THE PARADOX OF CHANGING UNITED STATES-NIGERIAN RELATIONS SINCE NIGERIAN INDEPENDENCE: A DECISION-MAKING EXPLANATION OF 11 LAG 11 IN UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD NIGERIA By EZEKIEL D. OKOYA It Bachelor of Arts Oklahoma City University Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 1976 Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate College of the Oklahoma State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of t~ASTER OF ARTS May, 1979 THE PARADOX OF CHANGING UNITED STATES-NIGERIAN RELATIONS SINCE NIGERIAN INDEPENDENCE: A DECISION-MAKING EXPLANATION OF "LAG" IN UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD NIGERIA Thesis Approved: cr~o · ~ Dean of the Graduate College 1029446 ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I wish to express my thanks to all who have assisted me in the completion of this study. I am deeply grateful for the encouragement and guidance which was given to me by Dr. James J. Lawler, chairperson of my thesis committee. I also appreciate the many constructive sug­ gestions offered by the other committee members: Dr. Raymond Habiby and Dr. Franz von Sauer. I also wish to acknowledge. my parents who, through their support and encouragement, made my education possible. I accept full responsibility for any.limitations or errors in the thesis. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page I. INTRODUCTION 1 Rationale For A Decision-Making Approach .. 4 The Paradigm. 6 II. THE ERA OF GOOD FEELING, 1960 TO 1967 .....• 12 Decision-Makers: Institutions and Incumbents . 13 Institutional Developments. .•. 13 Idiosyncratic Variables .. 20 Demands . 27 Functional Requisites ... 33 Capabilities ....... 40 Characteristics of Nigeria. 43 III. DETERIORATING RELATIONS, 1967 TO 1970 .... 46 Decision-Makers .... 48 Institutional Variables . 48 Idiosyncratic Variables . 50 Demands . 55 Functional Requisites .. 57 Capabilities ..... 59 Perceived Characteristics of Nigeria .. 61 IV. UNFRIENDLY RELATIONS, 1970 TO 1976 64 Decision-Makers ........ 66 Institutions ..... 66 Idiosyncratic Variables . 70 Demands . ; . 74 Functional Requisites .. 77 Capabilities ..... 83 Characteristics of Nigeria. 86 iv Chapter Page V. RESTORATION OF FRIENDLY RELATIONS: APRIL, 1976 TO SEPTEMBER, 1978 . .... 90 Decision-Makers. 91 Institutions ..... 92 Idiosyncratic Variables .. 94 Demands .. · ....... 101 Functional Requisites .. 104 Capabilities ........... 106 Perceived Characteristics of Nigeria • 109 VI. CONCLUSIONS ............... 113 Institutions: Structure and Consensus ..... 113 Idiosyncratic Variables ...... 115 Demands. 117 Functional Requisites ............... 118 Capabilities .........•.... 119 Perceived Characteristics of Nigeria •....... 121 The Decision-Making Paradigm: Strengths and Limitations. ... 122 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY. 124 v CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION Since Nigeria became independent in 1960, her importance to the United States as a supplier of petroleum has rapidly increased and the two countries have become increasingly interdependent in terms of trade and investment. 1 Yet foreign relations between the two countries have shown no corresponding pattern of steady improvement. Indeed, dur- ing the decade from 1967 to 1976 relations between Nigeria and the United States seriously deteriorated. In 1967, the United States antagonized the Federal Military Gov- ernment of Nigeria by denying Nigeria's request to buy arms from United States manufacturerswhile antagonizing Biafra by withholding recogrii­ tion.2 Nigeria produced approxi~ately 115.7 million barrels of oil in 1967 vaTued at $215.6 million. 3 Nigeria ranked sixteenth among world producers. 4 At the time of the Arab oil embargo of 1973-1974, Nigeria . l See Scot R. Pearson and Sandra C. Pearson, 11 0i 1 Boom Reshapes Nigeria's Future, .. Africa Report, Vol. 16 (February, 1971), pp. 14-17; Jean Herskovits, .. Nigeria: Africa's Emerging New Power, .. Saturday Re­ view: World (February 9, 1974), pp. 14-17; 11 Wooing of Nigeria, .. United States News and World Report, Vol. 83 (December 5, 1977), pp. 67-70. 2oye Ogunbadejo, ''Nigeria and the Great Powers: The Impact of the Civil War on Nigerian Foreign Relations, .. African Affairs, Vol. 75 (January, 1976), p. 18. 3Pearson and Pearson, p. 15. 4worl d Oi 1, Houston: Petroleum Industry Research Foundation, Inc. (August 15, 1968), pp. 187-188. 1 2 had become the second largest supplier of crude oil to the United States--a position which Nigeria has retained ever since.5 Nigeria was then, as it was in 1976, the sixth major world petroleum producing nation6 and a member of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (O.P.E.C.). Nigeria•s total production exceeded 823 million barrels in 1974. 7 Nevertheless, the Nixon administration aroused unfavorable comments in the Nigerian press in October, 1973, by cancelling a sche­ duled meeting between President Nixon and General Gowan, the Head of State and Supreme Commander of Nigeria during the latter•s visit to the United Nations. 8 Herskovits commented, 11 Fortunately Gowan is not easily piqued; otherwise, Nixon might be asking us to lower our thermostats even further. 119 The United States - Nigerian relations reached their nadir in 1976. President Ford•s letter to African leaders asking them to call for withdrawal of Cubans and Russians from Angola drew an angry re­ sponse from the Nigerian head of government, General Murtala Muhammed, who accused the United States of 11 armtwisting 11 • 10 Attacks by demon­ strators upon the United States Embassy in Lagos--in January, 1976, and again after the assassination of General Muhammed, in February, 5Herskovits, 11 Nigeria: Africa•s Emerging New Power, .. p. 17. 6united Nations Monthly Bulletin of Statistics (New York: United Nations, July, 1977}, p. 38. 7united States Bureau of Mines, Mineral Yearbook, Vol. III (1975), p. 683. 8African Diary, Vol. 13 (October 15-21, 1973), p. 6674. 9Herskovits, p. 17. 1011 Nigeria, .. Africa Contemporary Record (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1976), p. 799. 3 1976--reflected anti-American sentiment in Nigeria, as did the cancel­ lation by the Nigerian government of Secretary of State Kissinger•s scheduled visit to Nigeria in April, 1976. 11 These events occurred at a time when Nigerian petroleum comprised 14 percent of petroleum im­ ports to the United States, second only to Saudi Arabia. 12 By 1974, Nigeria had overtaken and surpassed South Africa,, as the leading African trading partner of the United States. 13 Nigeria•s crude has economic advantage: a sulfur content which is only 0.1 percent, compared ~ith 0.2 percent and 1.7 percent for Libyan and Saudi Arabian oil, respec­ tively;14 and lower transportation costs than oil from the Arabian Peninsula. The availability of Nigerian oil 1973-1974 demonstrated its advantages as another source to Middle Eastern sources. Yet only during the Carter administration have relations between the countries shown any signs of marked improvement. 15 The objective of this study is to identify major factors in policy- making which contributed to deteriorating relations between Nigeria and the United States during a period of increasing economic interde­ pendence, and to improved relations during the Carter administration. A decision-making paradigm will be used to analyze the effects of non- 11 Ibid. 12sandy Feustel, 11 Leadership in Africa, .. Africa Report (May-June, 19 77) ' p . 48 . 13Bruce Oudes, 11 The United States• Year in Africa, .. Africa Contem­ porary Record (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1975), p. 87. 14Petroleum Press Service, Vol. 40, No. 10 (October, 1973), p. 365. 15 Feustel, p. 48. 4 economic variables upon United States policy decisions concerning Nige- ria. The thesis will be advanced that changes in the characteristics of the decision-makers, as well as changes in the domestic and inter­ national constraints upon the decision-making process, have facilitated a 11 re-definition of the situation 11 in United States• policy toward Africa; and that this in turn, has contributed to a policy toward Nigeria which is more congruent with economic relations of the two countries. Rationale for a Decision-Making Approach It is submitted that a decision-making approach offers advantages in the an~lysis of the erratic course of United States policy toward Nigeria. The 11 Realist 11 approaches of Morgenthau and others are useful in identifying discrepancies between foreign policy and national inter- est, but are of little help in explaining why those discrepancies exist. 16 Morgenthau diagnoses of such discrepancies in terms of defi­ ciencies in the 11 quality of democracy .. , undue influence of public opin­ ion upon foreign policy and/or excessive legalistic-moralistic attach­ ments are not only vague, impressionistic and difficult to operational- ize; but also beg the question why such deficiencies exists at any given time. 17 President Carter•s foreign policy hardly seems less legalistic or moralistic than that of the Ford, Nixon and Johnson ad- 16For expositions of realism, see Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 4th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), P'. 3-14; Kenneth W. Thompson, Political Realism and the Crisis of World Politics: An American Ap~roach to Foreign Pol icz (Princeton: University Press, 1960), pp. 3-25. .·. 17 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 12-13. 5 ministrations, nor does he appear to be less influenced by public opinion than they. Yet United States policy toward Nigeria seems to have improved during his administration. Determining the 11 national interest .. in pursuing a particular policy is a complex task. Charles Binton Marshall observes that 11 there are many national