Introduction to Epistemology Philipp Blum draft version Foreword This course was written for an ‘intensive seminar’ “Introduction to Epistemology” I gave during spring term at theFacultyofTheology,UniversityofLucerne(Apriland; Mayand, ). IwasreplacingProf.Gianfranco Soldati, from the University of Fribourg, on whose slides the course is based. I also made extensive use of my notes from the ‘Kompaktseminar’ “Varieties of Skepticism” Crispin Wright gave at University of Heidelberg in spring , as well as of my MA thesis in theoretical computer science which I submitted at the University of Berne. I learned from the feedback of my students, and from Kevin Mulligan who sent me an unpublished paper of his on correctness conditions. To do, in this order . read the rest of Sellars, incorporate it into ch. : (Sellars ) . incorporate the rest of wright.tex - put it back into courses . incorporate the logic MA thesis, and the stuff on information (perhaps within ch )? . discuss Nozick and the dispositional analysis . make full biblio of Dretske, make proper references to zebras and closure . rework the scepticism paper . read Engisch on intentional objects and rework that chapter . return to correctness vs accuracy: cf Mulligan forthcoming and Buekens (on correctness) . What Wright said in Heidelberg about how Nozick on knowledge could be defended against counterexamples by dropping the counter- factual analysis of dispositions is identical in content (and sometimes wording) to Gundersen (). Contents The Bases of Our Knowledge . Seeing Things ................................................... .. “Epistemology” .............................................. .. Perception ................................................ .. The Argument from Illusion ....................................... .. The Intentionality of Perception ..................................... . Intentionality and Representation ........................................ .. Emotions and their Correctness Conditions ............................... .. Two Types of Perspectivality ....................................... .. Intrinsicness and Relationality ...................................... Intentional properties are extrinsic, but non-relational ......................... Representational properties are intrinsic, but relational ......................... .. Correctness and Truth .......................................... .. Indeterminacy of Content ........................................ The Determination of Aboutness .................................... The Attribution of Representational Content .............................. . Belief ....................................................... .. Representation-as ............................................. .. Different Types of Normativity ...................................... .. Supposing, Holding True and Judging .................................. .. From Belief to Judgement ......................................... .. The Eliminability of Truth ........................................ TheMythoftheGiven . .......................................................... .. ..................................................... .. ..................................................... .. ..................................................... .. ..................................................... .. ..................................................... . .......................................................... .. ..................................................... .. ..................................................... II .. ..................................................... .. ..................................................... .. ..................................................... . .......................................................... .. ..................................................... .. ..................................................... .. ..................................................... .. ..................................................... .. ..................................................... The Analysis of Knowledge . What an Analysis of Knowledge Could Be .................................... .. Philosophical Biconditionals ....................................... .. Gettier .................................................. .. Dretske and Nozick: Closure and Tracking ............................... .. Knowledge as a Disposition to Get Things Right ............................ .. Epistemic Supererogation ........................................ . Knowledge First .................................................. .. Assertion and Evidence .......................................... .. Williamson on the Primeness of Knowledge ............................... .. Williamson Against Transparency and Luminosity ........................... .. Epistemic Logic .............................................. .. Introspection ............................................... . TheAPriori .................................................... .. The Traditional Notion and its Problems ................................ .. The Extent and Nature of the A Priori .................................. .. Two-dimensional Semantics and Semantic Externalism ......................... .. The McKinsey Paradox ......................................... .. Inferentialism and McGee ........................................ Skepticism . Different Questions Need Different Answers ................................... .. Pyrrhonian and Modern Skepticism ................................... .. Different Skeptical Questions ...................................... .. Different Anti-Skeptical Answers ..................................... .. Burge on Content Preservation ...................................... .. Undermining Truth or Claimability? Moore’s Proof .......................... . Humean Skepticism ................................................ .. Warrant Transmission Failure, Rule Circularity and Blind Rule-Following ............... .. The Justification of Deduction ...................................... .. Rejecting Empiricism? .......................................... .. Dogmatism and Perceptual Justification ................................. III . Cartesian Skepticism ............................................... .. Cartesian Doubt: Methodic and Hyperbolic ............................... .. Doubting the Material World ...................................... .. TheBrainintheVat ........................................... .. TheEvilDemon ............................................. .. TheCogito ................................................ Answering the Skeptic . Disbelieving the sceptics without proving them wrong .............................. .. Moore’s paradox and pragmatic indefensibility ............................. .. Belief and disbelief ............................................ .. Pragmatic indefensibility ......................................... .. Disbelieving the skeptic without proving him wrong ........................... .. Meeting the skeptical challenge ..................................... . Epistemic normativity ............................................... .. Epistemic oughts are really mights .................................... .. Epistemic supererogation ......................................... .. Apriority as an evaluative notion ..................................... .. Against the contingent a priori ...................................... .. Epistemic subrogatives .......................................... . An Epistemology of Attitudes ........................................... .. Affective knowledge of values ....................................... .. Resisting counterevaluatives ....................................... Gendler .................................................. Make-believe in general ......................................... .. Intentional objects ............................................ .. The value of justification ......................................... .. Reactive epistemology .......................................... IV Chapter The Bases of Our Knowledge . Seeing Things .. “Epistemology” Theoretical philosophy aims to articulate a view of ourselves and the world that is systematic, comprehensive, beautiful and makes sense both of them and of our desire to understand them. Its most general articulation is within the ‘subdiscipline’ (if there is such a thing) of metaphysics, which asks questions about the natures and determinations of things, about the ontological categories into which they fall, their metaphysical status and their modalities. Metaphysics, so conceived, not only concerns the world as opposed to what we think about it, but also us as parts of that world and our relations to it, themselves a part of the world, connecting two worldly items. The philosophy of mind is more narrowly concerned with such relations, in particular their foundations ‘on our side’, as it were – mental phenomena, such as feelings, intentions, imaginings, suppositions, beliefs, desires – and with the nature of these relations, in particular the question whether they relate things that belong to the same or to different metaphysical categories. Among such relations between us and the world, we may distinguish two different ‘directions of fit’. Some mental phenomena, such as wishes, impose conditions on the world: I determine what wish you have by asking how the