CHAPTER FOUR DAVID R. GRIFFIN’S Theodicy David Ray Griffin was Professor of Philosophy of Religion and Theology at Claremont School of Theology from 1973 until he retired in 2004. In 1973 he founded The Center for Process Studies along with John Cobb Jr. Griffin defends process theism, which is a theology based mainly on the work of philosophers Alfred North Whitehead (1861–1947) and Charles Hartshorne (1897–2000). Griffin wrote a book on theodicy in 1976 calledGod, Power, and Evil: A Process Theodicy. In 1991 he published Evil Revisited: Responses and Reconsiderations, which presented some new ideas on theodicy, but mainly responded to critique against the book from 1976. In 2001 Griffin wrote two chapter long presentations of his process theodicy in two different books; his ownReenchantment Without Supernaturalism, and a new edition of the 1981 book Encountering Evil. Live Options in Theodicy edited by Stephen T. Davis. Griffin’s last whole book on theodicy is the book from 1991. His book Reenchantment Without Supernaturalism from 2001 has a chapter on theodicy which is struc- turally very similar to his 1991-book, but with some changes in content. Because of the changes I will use his most updated text, Reenchantment without Supernaturalism, but when there are more details in the 1991- book, I will supplement with that. I will follow the structure from the 1991 and 2001 books, and add supplements from other books by Griffin when these supply details that are relevant for the discussion to come.1 First there will be a presentation of how Griffin understands the problem of evil in relation to his understanding of God. Then comes a list of arguments that Griffin has against the theodicies of traditional theism. I include this list because it shows important points where 1 In addition to these two, the most relevant texts from Griffin are David Ray Griffin, Religion and Scientific Naturalism: Overcoming the Conflicts, Suny Series in Constructive Postmodern Thought (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2000); his text in Stephen T. Davis, Encountering Evil: Live Options in Theodicy, New ed. (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2001); and David Ray Griffin,Two Great Truths: A New Synthesis of Scientific Naturalism and Christian Faith (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2004). 48 chapter four Griffin thinks differently than the previously presented theodicies, and in addition it functions as a good presentation of many of the argu- ments that will be relevant in the discussion. After this there will be a general presentation of process theism, since process theism may be unfamiliar to many readers. Then we are ready for Griffin’s theodicy with his answer to why there is evil and why there is so much evil. Finally, there will be some answers from Griffin to various arguments against his theodicy. But first, how does Griffin understand the prob- lem of evil? In Griffin’s work he uses the rational-empirical criteria of self- consistency and adequacy to the facts of experience. He holds that ‘a worldview proves itself worthy of belief (…) if and only if it meets these criteria at least as well as other available options’.2 Griffin rejects the claim of ‘relativistic postmodernism’ that there are no facts of experience that are universal. He calls such universal facts ‘hard-core commonsense notions’ and by that he means notions that are univer- sally presupposed in practice, even though not consciously or verbally.3 Some relevant notions that Griffin finds non-negotiable are the perfect goodness of God, the importance of self-consistency, and the exist- ence of genuine evil. By ‘genuine evil’, Griffin means evil which – all things considered – it would be best if it had not happened. We shall soon see that this leads Griffin to think that the only possibility to solve the problem of evil, is to modify the traditional doctrine of divine power.4 Griffin has a ‘generic idea of God’, meaning an idea of God com- mon in Judaism, Christianity, Islam and other theistic traditions. This generic idea of God has thirteen features, which is that God is: 1) A personal, purposive being. 2) Perfect in love, goodness and beauty 3) Perfect in wisdom and knowledge. 4) Supreme, perhaps even perfect, in power. 5) Creator and sustainer of the universe. 6) Holy. 2 David Ray Griffin, Evil Revisited: Responses and Reconsiderations (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 2. 3 Ibid., 3. The same view is held in David Ray Griffin, Reenchantment without Supernaturalism: A Process Philosophy of Religion, Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 29–35. 4 Griffin, Evil Revisited, 2–3, cf Griffin, Reenchantment without Supernaturalism, 29–35..