THE NARCISSISM OF MINOR DIFFERENCES This page intentionally left blank THE NARCISSISM OF MINOR DIFFERENCES HOW AMERICA AND EUROPE ARE ALIKE AN ESSAY IN NUMBERS PETER BALDWIN 1 2009 1 Oxford University Press, Inc., publishes works that further Oxford University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education. Oxford New York Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto With offi ces in Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore South Korea Switzerland Th ailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam Copyright © 2009 by Oxford University Press, Inc. Published by Oxford University Press, Inc. 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 www.oup.com Oxford is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Baldwin, Peter. Th e narcissism of minor diff erences : how America and Europe are alike / Peter Baldwin. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-19-539120-6 1. National characteristics, European. 2. National characteristics, American. 3. Europe—Relations—United States. 4. United States—Relations—Europe. I. Title. D2021.B34 2009 305.809—dc22 2009007226 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper for my sons, Lukas and Elias, who negotiate both sides of this supposed divide with aplomb This page intentionally left blank CONTENTS Acknowledgments ix INTRODUCTION1 ONE Th e Economy 15 TWO Health Care 40 THREE Th e Rest of the Welfare State 60 FOUR Crime 74 FIVE More Broadly 91 SIX Education and the Higher Pursuits 97 SEVEN Th e Environment 122 EIGHT Civil Society 148 NINE Nationalism 160 TEN Religion and Science 163 ELEVEN Assimilation 176 TWELVE Lumping and Splitting 183 THIRTEEN A Meeting of the Twain? 204 FOURTEEN Separated at Birth? 216 FIFTEEN Th e Post Facto State 227 SIXTEEN How the West Was One 236 SEVENTEEN Acorn and Oak 243 A Note on Sources 251 Notes 253 Figure Sources 285 Index 311 This page intentionally left blank ACKNOWLEDGMENTS i am enormously indebted to Michael Kellogg, a scholar in his own right, for invaluable research assistance. Without his help, I would still be scur- rying down the back alleys of the Internet, trying to come up with something quantifi able on sugar consumption, per capita piano sales, newspaper read- ership, or who knows what. Yves-Pierre Yani, of the UCLA Department of Economics, did preliminary calculations for several of the graphs on income distribution and poverty. Jamie Barron, of the UCLA Statistics Department, refi ned and improved these calculations where noted, and was immensely use- ful in helping me sidestep the worst of my statistical mistakes. Th e usual provi- sos concerning ultimate attribution of fault apply. Several colleagues and friends were of help with suggestions and leads to information I had overlooked, as well as wise counsel on how to phrase and structure matters. Many of them probably disagree with the argument here, and to the extent that I can, I absolve them of any implication in it. Th ey were nonetheless too kind just to send me packing. I am indebted to Jens Alber, Joyce Appleby, Perry Anderson, Timothy Garton Ash, Peter Aterman, Michael Burda, Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Neil Gilbert, Jacob Hacker, Josef Joff e, Matthieu Leimgruber, Peter Mandler, Claus Off e, Timothy B. Smith, Lars Trägårdh, and George Weidenfeld. Frank Castles went far beyond the call of duty or collegiality. He has read the manuscript in several versions, not to mention hearing it as a lecture, and has still had the patience to guide me around numerous pitfalls. I am deeply grateful. Th e inspiration to write a longish version of these ideas came during the question period at a talk I was invited to give at Jürgen Kocka’s ongoing sem- inar on comparative history at the Free University of Berlin in April 2006. Th e fervor with which the students present insisted that the European social x ACKNOWLEDGMENTS model was not only a reality, but also a crucial issue in the recent election cam- paigns in the new EU nations of the former East Bloc, led me to ponder how distinctive this model actually was. Versions of this material were presented in a lecture at Syddansk Universitet, Odense, and as the James Seth Memo- rial Lecture at the University of Edinburgh in 2007. I am grateful to Klaus Petersen, Frank Castles, and Richard Parry for those invitations. I am also indebted to my editor at Oxford, David McBride. Presented with a manuscript containing several hundred graphs and even more statistics, it is not every editor who agrees both that it is publishable and could be pitched to a wide audience. I wish I could be certain that his training as a doctoral student in my own department at UCLA is responsible, but I fear it is likely to be native talent. I am grateful to him for sticking with the project through its various twists and turns. Finally, my greatest debt is to my wife and colleague, Lisbet Rausing. She has worked my prose over so many times that it may fi nally be readable. She has subjected my arguments to so thorough a pummeling that they may now be convincing. I would like to think that she has put in so much eff ort on my behalf because she loves me as much as I adore her. But that would be impossible. THE NARCISSISM OF MINOR DIFFERENCES This page intentionally left blank INTRODUCTION: EUROPE AND AMERICA, HISSING COUSINS the atlantic gets ever wider. Not just in a physical sense, as oceans rise and coastlines recede, but also in ideological terms. Europe and America appear to be pitted against each other as never before. On one shore, capitalist markets, untempered by proper social policies, allow unbridled competition, poverty, pollution, violence, class divides, and social anomie. On the other side, Europe nurtures a social approach, a regulated labor market, and elabo- rate welfare networks. Possibly it has a less dynamic economy, but it is a more solidaristic and harmonious society. “Our social model,” as the voice of British left liberalism, the Guardian, describes the European way, “feral capitalism,” in the United States.1 With the collapse of communism, the European approach has been promoted from being the Th ird Way to the Second Way. Th e UK fl oats ambiguously between these two shores: “Janus Britain” in the phrase of the dean of transatlanticist observers, Timothy Garton Ash.2 It is part of 2 THE NARCISSISM OF MINOR DIFFERENCES Europe, says the British Left ; an Anglo-Saxon coconspirator, answer its conti- nental counterparts. Th at major diff erences separate the United States from Europe is scarcely a new idea. But it has become more menacingly Manichaean over the last decade. Foreign policy disagreements fuel it: Iraq, Iran, Israel, North Korea. So does the more general question of what role the one remaining superpower should play while it still remains unchallenged. Robert Kagan has famously suggested that, when it comes to foreign policy, Americans and Europeans call diff erent planets home.3 Americans wield hard power and face the nasty choices that follow in its wake. Europeans, sheltered from most geopolitical strife, enjoy the luxury of approaching confl ict in a more conciliatory way: Martian uni- lateralism confronts Venusian multilateralism. But the dispute goes beyond diplomatic and military strategy. It touches on the nature of these two soci- eties. Does having the strongest battalions change the country that possesses them? Aft er all, America is not just militarily strong. It is also—compared to Europe—harsh, dominated by the market, crime-ridden, violent, unsolidaris- tic, and sharp-elbowed. Competition is an offi cial part of the national ide- ology and violence the way it spills over into everyday life.4 Or so goes the argument: a major battle of worldviews and social practices separates America from Europe. Th e idea that the North Atlantic is socioculturally parted is elaborated in both Europe and America for reasons that are as connected to domestic politi- cal needs and tactics as they are to any actual diff erences. American criticism of Europe, when it can be heard at all, typically concerns foreign policy or trade issues. American conservatives occasionally make the old continent a symbol for what they see as the excesses of the welfare state and statutory regulation. But the longstanding European criticism of America has become more vehe- ment and widespread and is now shared by right and left alike. Europeans are keen to defi ne an alternative to American hegemony, now that Europe no lon- ger needs the protection of the United States in a post-cold-war world. Beset with internal fractures and disagreements, they have rediscovered the truism that nothing unites like a common enemy. In other words, this is not a symmetrical dispute. American anti- Europeanism exists, of course, but it pales next to its European counterpart. “Th ere are no anti-European demonstrations,” as Russell Berman writes, “no burning of French or German fl ags, no angry mobs with pitchforks and trac- tors in front of Louis Vuitton boutiques or BMW dealerships. American ‘anti- Europeanism’ is not an equal partner but only an anemic aft erthought to the INTRODUCTION 3 European spectacles.”5 Th e renaming of french fries in the congressional caf- eteria in 2003 (rescinded by 2006) is about as far as things have gone.