Continuity and Change in the Foreign Policies of the Mbeki and Zuma Governments There is a commonly held view in foreign Introduction policy analysis circles that in the transition from the Mandela to the Mbeki government, Paradoxical though it may sound, the foreign continuity was the order of the day, policy of South Africa, like that of all other while from Mbeki to Zuma it purportedly states, is a story essentially of both continuity suggested change. Was this the case? We and change. In political and foreign policy anal- are interested in establishing whether ysis, change and continuity depend on several Mbeki introduced important nuances, explanatory factors, including institutional, refinements and changes in foreign policy environmental and personality dynamics.1 that might reveal some discontinuities, Here should be added aspects such as routines and whether the foreign policy directions in decision making, beliefs, socialisation, and and strategies of the Zuma presidency human and financial resources, which all have resembled a fundamental break from those a bearing on whether a government’s foreign pursued by Mbeki. In terms of the latter, policy is the product of continuity or a subject 2 the leadership tensions in the African of change. Let us remember that it is in the na- National Congress (ANC) which brought ture of governments, especially bureaucracies, about the Zuma presidency were said to not to favour change over continuity. South be accompanied by changes in policy. African foreign policy theorist Costa Georghiou Could it be that this rupture in the ruling argues that ‘persistence and change coexist uneasily, and it is this mixture that makes ANC and the government was ironically the future so uncertain. The twin forces of characterised by policy continuities? integration and disintegration, continuity and change, creates a mood of both confidence and disorientation in international politics’.3 In this article we seek to understand the paradox inherent in South Africa’s foreign Chris Landsberg policy by examining its avowed macro-agendas within a world increasingly realigning itself Chris Landsberg is Professor of International in powerful economic groupings. It is given as Relations at the University of Johannesburg. read that statements made by policymakers © Africa Institute of South Africa AFRICA INSIGHT Vol 41 (4) – March 2012 1 Continuity and Change in the Foreign Policies of the Mbeki and Zuma Governments | Chris Landsberg Continuity and Change in the Foreign Policies of the Mbeki and Zuma Governments | Chris Landsberg may assume different forms when delivered to more strategic. He came to advance the course Eradicating poverty, unemployment and in- it, ‘the regeneration of Africa is the main pillar different audiences – for instance for the con- of a highly ambitious transformational and de- equality were not merely ends in their own right of South Africa’s foreign policy objectives. It is sumption of domestic voters or for the global velopmental foreign policy programme and, in – they were also means to boosting the econo- central to ensuring a better life for all in South media – yet it is precisely this schizophrenia, many respects, he modified and refined many my in a cyclical process that Mbeki championed Africa and on the continent’.9 The fact that in the legacy of decades of hounding by a vehe- of the foreign policy directives of the Mandela under the rubric of a ‘developmental state’. In 2008 South Africa had diplomatic relations mently critical world, that has informed the government, of which he was a key member. his modernisation project, emphasis was con- with 47 of the continent’s states, compared to new Republic’s political discourse over the last Where Mandela’s government had spoken stantly placed on creating a macro-economic just one at the height of apartheid, was testi- 12 years or so. of domestic and continental African interests environment that could boost growth and cre- mony to its ‘Africa first’ policy. This policy article tests the commonly held and of ‘universality’, Mbeki would seek, some- ate opportunities for sharing it. Domestic and The Mbeki administration endeavoured view that, in the transition from the Mandela what ambitiously perhaps, to put these words foreign policy was informed by his understand- to remain faithful to the idea of never going to the Mbeki government, continuity was the into actual policy. He would come to herald ing that South Africa was characterised by a it alone in Africa, but preferred to build stra- order of the day, while from Mbeki to Zuma it the Republic as an ‘active agent of progres- context of ‘Two Nations’ and ‘Two Economies’. tegic partnerships as it sought to consolidate purportedly suggested change. We are inter- sive change’4 as he pursued a foreign policy of One was largely poor and black, living mainly its agenda. As Mbeki engaged Africans as ested in establishing whether Mbeki introduced redress and development. He was determined in conditions of poverty and ranked around 135 partners, he shunned hegemonic ambitions. important nuances, refinements and changes to see South Africa become a pivotal state on on the Human Development Index. The other Therefore, while many commentators over- in foreign policy that might reveal some discon- the continent, as a reliable global player follow- was largely wealthy and white, and ranked stated Pretoria’s leverage and labelled it a ‘he- tinuities, and whether the foreign policy direc- ing a predictable foreign policy in pursuit of a around 28th. gemon’ demanding leadership and dominance, tions and strategies of the Zuma presidency progressive agenda. To do this he would come These two economies, belonging to both the Pretoria-Tshwane chose the part of partnership resembled a fundamental break from those to rely heavily on negotiations, diplomacy and developed global ‘First World’ and developing and equality with African states. pursued by Mbeki. In terms of the latter, we what became known as ‘soft power’. ‘Third World’, led the Mbeki government to Mbeki advocated a New Partnership for consider whether the leadership tensions in the Mandela had struggled to articulate an identify six broad strategic goals that domes- Africa’s Development (NEPAD), a modernisa- ANC which brought about the Zuma presidency effective national interest paradigm and set- tic and foreign policy should have in order to tion and pro-growth plan aimed at soliciting were accompanied by changes in policy, or tled for a foreign policy that sought in part to narrow the gap: eradicating poverty; reducing Western investment, aid, market access and whether this rupture was ironically character- realise the goals of the Reconstruction and unemployment and creating jobs; fighting assistance for Africa’s development and peace ised by policy continuities. More interestingly, Development Programme (RDP), notably job crime; building the capacity of state; bringing operations, in exchange for Africans holding we consider whether stated policy by the Zuma creation, addressing inequalities and accelerat- about a better Africa; and bringing about a bet- themselves accountable politically and eco- government was in line with practice followed ing economic growth. Mbeki however thought ter world. The last two aims reveal explicitly a nomically. If Mbeki’s much vaunted ‘African or whether there were deviations. he could realise his predecessor’s wish to in- line of thinking also evident in a 2005 strategic Renaissance’ served the purpose of the vision, fuse into foreign policy the notion of national Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) document then NEPAD became the policy strategy to interest. To do so, he set out to use domestic – that ‘the context of South Africa’s foreign realise that vision. NEPAD was a modernisa- 1999–2008: Mbeki’s Change sources for foreign policy and address the di- policy is firmly rooted in Africa and the South, tion and reconstruction programme aimed at trumping Continuity chotomy of the country’s domestic and interna- and its national interest is, therefore, defined in stimulating Africa’s development after decades tionalist roles by anchoring foreign relations, in terms of achieving the challenges of the second of failures that were the legacies of colonial- On the face of it, Thabo Mbeki’s vision was the eyes of voters at least, on domestic goals. A economy’7. ism, as well as the Cold War, bad governance, more internationalist than that of Nelson strategic 2005 foreign affairs document stated As part of a new ‘continentalism’, Mbeki unsound economic policies and management, Mandela, perhaps reflecting his exposure to that ‘domestic priorities guide the Department’s sought to influence the inter-African system, and destructive conflicts.10 It was a strategy of international affairs during the ANC’s decades policies and underpin its activities’.5 It further not in the direction of supra-nationalism or engagement which promoted intra- and extra- in exile, including his years attending univer- stated that ‘South Africa’s interaction with explicit federalism, but towards functional- African partnerships. sity in England and political training in Russia. the international community must necessar- ism and a rules-based continental order – if Major achievements in the African strat- Certainly, when he replaced Mandela as presi- ily reflect its national imperatives, including anything, a kind of confederalism or loose egy came through multilateralism: the re- dent in June 1999, the impetus of his diplomacy