UvA-DARE (Digital Academic Repository) Heritage under siege: military implementation of the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property Kila, J.D. Publication date 2012 Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Kila, J. D. (2012). Heritage under siege: military implementation of the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property. General rights It is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), other than for strictly personal, individual use, unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons). Disclaimer/Complaints regulations If you believe that digital publication of certain material infringes any of your rights or (privacy) interests, please let the Library know, stating your reasons. In case of a legitimate complaint, the Library will make the material inaccessible and/or remove it from the website. Please Ask the Library: https://uba.uva.nl/en/contact, or a letter to: Library of the University of Amsterdam, Secretariat, Singel 425, 1012 WP Amsterdam, The Netherlands. You will be contacted as soon as possible. UvA-DARE is a service provided by the library of the University of Amsterdam (https://dare.uva.nl) Download date:08 Oct 2021 Part II A description of developments during the research and current progressing views on Cultural Property Protection, publications by Joris Kila from 2008 to 2011. 67 1. 'The Role of NATO and Civil Military Affairs', in Lawrence Rothfield. (ed.), Antiquities under Siege, part II chapter 16. New York 2008. 68 07_736 Ch 16.qxd 12/5/07 3:09 PM Page 177 C H A P T E R 1 6 The Role of NATO and Civil Military Affairs JORIS D. KILA WORKING WITH THE MILITARY TO EFFECTIVELY PROTECT CULTURAL HERITAGE IS A challenge that takes on a distinctive form when one turns from the context of the United States to that of Europe, where many of the militaries’ rules, cus- toms, and organizational structures differ, and where the multinational nature of military activities creates distinctive opportunities—and poses distinctive dilemmas—for promoters of heritage protection. This article will focus on the intersection of cultural and military issues in Europe (including the EU) and the role of NATO (which includes the United States). I will focus on what has been done, what is being done now, and steps to be taken in the future. WHY SHOULD NATO DEAL WITH CULTURE? In theory, NATO would be the ideal organization to house and support a mil- itarized cultural emergency team. International treaties such as the 1954 Hague Convention and its protocols require that NATO and the EU bring in expertise concerning cultural heritage protection in times of armed conflict in their organizations. In the case of NATO, this task would fall naturally to the department of Civil Emergency Planning (CEP), in particular the Senior Civil Emergency Planning Commit- tee (SCEPC). Of course, there is also a related military intelligence element, es- pecially in the case of the illicit traffic of artifacts. In addition, NATO’s Allied Command Transformation (ACT)1 should include cultural heritage protec- tion in its program. 177 69 07_736 Ch 16.qxd 12/5/07 3:09 PM Page 178 Since many countries are members of NATO, the possibility of locating and recruiting militarized experts is potentially great. Furthermore, the NATO CIMIC (Civil Military Cooperation) AJP-9 doctrine seems designed to en- hance implementation of Cultural Affairs: responsibility for providing advice on cultural heritage issues to military planners and commanders of NATO forces lies with CIMIC/CA, where CA stands for Civil Affairs. In the field, the deployment of military cultural experts must be in support of the commander’s mission. This is based on NATO CIMIC doctrine AJP-9, wherein CIMIC (known in the United States and United Kingdom as Civil Af- fairs, or CA) is defined as: The co-ordination and co-operation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organisa- tions and agencies. The AJP-9 doctrine gives room for multiple interpretations. The phrase “in support of the Commander’s mission” could mean in the actual area of de- ployment of a battle group, e.g., Al Muthanna (Iraq), or in a wider context in support of the mission in a whole country, e.g., the NATO commander’s mis- sion in Afghanistan. It can be argued that cultural activities, including tourism and creation of national identity, are of benefit to the whole country, and should be protected. The NATO doctrine is useful as a reference since, al- though all the countries involved in Iraq and Afghanistan have vastly different military and civilian structures, they are mostly NATO members, including the United States, and therefore should comply with the doctrine. (For a more detailed look at NATO CIMIC doctrine, please see the related table in appen- dix D.) However, each of these approaches is problematic. A major problem with getting NATO2 involved in cultural heritage protection is the fact that mem- ber states such as France oppose the idea of creating and developing special ex- pertise aimed at reconstruction and stabilization processes during and after missions within NATO. Their main argument is that such expertise should be implemented by the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF)3, the EU’s first military ini- tiative.4 Therefore, initiatives not coming directly from member states are not discussed within NATO. However, the RRF is for now not equipped to handle such processes be- cause it has only been partially implemented and is not very active. If the RRF—or NATO, for that matter—were to take a more active role, there are two levels at which support could be provided—a tactical level and a strategic level. On the tactical level, projects such as improving the plumbing in a village could be undertaken by professional military personnel skilled at 178 JORISD . KILA 70 07_736 Ch 16.qxd 12/5/07 3:09 PM Page 179 such tasks. On the strategic level, as pertains to cultural heritage protection, ar- chaeologists, museums curators, librarians, and the like from civilian society should be militarized and form a multinational asset able to work with and within the military to aid in projects in which a more specialized skill set is needed and provide training in peacetime. In order to put matters on the map, member states must request as soon as possible the implementation of Cultural Affairs within NATO. In the mean- time, NATO should at least organize a special conference on the subject.5 PROBLEMS WITH FITTING CULTURAL HERITAGE PROTECTION INTO CIMIC/CA With respect to Cultural Affairs, the CIMIC doctrine has led to poor results in practice due to the following: a) It was written with more common public policy issues in mind, such as provid- ing humanitarian aid, repairing electricity and sewage systems, supplying drinking water, and addressing public health concerns. In general, militaries do not want to interfere in such activities for political and economic reasons. Specifically, the military does not want to be accused of spending tax money where it is not necessary. b) Militaries want neither to be falsely labeled as competing with civilian players, nor to be accused of devoting resources to objectives beyond the scope of their mission. The military does not consider knowledge and handling of cultural goods and environments to be part of its core business, and certainly not a priority. CLASH OF CULTURES In contrast with, for instance, the field of humanitarian emergency aid, there is not a large number of organizations active in the field of culture. In other words, the market situation in-theatre concerning Cultural Affairs differs from other branches when implementing CIMIC/CA activities. This is rele- vant since, in these other branches, many NGOs consider military involve- ment as competition. Furthermore, rumors have arisen that funds first allocated for NGOs are redirected to the military. This has been proven not to be the case with Cul- tural Affairs6 and is one of the rare advantages in the complex of matters to deal with. However, many policy- and decision-makers are not aware of this and governmental departments are also confused on this subject. One such rumor impacted the ability of a CIMIC museum team from the Dutch government to fulfill a request by the Iraqi government to travel to Bagh- dad for the purpose of assisting Iraqis in solving restoration and conservation problems such as saving the collection of the former museum of modern art, The Role of NATO and Civil Military Affairs 179 71 07_736 Ch 16.qxd 12/5/07 3:09 PM Page 180 restoring and preserving looted and damaged archives, and training in certain disciplines concerning issues related to museums, among others. The team’s trip was halted shortly before its planned departure because of interference by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The development aid section of this min- istry had raised questions to the military concerning fears that NGOs could re- gard the source and use of the funding for the trip as an apparent overlap in the purpose of the team’s trip and the missions of certain NGOs. In reality, there are only a few NGOs dealing with cultural heritage protection, and they sup- port the deployment of militarized experts. Furthermore, it seems very hard to make a distinction between cultural and humanitarian emergency aid and exactly what constitutes cultural emergency aid. For one, neither militaries, governments, nor NGOs are willing to make the distinction.