Chapter 12 Luis de Molina: The Metaphysics of Freedom Alexander Aichele Luis de Molina (1535–1600) has not just given the Society of Jesus its doctrine of grace and human freedom; unlike many other early Jesuit thinkers, he also features heavily in contemporary philosophical debates.1 For the most part, these debates center on his theory of middle knowledge (scientia media) by which God knows future contingents without determining them.2 Lying be- tween natural knowledge (naturalis) entailing all possibly true propositions, that is, every possible world, and free knowledge (libera), entailing every prop- osition that is actually true, that is, the actual world, middle knowledge en- sures both God’s foreknowledge and human freedom. As Molina holds radical indeterminism, middle knowledge is his main defense against deterministic arguments deeming human freedom illusionary, since man’s ignorance of fu- ture events does not preclude their necessity: consciousness of acting freely does not lead to indeterminateness of decision or future action. Based on the Concordia3 and the Commentary4 on the first part of Thomas Aquinas’s (1224/25–74) Summa theologiae, this chapter outlines the meta- physical and logical background to Molina’s concept of freedom, which cul- minated in his theory of middle knowledge. The first section of the chapter analyzes Molina’s interpretation of metaphysical modality. The second then treats freedom and the corresponding theory of causation, while the final part 1 On Molina’s life, work, and impact, see Friedrich Stegmüller, ed., Geschichte des Molinismus, i, Neue Molinaschriften (Münster: Aschendorff, 1935), esp. 1–80; Johannes Rabeneck, S.J., “De Ludovici Molina studiorum philosophiae curriculo,” Archivum historicum Societatis Iesu 6 (1937): 291–302; Frank B. Costello, S.J., The Political Philosophy of Luis de Molina, S.J. (1535– 1600) (Rome: Institutum Historicum Societatis Iesu, 1974); and, more recently, Alfred J. Fred- doso, “Molina. Luis de,” in The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Craig, vol. 6 (London: Routledge, 1998); https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/biographical/molina -luis-de-1535-1600/v-1 (accessed April 28, 2018). 2 See Ken Perszyk, ed., Molinism: The Contemporary Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 3 Luis de Molina, Liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, providentia, praedesti- natione et reprobatione concordia, ed. Johannes Rabeneck, S.J. [Concordia hereafter] (Oña: Sapientia, 1953). 4 Luis de Molina, Commentaria in primam Divi Thomae partem [Commentaria hereafter] (Ven- ice: Minima Societas, 1602). © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���9 | doi:�0.��63/97890043944�4_0�4 <UN> 298 Aichele of the chapter explains the necessity of Molina’s famous tripartition of God’s knowledge. 1 Modalities Contingency in general means being able to be or not to be. Metaphysically contingent things or states of affairs may exist or not or may obtain or not. Contingent propositions may be true or not or false or not. Contingency im- plies possibility and excludes necessity. Contingent existence depends on causes and contingent truth-values depend on reasons that have to be con- tingent in themselves. As Molina firmly holds to the Aristotelian concept of truth, according to which the truth or falsehood of a proposition depends on the being or not-being of its subject matter, such priority of being itself lays the focus on metaphysical modality. Since anything actual must be possible, we start with potentiality, simply taken as the metaphysical variant of possibility. 1.1 Potentiality As possibility consists in the absence of contradictory predicates, potentiality consists in the absence of contradictory qualities destroying the identity of any logical or metaphysical subject. In short, Molina adopts the classical analysis of possibility as consistency.5 Treating the issue of God’s omnipotence, however, Molina distinguishes two different meanings of being able to be: One way in relation to a potency, because there is a potency in particular by which it is able to be. The other way according to itself, because, just considered a particular nature in itself, nothing conflicts with its being among natural things whether there is a potency by which it is able to be or whether the main reason for its not being able to be is that there is no potency by which it is able to be.6 The second sense of potentiality is fundamental, since it defines being in general: All this is called being able to be in the second way, which, considered in itself, can be produced without generating contradiction and, what is 5 Molina, Commentaria, q. 9, a. 1, disp. 2, 68.ia. 6 Ibid., q. 25, a. 3, 330.ic/d. <UN>.