philosophy and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy March 2012 DISSERTATION APPROVAL PAGE Student: Kara E. Barnette Title: Necessary Error: Josiah Royce, Communal Inquiry, and Feminist Epistemology This dissertation has been accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in the Department of Philosophy by: Scott Pratt Chairperson Bonnie Mann Member Naomi Zack Member Linda Fuller Outside Member and Kimberly Andrews Espy Vice President for Research & Innovation/Dean of the Graduate School Original approval signatures are on file with the University of Oregon Graduate School. Degree awarded March 2012 ii © 2012 Kara E. Barnette iii DISSERTATION ABSTRACT Kara E. Barnette Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy March 2012 Title: Necessary Error: Josiah Royce, Communal Inquiry, and Feminist Epistemology Feminist epistemologists have often argued that our relationships with structures of power shape the content, expression, and social force of what we know. While feminist standpoint theorists have often maintained that experiences on the margins of social power can lead to better understandings of the roles of systems of oppression in society, more recent writings on epistemologies of ignorance examine the reverse, how experiences from positions of social power limit our understandings. In this project, I draw on the concept of epistemic privilege as it has been formulated by feminist standpoint theorists, criticisms of objectivity and fixed, transcendent truths, and analyses of the relationships between structures of power and concepts of knowing. By considering the works of Sandra Harding, Lorraine Code, and Patricia Hill Collins, among others, I argue that knowledge is situational and contingent and that some individuals possess privileged understandings due to their positions on the margins of power structures. However, I also argue that, in order for feminist epistemology to utilize the concept of epistemic privilege successfully, it must incorporate a concept of error into its considerations of constructions of knowledge. Thus, throughout this dissertation, I examine how a concept of error could bolster efforts to subvert the dominant approaches to knowledge that have upheld male privilege iv and undermine the patriarchal power structures that rely on them. I propose a form of feminist inquiry that incorporates a method of error sensitivity, which will enable inquirers to recognize when institutions of power, individual limitations, and cultural myths are restricting knowing subjects’ perspectives and leading them to commit errors. This concept of error, and the related approach to error-sensitive inquiry, relies upon a commitment to continuous and ever-expanding inquiry by a community, rather than an isolated individual. Thus, I derive much of my conceptual framework from the work of Josiah Royce and his concepts of the Beloved Community, loyalty to loyalty, and communities of interpretation. v CURRICULUM VITAE NAME OF AUTHOR: Kara E. Barnette GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED: University of Oregon, Eugene, OR Gustavus Adolphus College, St. Peter, MN DEGREES AWARDED: Doctor of Philosophy, Philosophy, 2012, University of Oregon Master of Arts, Philosophy, 2009, University of Oregon Bachelor of Arts, Philosophy, 2005, Gustavus Adolphus College AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST: American Philosophy Feminist Philosophy Epistemology PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: Visiting Professor, Gustavus Adolphus College, 2010 - Present Graduate Teaching Fellow, University of Oregon, 2005 - 2009 GRANTS, AWARDS, AND HONORS: Paideia Prize for Outstanding Graduate Teaching Fellow in Philosophy, University of Oregon, 2008. PUBLICATIONS: “Communities, Traitors, and the Feminist Cause: Looking Toward Josiah Royce for Feminist Scholarship.” The Pluralist, Vol. 2 No. 2, Summer 2007. vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I wish to express my sincere appreciation to Doctor Scott Pratt, whose guidance, encouragement, boundless wisdom, and attention to detail were invaluable to this project. I would also like to thank the other members of my committee, Professors Bonnie Mann, Naomi Zack, and Linda Fuller, whose questions and comments insightfully challenged me to broaden my perspectives. Moreover, I owe many thanks to my teachers and colleagues in the Philosophy department at Gustavus Adolphus College, whose confidence in me and support for me have been constant sources of encouragement. In addition, I owe a debt of gratitude to the members of the Josiah Royce Society, who helped me maintain my enthusiasm and pointed me toward the most useful resources for this project. Finally, I would like to thank my husband, Andrew Grace for his love, support and editing skills, all of which were crucial for the completion of this project. vii Dedicated to my loving parents, Glenn and Sally Barnette viii TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page I. FEMINIST STANDPOINT THEORY, COMPETING “VIEWS FROM BELOW,” AND THE NEED FOR ERROR SENSITIVITY ................................... 1 Introduction............................................................................................................ 1 Identity, Knowledge, and the Supreme Court........................................................ 3 Sandra Harding and the Idea of Epistemic Privilege ............................................. 9 Sexual Assault and the Case for Women’s Epistemic Privilege............................ 14 The Myth of the Black Rapist and Lynching in America ...................................... 19 Competing “Views from Below” in Incidents of Interracial Acquaintance Rape ....................................................................................................................... 24 The Importance of Error Sensitivity ...................................................................... 31 Notes ...................................................................................................................... 35 II. KNOWING, AGENCY, AND EPISTEMIC PRIVILEGE: A REVIEW OF CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY ............................................ 38 Commitment One: Conventional Epistemology Has Depended upon Myths that Maintain Existing Power Structures ...................................................................... 40 Commitment Two: Better Knowing Must Participate in Destabilizing Systems of Oppression ......................................................................................................... 44 Commitment Three: Better Knowing Is Situated within the Lived Experiences of Those on the Peripheries of Power .................................................................... 45 Summarizing Commitments One through Three ................................................... 49 Commitment Four: Feminist Inquiry Should Be Able to Adjudicate between Conflicting Accounts from Below ......................................................................... 50 Epistemic Privilege, Feminist Empiricism, and Responsible Knowing ................ 56 Feminist Epistemology and Structures of Power ................................................... 59 ix Chapter Page Mestiza Consciousness and a Role for Agency ..................................................... 67 Conclusion …….. .................................................................................................. 70 Notes ...................................................................................................................... 72 III. ERROR, IGNORANCE, AND RESPONSIBILITY ............................................. 74 The Possibility of Error in The Religious Aspects of Philosophy and The Sources of Religious Insight................................................................................... 78 The Concept of Error in “Error and Truth” ........................................................... 85 Error and Royce’s Pluralist Ontology.................................................................... 91 Contemporary Accounts of Error and Ignorance ................................................... 99 Error Sensitivity and Testimony ............................................................................ 102 Notes ...................................................................................................................... 104 IV. INTERPRETATION WITHOUT ASSIMILATION: COMMUNITIES OF INTERPRETATION IN ROYCE’S MATURE PHILOSOPHY .......................... 107 Royce’s Triadic Model of Interpretation ............................................................... 108 Royce’s Model of Interpretation and the Commitments of Feminist Epistemology ......................................................................................................... 119 Error Sensitivity as the Core of Interpretation ....................................................... 128 Notes ...................................................................................................................... 137 V. NEW VISION OF FEMINIST INQUIRTY ........................................................... 140 Potential Feminist Objections to Royce and His Concept of Error ....................... 140 Visualizing an Error Sensitive Feminist Inquiry ................................................... 149 Defining My Method of Feminist Inquiry ............................................................