CHAPTER THREE The Chinese American Community Chinese Americans have made essential contributions to almost e very aspect of American life for over a c entury. They form a vital strand in the social fabric of the United States. At the same time, however, Beijing views Chinese Americans as members of a worldwide Chinese diaspora that, what ever the actual citizenship of individuals may be, presumes them to retain not only an interest in the welfare of China but also a loosely defined cultural, and even po liti cal, allegiance to the so- called Motherland ( ). Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, diaspora Chinese have 祖国 been called on to help achieve the rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation— a summons that places growing pressure on ethnic Chinese around the world to serve the “China Dream” ( ). While many overseas Chinese 中国梦 do feel pride in China as a country, Beijing’s demands that they actually serve China can put them in a difficult position. Under both the Nationalist and Communist parties, overseas Chi- nese have played an impor tant role in modern Chinese politics as well as in China’s relations with the outside world. Diaspora communities world- wide have been key sources of legitimacy and support for what ever gov- ernment held power in Beijing, but just as often they have been centers of antigovernment agitation. With PRC influence- seeking activities now This is an uncorrected proof. Changes may occur before publication. expanding, China’s long- standing focus on diaspora communities has also intensified to become an impor tant ele ment in overall US- China relations. Such trends demand not only greater societal attention and —-1 —0 —+1 Copyright © 2019 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved. 523-78801_ch01_1P.indd 39 3/25/19 2:56 PM 40 Chapter 3 understanding but also an appropriate response from the US government as well as nongovernmental institutions. As the Chinese Communist Party seeks to encourage, even entice, ethnic- Chinese communities and individuals overseas to more fully sup- port its interests, Chinese Americans in the United States and ethnic Chinese in other free socie ties need to better inform themselves as to the nature of this dynamic, and our governmental institutions may need to do more to defend their freedoms against harmfully intrusive and coercive activities. At the same time, it is essential that we not allow over- seas Chinese as an ethnic group to fall under any kind indiscriminate cloud of suspicion. Above all, it is impor tant to bear in mind that while ethnic Chinese can be quite naturally expected to take an interest in things Chinese, it is the Chinese Communist Party that puts a target on their backs through its presumption that they are all somehow the “sons and daughters of the Yellow Emperor” ( ) and thus owe some 炎黄子孙 mea sure of loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party. Origins and Structure From the 1950s to the 1970s, when the United States maintained an alli- ance with the regime of Chiang Kai- shek on Taiwan, pro- PRC organ- izations faced challenges gaining traction in the United States. During the 1950s, the FBI, aided by pro- Kuomintang security organ izations, closely monitored their activities and participants. This antagonistic state of affairs began to change after President Nixon’s historic trip to China in 1972.1 On February 24, 1973, more than forty Chinese on the East Coast, most of them immigrants from Taiwan, established the Wash- ington Association to Promote China Unification to help advocate for Beijing’s official positions. One of the found ers was a professor at the University of Mary land who was actively involved in organ izations that already supported China’s position on Taiwan and Tibet.2 However, a This is an uncorrected proof. Changes may occur before publication. more beneficial contribution came in the form of advancing US- China scientific, educational, and cultural exchanges that began to be promoted -1— by a growing number of preeminent Chinese American scientists, engi- 0— neers, and academics who were also advising the Chinese government +1— Copyright © 2019 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved. 523-78801_ch01_1P.indd 40 3/25/19 2:56 PM The Chinese American Community 41 to launch reforms in science and education. These Chinese Americans were also personally helping them establish vari ous programs to bring thousands of talented Chinese students to American institutions of learning. Recognizing the achievements, influence, and growth of the Chinese diaspora, Beijing undertook a systematic program designed to target and exploit overseas Chinese communities as a means of furthering its own po liti cal, economic, and security interests. The Beijing government used specialized bureaucracies to manage what it called “united front” activi- ties abroad. Organ izations such as the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, the Communist Party Central Committee’s United Front Work Depart- ment,3 and the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office led the charge. Almost all of t hese agencies have established nongovernmental fronts overseas, including the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification, the China Overseas Exchange Association, and the China Overseas Friendship Association.4 Other united front organ- izations, such as the Chinese Enterprise Association and other Chinese chambers of commerce, are almost always linked both to the United Front Work Department and to the Ministry of Commerce. Following the violent crackdown on the prodemocracy movement in Beijing on June 4, 1989, the Chinese Communist Party redoubled its efforts to reach out to overseas Chinese. Many members of t hese com- munities had supported the student democracy movement, providing funds and safe havens for fleeing dissidents. But se nior Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping was not dissuaded. In 1989, and again in 1993, he spoke of the “unique opportunity” overseas Chinese offered the PRC. Deng insisted that by drawing on their help, China could break out of inter- national isolation and improve its international po liti cal standing. Gain- ing influence over overseas Chinese groups in order to “turn them into propaganda bases for China” became an impor tant task of overseas Chi- nese united front work.5 This is an uncorrected proof. Changes may occur before publication. In China, all of the organ izations involved in outreach to the over- seas Chinese community are led by se nior members of the Chinese Communist Party. Party officials run the China Overseas Friendship —-1 Association and the China Council to Promote Peaceful Reunification. —0 —+1 Copyright © 2019 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved. 523-78801_ch01_1P.indd 41 3/25/19 2:56 PM 42 Chapter 3 The head of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, Qiu Yuanping, also leads the China Overseas Exchange Association. Qiu has a career back- ground with the Party’s International Liaison Department. The presi- dent of the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful Reunification is none other than Yu Zhengsheng, the former chairman of the Chinese People’s Po liti cal Consultative Conference and a former member of the Standing Committee of the Po liti cal Bureau of the Communist Party’s Central Committee.6 Goals and Methods The key goal of the party’s united front work with overseas Chinese is to gain support for the Communist Party’s efforts to modernize the country by convincing members of overseas Chinese communities that the party is the sole representative of China. A second goal is to isolate competing forces that the party perceives to be adversarial, or even hos- tile. For example, as part of a massive campaign to monitor, control, and even intimidate China’s ethnic minorities (no matter where in the world they are), Chinese authorities are creating a global registry of Uighurs who live outside of China. Chinese authorities threaten to detain Uighur relatives who remain in China if they do not provide personal informa- tion about their relatives living abroad to the Chinese police. This cam- paign has particularly targeted Uighurs living in Germany but is now reaching Uighurs in the United States as well.7 Uighurs are not alone; Tibetan exiles living in the United States have long reported similar campaigns against members of their families and community. Chinese security officials have even been known to travel to Amer i ca on tourist visas to exert pressure on Chinese dissidents living here.8 FBI agents have contacted prominent Chinese exiles in the United States offering them protection from Chinese agents who might travel to the United States to menace them.9 This is an uncorrected proof. Changes may occur before publication. For most Chinese Americans, however, China’s efforts to influence them are far more anodyne. The official description of the Overseas Chi- -1— nese Affairs Office (OCAO) states its purpose as: “to enhance unity and 0— friendship in overseas Chinese communities; to maintain contact with +1— Copyright © 2019 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University. All rights reserved. 523-78801_ch01_1P.indd 42 3/25/19 2:56 PM The Chinese American Community 43 and support overseas Chinese media and Chinese language schools; [and] to increase cooperation and exchanges between overseas Chinese and China related to the economy, science, culture and education.” Over the past three de cades, the OCAO has dispatched former reporters and edi- tors