The Behavior Analyst 1986, 9, 175-190 No. 2 (Fall) Mentalism, Behavior-Behavior Relations, and a Behavior-Analytic View of the Purposes of Science Steven C. Hayes Aaron J. Brownstein University of Nevada-Reno University of North Carolina at Greensboro In a behavioral view, the purposes of science are primarily prediction and control. To the extent that a scientist embraces both of these as a unified and generally applicable criterion for science, certain phil- osophical and theoretical practices are counterproductive, including mentalism in both its metaphysical and metatheoretical forms. It is possible and often worthwhile to recast some mentalistic talk into an issue ofbehavior-behavior relations. When behavior-behavior relations are approached non-mechanisti- cally, however, analysis cannot stop at the level of the relations themselves. Several analytic concepts common in the behavioral community share some ofthe dangers ofmentalism ifnot employed properly, including such concepts as self-reinforcement, response-produced stimulation, and self-rules. Criticism of a behavioral approach to amine some of the philosophical under- human behavior has been frequent since pinnings of a behavior-analytic view of its inception. Recently, a type ofcriticism science. Many of the points we hope to has emerged from knowledgeable critics make have been made elsewhere, but the suggesting that there is a more rapid path discussions have often been directed to- to the kinds ofscientific knowledge sought ward other specific concerns and have by behaviorists (e.g., Keat, 1972; Wes- not always been interconnected or given sells, 1981, 1982). Even individuals who a comprehensive rationale. Keystones of formerly have been sympathetic to a be- a behavior-analytic position can then ap- havior-analytic position have embraced pear to be dogmatic or arbitrary, rather this line of criticism. For example, Kil- than required for the intellectual integrity leen has suggested that we need to "re- of the position. store the excitement" in our field by ad- Our starting point will be the primary mitting mentalism (Killeen, 1984). purposes of science from a behavior-an- Behavorists would enthusiastically alytic viewpoint-prediction and con- embrace this suggestion if the alterna- trol. We will attempt to show that an tives being proposed (e.g., Killeen's emphasis on prediction and control is not "emergent behaviorism," 1984) ad- arbitrary in behavior analysis because it vanced the goals of science as seen by is a necessary part of successful forms of behavior analysts. Sadly, that possibility the philosophy that underlies behavior- does not appear likely. Instead, the critics analytic theorizing. We will examine seem to be proposing a kind of science mentalism from several vantage points that is ill-suited to the scientific ends and show that regardless of its form, sought by behavior analysts. Although the mentalism is necessarily counterproduc- criticisms may seem to be about scientific tive to the purposes ofscience embraced strategies or tactics, in actuality they con- by behavior analysts. Mentalism can, cern the behavior-analytic view of sci- however, contribute to the purposes of entific explanation itself. science as seen from other perspectives. The nature ofthe recent criticism sug- We will examine a behavioral translation gests that it may be worthwhile to reex- of some types of mental phenomena in terms ofbehavior-behavior relations, but warn against uses of the translation that Requests for reprints may be sent to Steven C. also interfere with the accomplishment Hayes, Department of Psychology, University of Nevada-Reno, Reno, NV 89557-0062. This paper of prediction and control. We will then is published in loving memory ofAaron J. Brown- briefly examine several concepts within stein (1932-1986). We will miss you, old friend. a behavioral perspective that are on a 175 176 STEVEN C. HAYES & AARON J. BROWNSTEIN slippery slope to the same problem cre- a function" (Skinner, 1953, p. 35). This ated by mentalism. position is not based on an a priori dic- tum that only what are commonly called THE PURPOSES OF SCIENCE: "external variables" can possibly influ- PREDICTION AND CONTROL ence behavior. In a sense, the flow is in the opposite direction. Ifan event can in When differences in goals are made ev- principle directly allow both prediction ident, many arguments seem to dissolve. and control ofbehavior, then it deserves The goals of science from a behavior- the name "environmental variable" or analytic viewpoint have been quite ex- "external variable." This relation can be plicitly stated: "We undertake to predict shown by the fact that, in behavior anal- and control the behavior of the individ- ysis, the words "external" or "environ- ual organism. This is our 'dependent mental" do not always refer to the world variable'-the effect for which we are to outside the skin: rather they refer to the find the cause" (Skinner, 1953, p. 35). It world outside behavior (most of which, seems only fair to evaluate a position with of course, is outside the skin). For ex- respect to the goals it sets for itself, while ample, it is sometimes useful ("useful" recognizing ofcourse that other purposes in terms of prediction and control) to might be well served by different posi- think of an "internal environment" in- tions. fluencing behavior. An emphasis on "external variables" The Emphasis on Control comes from the goals ofscience as viewed Prediction and control are the primary by behavior analysis. Seeking both pre- goals of behavior analysis (the goals of diction and control puts certain con- interpretation and explanation are dis- straints on the kinds of statements of re- cussed later). The behavioral approach lations that are useful for the scientist. places emphasis on the words "and con- Only statements that point to events ex- trol" in the phrase "prediction and con- ternal to the behavior of the individual trol." Behavior analysis has sought an organism being studied can directly lead explanation ofbehavior in terms ofevents to prediction and control. The logic of that are ofa kind that at least potentially this claim is as follows. Scientific state- allows both prediction and control si- ments, as Skinner pointed out, are not multaneously. As we discuss below, some themselves the causes ofthe phenomena kinds of descriptions of events and re- they encompass. Bodies do not fall, for lations can in principle only directly pro- example, because of the law of gravity. duce successful prediction and not con- Rather humans can bring their behavior trol. Other kinds ofdescriptions ofevents under the control ofthis verbal statement and relations can allow both, in principle, of a relation (i.e., this rule) and achieve though of course for practical reasons certain ends. Thus, scientific rules help control may presently be impossible. Be- us accomplish particular ends by describ- havior analysis is committed to empha- ing contingencies. They are rules for sci- sizing this latter kind of analysis. entists, not rules for the world. Thus, sci- The importance ofprediction and con- entists who seek prediction and control trol as a guide to behavior-analytic theo- must rely on rules that start with the en- rizing cannot be overemphasized. It is vironment, in the sense of the "world the key to understanding many behav- outside of the behavior," because scien- ioral positions that might otherwise ap- tists are, and can only ever be, in other pear to be arbitrary. For example, be- organisms' environment in this sense. havior-analytic accounts ofbehavior are Scientists cannot directly use a rule to always ultimately to be cast in terms of control behavior unless it starts where "environmental variables" or "external the scientist is-in the potentially man- variables": "Our 'independent vari- ipulable world outside of the behavioral ables'-the causes of behavior-are the system. If a scientific statement is used external conditions of which behavior is by the scientist to control phenomena but MENTALISM AND SCIENCE 177 does not itself start from where the sci- radical behaviorism is a dynamic spatio- entist resides there must be some un- temporal contextual unit-none of the specified and unanalyzed link between the terms can be defined independently of statement and the scientist's behavior. It any of the others. Radical behaviorism may be useful, but it is necessarily in- is so thoroughgoing in its attempt to ana- complete in the sense that the rule itself lyze context that even the behavior of did not specify whatever was done to scientists as they conduct contextual control the phenomena of interest. analyses is to be understood through more contextual analyses (Skinner, 1945). Why Prediction Must Be Included and The explanatory model of the "act in Control Emphasized context" is shared by many perspectives on behavior, from certain forms of evo- Much of the confusion over a behav- lutionary biology (e.g., Dawkins, 1982), ior-analytic perspective on the goals of to some types of cultural anthropology science would have vanished had control (e.g., Harris, 1979), to Marxism. Because alone been emphasized as the defining a basic explanatory model (or "root met- property of science. To the extent that aphor") is at the core of any well-inte- control is pursued, it forces us to em- grated and consistent world view, Pepper phasize external variables that are func- (1942) has suggested that all perspectives tionally related to the behavior. Indeed, that rely on the "act in context" as an ifthe critics ofa behavioral position were explanatory model be thought ofas types right and the emphasis on control rep- of the world view he calls "contextual- resented merely an emphasis on tech- ism." According to Pepper (1942), the nological advancement, there would have underlying "truth criterion" of contex- been no reason not to emphasize control tualism is "successful working" or prag- alone as the issue. The criticism is a fairly matism (Pepper, 1942).