Moderator’s introduction to the workshop Since the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, Russia has been forced to abandon its traditional diplomatic strategy centering on European allies. Instead, it has to look east and actively promote a new Asia-Pacific strategy. Nevertheless, scholars at home and abroad have frequently questioned the continuity of Russia’s new strategy. From a historical point of view, one of the most fundamental problems in Russian state-building is the ideological swing caused by the geographical differences between the East and the West. Every seemingly accidental choice is underpinned by a profound historical tradition. Therefore, Russia’s path of state-building is unique in the development of world history and political science. Studying this issue is helpful to understand the direction of the development of the modern Russian state and the future development of Sino-Russian relations. At the workshop, Prof. Uyama Tomohiko and Associate Professor Alexander Morrison analyzed the Central Asia policy of the Russian Empire, stressing the strict control of Central Asia by the Russian Empire. As a result, the local forces and the people in Central Asia basically were obedient to the Czar in the mid and late 19th century. They did not have a special impact on the disintegration of the empire. The collapse of the central regime was the root of the disintegration of the Russian Empire. Prof. Zhang Guangxiang expounded on how the state built the economy by introducing the industrialization of Russia in the mid and late 19th century, saying the accumulation of Russian 1 capital and the promotion of industrialization were all achieved by the intervention of the state. Prof. Zhang Jianhua pointed out that “national identity” and “civic identity” is a concurrent, thorny question that goes in the same or opposite direction in the course of rapid political, economic, social and cultural transformation, giving examples of the ethnic policies of contemporary Russia. Associate Professor Dimitrii Andreev explained the institutional characteristics of Russian state-building through the development of bureaucracy in the “long 19th century” of the Russian Empire. Pang Dapeng and Zhao Huirong discussed the transformation of the contemporary Russian political system and the relationship between Russia and Europe. From the perspective of historical development, it is not accurate to identify Russia as a nation-state. Scholars at home and abroad now tend to call it an “empire.” For a country with a highly complex ethnic composition and constantly expanding geographical territory, there is no doubt that state-building occupied the first place in Russia’s history during the period of the Czar and the Soviet Union. It is exactly the aforementioned characteristics that lead to the complexity and difficulty in Russia’s state-building. An awareness of historical phenomena that shows the essence of Russian state-building is helpful to grasp Russia’s fundamental interests in diplomacy. This will help make reasonable predictions in foreign decision-making. International academic exchanges like the Broadyard Workshop (博雅工作坊) provide the public with a channel to understand Russia comprehensively and truly. They also help support the development of a Chinese national 2 strategy, and contribute to the development of the intellectual power of China’s domestic academia. Zhuang Yu September 10, 2019 3 The 21st Broadyard Workshop Russia’s Choices in its Approach to ‘State-Building’ September 5, 2019 The 21st Broadyard Workshop is led by Zhuang Yu, associate professor at the Department of History of Peking University, and participated by experts and scholars from well-known universities and research institutions at home and abroad, including Moscow State University, Oxford University, Hokkaido University of Japan, Beijing Normal University, Jilin University, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Focusing on the multi-dimensional research methods and perspectives in this field, they had an in-depth discussion on the important issue of Russia’s state-building path. Qian Chengdan, director of the Institute of Area Studies, Peking University (PKUIAS), extended a warm welcome to experts and scholars from various countries as well as teachers and students attending the workshop. He pointed out that choosing “Russia’s Choices in its Approach to ‘State-Building’” as the theme of the first workshop of the new semester was significant. Russia is an important great power and a near neighbor, sharing a long border with China. Issues related to Russia have attracted close attention of academia, and are of great research value. PKUIAS frequently holds thematic workshops on specific countries and regions, inviting experts and scholars from all over the world. Such international platforms aim to promote mutual exchanges and understanding among scholars. An emerging international dialogue is the main driving force to enhance area studies. This workshop gathers 4 scholars from well-known universities and research institutions in Russia, the UK and Japan. It is hoped that these guests will often come for events, and put forward valuable suggestions for PKUIAS. Uyama Tomohiko, a professor of Central Eurasian studies with Slavic-Eurasian Research Center, Hokkaido University, gave the first presentation, entitled “The Russian Empire’s Attitudes Toward Its Non-Russian Subjects: Between Particularism and Russian Nationalism.” There have long been different views in academia on the attitude of the Russian imperial policy toward non-Russian subjects. Some people call the empire a “prison of nations,” while others think that Russia was more racially and ethnically tolerant than other European empires. Uyama Tomohiko opposed the latter view, which dominates the historical discourse in today’s Russia, and pointed out that Russia’s Orientalistic and discriminative attitudes toward non-Europeans is in many ways as common as in other European empires. Moreover, there is another problem in both the “tolerant empire” and the “prison of nations” theory. Both tend to regard Russia’s policy toward non-Russians as basically consistent throughout the imperial period and all peoples. However, Russian policy changed greatly over time and there are stark differences in policies toward different peoples. First, policies were formulated by the Russian empire depending on circumstances of incorporation of given peoples and subsequent situations with them. Roughly speaking, those peoples who were annexed to the Russian Empire by the early 5 19th century and were seen as more or less developed, with the exception of Jews, were incorporated into the same soslovie (estate) system as the Russians and had nearly the same rights and obligations. Aristocrats of these peoples, most notably Poles, Baltic Germans, Tatars and Georgians, formed part of the imperial elite. Some of them converted to Russian Orthodoxy and were assimilated to the Russian nobility, while many others became pillars of imperial rule in their own regions. In contrast, peoples who were seen underdeveloped, including among others indigenous peoples of Siberia, were grouped together as inorodtsy (people of different descent), a category outside the normal soslovie system, The Kazakhs, Kalmyks, Nogais, and later annexed peoples of Turkestan were also given the status of inorodtsy, who were considered to need special treatments because of their backwardness and peculiar modes of life such as nomadic, pastoralism, hunting and gathering. Imperial authorities exempted them from military conscription, partially preserved their customary law, and adapted tax systems to local conditions. Russian policy toward inorodtsy was thus protectionist and paternalist, but at the same time was discriminatory. Notables from among inorodtsy often played important roles in establishing Russian rule in their regions but were not incorporated into the Russian nobility with some exceptions, and their privileges were reduced over time. It is important to keep in mind that the Russians were not always in an absolutely dominant position. The empire’s control of ethnic relations was largely flexible and depended on the power of the local people. The Germans in the Baltic region and 6 the Poles in Ukraine and Belarus were dominant in land ownership and cultural terms, and the Tatars had a relatively strong influence in the Volga-Ural region. The imperial power manipulated interethnic relations, sometimes using dominant peoples’ influences in regional governance, and sometimes pretended to protect weaker peoples to constrain stronger ones. Policy of constraint became particularly visible from the mid-19th century, with the independence-aspiring Poles as the main target of repression. The Jews were also perceived as a threat, and in 1835 they were put into the category of inorodtsy, which in this case meant only discrimination, not protection. Second, regional differences were important in administration of both major peoples and inorodtsy. The principles of regional administration were stipulated by the basic law of 1775, but not all of them were applied to the peripheries, and special statutes were enacted for the Caucasus, Turkestan, the Steppe Region, etc. There were also special statutes for some ethnic groups. Thus, the Bashkirs were governed by the statute about the Bashkirs, and the Kalmyks and the Kazakhs of the Inner Horde (Astrakhan province) were governed by special clauses. Cossacks and migrants were governed by still different rules,