~ -_,,.,_ _, __ ., , ,; !\~OT FOR PUBl.JCATION I CONFIDF.l'. ru L EITHER IN WHOLE OR IN Pl\.RT I l l BILDERBERG MEETINGS WILLIA1.1SBURG CONFERENCE 20-22 .March 1964 ............ .. ····-~ .....,..,d-.i.~ - ·~~.'jj'~;i:t~~ ,,;~ ~~ ~~'l.'ilfl(~~~,;;.~i4,,..i'l--~- BILDERBERG MEETINGS WILLIAMSBURG CONFERENCE 20-22 March 1964 . I' "r: , ;, ~':cl~:..;.-'~-~--..;;~~~.- .: ~ r LIST OF PARTICIPANTS CHAIRMAN: H.R,H. THE PRINCE OF THE NETHERLANDS HONORARY SECRETARY GENERAL FOR EUROPE: I~ ERNST H. VAN DER BEUGEL I{ HONORARY SECRETARY GENERAL FOR THE UNITED STATES: f' jOSEPH E. jOHNSO N t HONORARY TREASURER: !' I. PAU L RYKENS t DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL FOR EUROPE: ARNOLD T. LAMPING t * /' * * f' ACHESON, DEAN UNITED STATES AGNELLI, GIOVANNI ITALY BALL, GEORGE w. UNITED STATES BAUMEL, JACQUES FRANCE ' BAUMGARTNER, WILFRID S. FRANCE f BEER, HENRIK I NTERNATIONAL BENNETT, FREDERIC M. UNITED KINGDOM BERG, FRITZ GERMANY I' Bmm, l'vL NuRI TURKEY I I BTRRENBACH, KURT GERMANY MA X GERMANY BRAUER, r BUCHAN, ALASTAIR UNITED KINCDOM i BuNDY, 11cGEoRGE UNITED STATES I CABOT, Louis Vv. UN ITED STATES [, CrsLER, WAL KER L. UNITED STATES ~ COLLADO, EMILIO G. UNITED STATES DEAN, AR'rH UR H. u N!TED STATES 3 i fl i~l i 'I DEFFERRE, GASTON FRANCE l\llALFATTI, FRANCO M. hALY DUNCAN, JAMES s. CANADA MANSHOLT, Sicco INTERNATIONAL DUNDEE, LORD UNITED KINGDOM McCLOY, J01rn J. UNITED STATES ERLER, FRITZ GERMANY McGHEE, GEORGE C. UNITED STATES FORD, GERALD R. UNITED STATES MEYNEN,]OHANNES NETHERLANDS FRELINGHUYSEN, PETER H.B. UNITED STATES MURPHY, ROBERT D. UNITED STATES FULBRIGHT, J. WILLIAM UNITED STATES NEBOLSINE, GEORGE UNITED STATES GALLOIS, .PIERRE FRANCE NYKOPP, ]OHAN FINLAND GRIFFIN, ANTHONY G.S. CANADA PEARSON, LESTER B. CANADA GUBBINS, Sm CoLIN UNITED KINGDOM PECCEI, AURELIO ITALY HAEKKERUP, PER DENMARK PINAY, ANTOINE FRANCE HAUGE, GABRIEL UNITED STATES ROCKEFELLER, DAVID UNITED STATES HEALEY, DENIS UNITED KINGDOM RoLL, Sm ERic UNITED KINGDOM HEENEY, ARNOLD D.P. CANADA SCAGLIA, GIOVANNI B. ITALY HEINZ II, HENRY J. UNITED STATES SCHMID, CARLO GERMANY HERTER, CHRISTIAN A. UNITED STATES SCHWEITZER, PIERRE-PAUL INTERNATIONAL H0EGH, LEIF NORWAY SHULMAN, :MARSHALL UNITED STATES HOLIFIELD, CHET UNITED STATES SMITH, H. PAGE INTERNATIONAL JACKSON, CHARLES D. UNITED STATES SNoY ET D'OPPUERs, BARON BELGIUM JACKSON, HENRY M. UNITED STATES SPEIDEL, HANS GERMANY ]AVITS, JACOB K. UNITED STATES STEWART, MICHAEL UNITED KINGDOM ]ELLICOE, LORD UNITED KINGDOM STIKKER, DIRK u. INTERNATIONAL KERCHOVE D'OussELCHEM, NICOLAS W. DE BELGIUM STONE, SHEPARD UNITED STATES KISSINGER, HENRY A. UNITED STATES TERKELSEN, TERKEL DENMARK KLEFFENS, EELCO N. v AN INTERNATIONAL UMBRIGHT, VICTOR H. SWITZERLAND KNUDTZON, HARALD DENMARK VITTORELLI, PAOLO ITALY KoHNSTAMM, MAx INTERNATIONAL WALLENBERG, MARCUS SWEDEN KOSTER, HENRI J. DE NETHERLA!\DS V\TESTRICK, LUDGER GERMANY KRAPF, FRANZ GERMANY WINTERS, ROBERT H. CANADA KUHLMANN-STUMM, KNUT fREIHERR VON GERMANY WOLFF VON AMERONGEN, OTTO GERMANY LA MALENE, CHRISTIAN DE FRANCE \l\fRISTON, \'\/ALTER B. UNITED STA TES LA MALFA, Uco ITALY \'\TYNDI-IAM WHITE, ERIC INTERNATIONAL LANGE, HALVARD NORWAY LENNEP, JoNKHEER EMILE VAN INTERNATIONAL IN ATTENDANCE: LINDSAY, FRANKLIN A. UNITED STATES H.R.H. PRINCESS BEATRIX NETHERLANDS LIPKOWSKI, jEAN DE FRANCE BRAAM HoucKGEEST, ANDREAS E. VAN NETHERLANDS LITCHFIELD JR., LAWRENCE UNITED STATES CHIUSANO, VrrTORINO ITALY LOLLI, ETTORE ITALY HuMELSINE, CARLISLE UNITED STATES LuNs, JosEPH M.A.H. NETHERLANDS .MOZER, ALFRED E. BELGIUM 11AJONICA, ERNST GERMANY RoY, BERTIE LE NETHERLANDS 4 5 INTRODUCTION The thirteenth Bilderberg meeting took place on 20, 21 and 22 March 1964 in the United States at Williamsburg (Virginia) under the chairmanship of H. R. H. the Prince of the Netherlands. There were ninety-four participants representing the United States, Canada and eleven West European countries as well as various international organi­ zations, and drawn from leaders in the field of politics (governments and par­ liaments), business, journalism, public service (national and international), the liberal professions and professional associations. In accordance with the rules adopted at each meeting, all participants spoke in a purely personal capacity without in any way con:imitting whatever govern­ ment or organization they might belong to. In order to enable participants to speak with the greatest possible frankness, the discussions were confidential with no representatives of the press being admitted. The Prince, however, did receive press representatives on tlie eve of the conference. The discussions were centred on the following points: THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE OF: I APPARENT CHANGES IN THE COMMUNIST WORLD (A) Soviet internal developments (B) the Communist Bloc II POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE ATTITUDE OF THE USSR TO THE WEST III RECENT DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE WESTERN WORLD (A) political r. how the Atlantic nations should organize themselves 2. attitudes toward relations with the Communist countries including China (B) military 1. NATO strategy 2. sharing of responsibility for nuclear deterrent 7 ... • -~,~ """"~~'"'""-''"·~-.. r l I l I (C) economic I. recent developments in the Common Market notably in relation to l agriculture and their impact 2. UN Conference on trade and development, GATT/Kennedy Round 3. International Finance THE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE (a) balance of payments adjustment and capital markets OF APPARENT CHANGES IN THE COMMUNIST WORLD (SOVIET (b) liquidity and further evolution of the international monetary INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS AND THE COMMUNIST BLOC) structure AND POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE ATTITUDE OF THE USSR 4. East-West trade TO THE WEST (a) trade with the USSR and European satellites (b) trade with Communist China and Cuba Discussion of these various points was prepared: (c) trading rules and restrictions of credits - by a note received by participants prior to the meeting from an American (d) coordination of Atlantic Community policy. participant; - by a verbal statement from a second American participant covering the It should be noted that item III (C) 4. (East-West trade) was dealt with at main points embodied in the note and· adding additional items for consider­ the beginning of the discussion on Chapter III, more especially because of its ation. connexion with Chapter II and item III (A) 2. This is the chronological order .. of discussion used as the basis for the present minutes. * * Additionally, item III (C) 3. (International Finance) could not be dealt with in the time available because of the extensive exchange of views which The American participant's paper dealt with both aspects mentioned above: occurred in respect of other items. APPARENT CHANGES IN THE COMMUNIST WORLD Soviet Internal Developments The fluctuations observed stemmed from the fluctuating state of the coun­ try's economy: rapid growth from I 956 to I 960 leading to the expectation of a shift in the balance of power through "peaceful coexistence", followed by the failure of such hopes together with a drop in agricultural production. This led to reorganization of the Party and the administration and to a revision of plans so as to free the economy from the grip of bureaucracy and face up to the agri­ cultural failure. The need to provide positive incentives as against overt co­ ercion explained destalinization and the growth of pragmatism in Party practice. The West had welcomed these changes as indications of "liberali­ zation" but this was a fallacious acceptance of the term in comparison to its Western significance. In fact, the Party had consolidated its position and Khrushchev controlled both Party and system. The Soviet economy had a great potential for expansion and power as was shown by the comparative rate of growth of heavy industry (8 to 10% per year) I' and the still more rapid development of science and technology. Basic in­ vestment was continuing independently of the attitudes adopted towards 8 !!j 9 I 11 individual consumption while the agricultural problem, however difficult, Present policy, described in Russia as "creative Marxism" and in China as could be partly solved. The author of the paper concluded in this connexion "revisionism'', was defended as more prudent and more effective than Stalinist that the economic system was unlikely to be halted or turned into the creation practice. It is expected to bear fruit in from five to fifteen years, allowing for of domestic affluence which might lead to a less aggressive society. political deterioration in Europe and economic competition among capitalist countries, these being developments on which its supporters counted. The Communist Bloc It might be expected that pressure would be sustained at all existing criti­ The Sino-Soviet dispute was not the only problem arising. Among the cal points (Berlin, the division p( Germany, alliances and bases) and that Eastern European States, repercussions of this dispute, of clestalinization and of others would be exploited a& they arose (cf. Cyprus, Zanzibar, Panama, etc.). Common Market success had led, on the one hand, to satellite pressure for The use of force to change the territorial status quo offered undue risks so that increased local autonomy and more favourable economic arrangements with the USSR felt non-aggression treaties to be of value; but there would be no the USSR and, on the oth~r, to Soviet efforts for greater economic i~tegration. entente with the West, let alone an alliance against the Chinese. The Com­ Outside the bloc, the same forces encouraged a more independent