Self-deception within the predictive coding framework Iuliia Pliushch Mainz 2016 Table of contents Table of contents __________________________________________________ ii List of figures ____________________________________________________ iv List of tables _____________________________________________________ v Introduction ______________________________________________________ 1 1 Review: Desiderata for the concept of self-deception _________________ 4 1.1 Motivation debate: intentionalists vs. deflationary positions __________ 5 1.1.1 Intentionalist positions ________________________________________________ 5 1.1.2 Deflationary positions _______________________________________________ 24 1.1.3 Constraints on a satisfactory theory of self-deception ______________________ 51 1.2 “Product” or kind of misrepresentation debate ____________________ 62 1.2.1 Belief (Van Leeuwen) vs. avowal (Audi) ________________________________ 66 1.2.2 Belief decomposed: regarding-as-true-stances (Funkhouser) and degrees of belief (Lynch, Porcher) ___________________________________________________________ 69 1.2.3 Dispositionalism (Bach, Schwitzgebel) vs. constructivism (Michel) __________ 73 1.2.4 Pretense (Gendler) __________________________________________________ 76 1.2.5 Emotional micro-takings (Borge) ______________________________________ 78 1.2.6 Self-deceptive process: belief formation or narrative construction? ___________ 82 1.2.7 Non-doxastic conception of self-deception _______________________________ 88 1.3 Classic psychological experiments testing self-deception _____________ 96 1.3.1 Questionnaires testing self-deception: SDQ (Gur & Sackeim) and BIDR (Paulhus) 97 1.3.2 Two classic testing paradigms ________________________________________ 106 1.3.3 Does motivation influence quantity or quality of processing? _______________ 113 1.3.4 Inference from the subpersonal to the personal level ______________________ 116 2 Self-deception – goal-directed subpersonal hypothesis testing ________ 122 2.1 Simplifying an explanandum for a theory of self-deception _________ 122 2.1.1 Role of intuitions for explanations of self-deception ______________________ 123 2.1.2 Explanandum: behavior and phenomenology ____________________________ 127 2.1.3 Tension as an epistemic feeling with an indicator function _________________ 136 2.2 The building blocks: Motivation? Process? Product? ______________ 147 2.2.1 Motivation: goal representations ______________________________________ 150 2.2.2 Process: subpersonal hypothesis-testing ________________________________ 161 2.2.3 Properties of self-deceptive misrepresentations __________________________ 175 3 Functions of self-deception ___________________________________ 182 3.1 Non-evolutionary theories of self-deception ______________________ 183 3.1.1 Cognitive dissonance _______________________________________________ 184 3.1.2 Stability of the self-concept __________________________________________ 190 3.1.3 Self-esteem – a central feature of the self-concept ________________________ 198 3.1.4 Terror-management theory __________________________________________ 211 3.2 Evolutionary theories of self-deception __________________________ 218 3.2.1 Constraints on the validity of an evolutionary psychological explanation _____ 219 3.2.2 Trivers’ evolutionary theory of self-deception ___________________________ 225 3.2.3 Criticism of Trivers’ evolutionary theory of self-deception _________________ 250 3.3 Comparison of the adaptation, byproduct and exaptation explanations 261 4 Modelling self-deception ______________________________________ 265 4.1 Connectionist models _________________________________________ 266 4.2 FTL model: Error minimization account ________________________ 272 4.3 Types of Bayesian explanations and their implications _____________ 277 4.4 Conceptual tools extracted from the predictive coding approach _____ 287 4.5 Application of conceptual tools extracted from predictive coding to self- deception _________________________________________________________ 312 5 Conclusion _________________________________________________ 331 6 References _________________________________________________ 333 I would very much like to thank both my supervisors for their impeccable guidance and the Barbara-Wengeler foundation for more than generous financial support, without which this work might not have seen the light of day. List of figures Figure 1. Bermúdez: types of self-deceptive intentions. ....................................................................................... 17 Figure 2. Talbott: characterization of divisionist approaches to self-deception ................................................. 19 Figure 3. Talbott: Defining assumptions for an ideally coherent self ................................................................. 21 Figure 4. Talbott: biased mechanism for selecting hypotheses ........................................................................... 22 Figure 5. Different kinds of motivation ................................................................................................................. 56 Figure 6. Schwitzgebel: phenomenological, dispositional account of belief ....................................................... 74 Figure 7. Drayson: kinds of explanations ............................................................................................................ 119 Figure 8. Phenomenology of SD. ......................................................................................................................... 134 Figure 9. Ingredients of a personal level explanation of self-deception. .......................................................... 149 Figure 10. Andersen: processes determining knowledge use. ........................................................................... 153 Figure 11. Balcetis: influence of motivation on cognition. ................................................................................ 163 Figure 12. Balcetis: limitation criteria for SD. .................................................................................................... 163 Figure 13. Price & Norman: multidimensional space of mental processes ...................................................... 167 Figure 14. Cognitive dissonance paradigm ......................................................................................................... 188 Figure 15. Scott-Kakures: sources of cognitive dissonance ................................................................................ 189 Figure 16. Taylor: information division .............................................................................................................. 201 Figure 17. Sedikides: kinds of self-evaluation motivation .................................................................................. 206 Figure 18. Kinds of self-esteem ............................................................................................................................ 211 Figure 19. The notion of a module. ..................................................................................................................... 220 Figure 20. Kinds of environmental constraints .................................................................................................. 222 Figure 21. Trivers: self-driven and imposed self-deception ............................................................................... 227 Figure 22. Trivers: categories of self-deception. .................................................................................................. 229 Figure 23. Trivers: detection-deception circle ..................................................................................................... 233 Figure 24. Byrne & Kurland: Simplest Non-Trivial Modular Mind. ................................................................ 238 Figure 25. Von Hippel & Trivers: Information processing biases. ................................................................... 246 Figure 26. Van Leeuwen: categorization of self-deception. ............................................................................... 253 Figure 27. Van Leeuwen: Essential features and they function in practical rationality .................................. 255 Figure 28. Van Leeuwen: Facilitators of self-deception...................................................................................... 256 Figure 29. Friedrich: How motivation could influence hypothesis testing. ..................................................... 273 Figure 30. Trope & Liberman: hypothesis testing model .................................................................................. 275 Figure 31. Carhart-Harris & Friston: Relationship between DMN, Attention and Sensory areas. ............... 308 Figure 32. Phenomenology of the self-deceiver .................................................................................................. 316 Figure 33. Relationships between phenomenal models. .................................................................................... 318 List of tables Table 1. Hypothetical examples of self-deception .................................................................................................. 3 Table 2. Davidson: weakness of the warrant vs. weakness of the will. ................................................................ 8 Table 3. Davidson: self-deception vs. wishful thinking. .......................................................................................