The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology ISSN: 1747-0218 (Print) 1747-0226 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/pqje20 Decay theory of immediate memory: From Brown (1958) to today (2014) Timothy J. Ricker, Evie Vergauwe & Nelson Cowan To cite this article: Timothy J. Ricker, Evie Vergauwe & Nelson Cowan (2016) Decay theory of immediate memory: From Brown (1958) to today (2014), The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 69:10, 1969-1995, DOI: 10.1080/17470218.2014.914546 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2014.914546 Published online: 22 May 2014. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 585 View related articles View Crossmark data Citing articles: 5 View citing articles Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=pqje20 Download by: [University of Missouri-Columbia] Date: 26 August 2016, At: 06:00 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2016 Vol. 69, No. 10, 1969–1995, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17470218.2014.914546 Decay theory of immediate memory: From Brown (1958) to today (2014) Timothy J. Ricker, Evie Vergauwe, and Nelson Cowan Department of Psychological Sciences, University of Missouri, Columbia, MO, USA (Received 30 September 2013; accepted 29 December 2013; first published online 22 May 2014) This work takes a historical approach to discussing Brown’s (1958) paper, “Some Tests of the Decay Theory of Immediate Memory”. This work was and continues to be extremely influential in the field of forgetting over the short term. Its primary importance is in establishing a theoretical basis to consider a process of fundamental importance: memory decay. Brown (1958) established that time-based expla- nations of forgetting can account for both memory capacity and forgetting of information over short periods of time. We discuss this view both in the context of the intellectual climate at the time of the paper’s publication and in the context of the modern intellectual climate. The overarching theme we observe is that decay is as controversial now as it was in the 1950s and 1960s. Keywords: Short-term memory; Decay; Brown (1958); Working memory; Forgetting; Time. Brown (1958) was a landmark article that marked a been done to refine the theory and identify how it shift in memory research during the early stages of plays a role in human cognition more generally. the cognitive revolution. In this work, Brown pro- Beyond this, Brown offers a spirited rebuke of posed a theory of forgetting based upon memory those who had dismissed the first whisperings of traces that lose activation, or decay, with the decay as misinterpreted consequences of interfering passage of time. This theory was accompanied by information. experiments showing forgetting in a short amount In an attempt to do justice to this seminal article of time, whereas previous work had only showed and its legacy, our investigation of Brown (1958) long-term forgetting. Brown’s account of memory begins with a consideration of its continuing was evidence-based and addressed more than importance for the field. We then move to a more simply a forgetting curve. While others had pro- in-depth account of the empirical and theoretical posed that decay exists, Brown took the further contributions of the article. Elaborating upon step of incorporating the idea of memory decay these contributions, for a fuller understanding and into a larger theoretical framework that includes appreciation of the work, we ponder the possible limits on the capacity of memory and rules describ- meanings of memory decay and then consider the ing the conditions under which decay should and historical context in which Brown’s contribution should not operate. This framework largely carries was made. Moving from past to present and through to the present, although much work has future, we consider some of the subsequent Correspondence should be addressed to Timothy J. Ricker, Department of Psychological Sciences, University of Missouri, McAlester Hall, Columbia, MO 65211, USA. E-mail: [email protected] Funding for this project was provided by NICHD Grant #2R01HD021338 to Nelson Cowan and by Swiss National Science Foundation Grant # PA00P1_139604 to Evie Vergauwe. The content is solely the responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily represent the official views of the National Institutes of Health. © 2014 The Experimental Psychology Society 1969 RICKER ET AL. models that incorporate decay, the likely status of McKeown & Mercer, 2012; Ricker & Cowan, decay given recent research findings, and the 2010, 2013). Nonetheless, controversy continues. future of decay and of Brown’s ideas. Researching this paper has been an interesting experience. In discovering, and rediscovering, many papers from the opening days of experimental THE CONTINUING IMPORTANCE psychology we have been struck by the similarity of OF BROWN (1958) the arguments against decay in Brown’s day to those we receive today when discussing our research The continuing importance of Brown (1958)is supporting decay theories of memory. An often- evident in that decay may be integral to the made complaint is that nothing can happen as a modern conceptualization of memory as two separ- function of time and an analogy to the accumu- able parts (e.g., Atkinson & Shiffrin, 1968; lation of rust frequently follows. The analogy goes Broadbent, 1958; Miller, 1956): the large amount like this. Although rust accumulates as a function of information that we have memorized over a of time, its cause is the oxidation processes, not lifetime, or long-term memory, and the small the passage of time itself. Following this logic, amount of information that is temporarily in a trace decay must not be a true cause of forgetting state of heightened availability, or short-term (or but rather a simplistic proxy. This line of thought working) memory. The fundamental difference can be seen even before Brown and his contempor- between the two, if they are separable, would aries proposed theories of memory decay. Earlier in appear to be that only the contents of short-term the twentieth century, the Law of Disuse was used memory are limited to a small number of items or to refer to the idea that information was lost with to a short period of time, whereas the same limits the passage of time. Pratt (1936), in his defence do not apply to long-term memory. Short-term of the Law of Disuse, felt the need to state: memory as a theoretical construct is therefore like The objection that a trace can not possibly disintegrate through a roof that stands on just two massive pillars, and disuse, that time in and of itself does nothing to any event in decay is one of those pillars. nature, must be regarded largely as a verbal quibble. Science Brown (1958) opens by saying: “The hypothesis often speaks of change as a function of time, meaning thereby of decay of the memory trace as a cause of forgetting that alterations are produced by processes internal to the event ” in question rather than by external forces acting upon the has been unpopular . In many ways the ideas put event. Let A and B represent two neural traces. Either one forward by Brown (1958) are as controversial may change as the result of the action of the other upon it. A today as they were 60 years ago. Contemporaries change may also occur in A by way of metabolic processes of Brown such as Underwood (1957) and Melton within its own organization which have nothing to do with B, (1963) claimed that all forgetting could be and vice versa. There is therefore no reason on these grounds to dismiss the principle of disuse. (Pratt, 1936,p.91) explained though processes involving interfering information. In the last decade several prominent Clearly the same critiques occurred then as now. researchers have made similar claims What Pratt elegantly states is that, for our purposes, (Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Brown, 2009; time is the important variable for understanding Nairne, 2002; Oberauer & Kliegl, 2006). Nairne behaviour. (2002) claims that “appeals to either rehearsal or As we compose this article, Google Scholar decay are unlikely to explain the particulars of indicates that Brown (1958) has been cited over short-term forgetting”. Similarly, Lewandowsky 1153 times. Any reference section of a paper et al. (2009) assert that “reliance on decay is not jus- dealing with decay is almost assured to cite tified by the data”. In their day, Brown and others Brown or, if they do not, many papers within the (Conrad, 1957; Murdock, 1961; Peterson & references section will themselves include a citation Peterson, 1959) gave strong refutations of this of Brown. It is probably safe to assume that all main approach to forgetting, just as some do today stream theories of memory decay draw on Brown (Barrouillet, Bernardin, & Camos, 2004; (1958) as a predecessor influential in their 1970 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, 2016, 69 (10) BROWN (1958) ON DECAY formation. When it comes to time-based forget- sense, Brown provided the planks on which other ting, the impact and influence of Brown (1958)is evidence favouring decay could stand. unquestionable. A second reason for the high cita- The heart of Brown’s argument against the evi- tion rate of Brown (1958) is that the paper was dence used to discredit decay was a rejection of the among the first to propose a procedure in which assumption that interference always caused forget- information has to be maintained over a short inter- ting. Rather, Brown argued it could be the case val of time which is filled with a demanding task. that supposed interference effects happen once for- This short-term procedure is often referred to as getting has already occurred.