On Michael Walzer's Theory of Distributive Justice WONG Fan A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Philosophy in Philosophy © The Chinese University of Hong Kong July 2000 The Chinese University of Hong Kong holds the copyright of this thesis. Any person(s) intending to use a part or whole of the materials in the thesis in a proposed publication must seek copyright release from the Dean of the Graduate School. I I [i i I H i II ^^iMSTTY I SYSTEaixW i I Ij 1 Contents Abstracts i Preface iii Acknowledgements viii 1. Walzer's Theory of Distributive Justice 1 Walzer's philosophical Approach 1 Distribution and Social Meanings of Goods 2 Monopoly, Domination, and Complex Equality 9 Relativist Theory of Justice and Democratic Socialism 19 2. On Equality 23 I Ameson on Walzer's Criticism of Simple Equality 23 Cohen's "Voluntary Equality" — A Defense Of Literal Equality 26 Ameson's Criticism on Walzer's Complex Equality 33 Further Problems on Walzer's Complex Equality 41 f:!i 1： 3. Social Meanings of Goods 45 Is Walzer's Theory Unnecessarily Restrictive? 45 : Social Meanings of Goods and Moral Considerations 51 The Conflicting Social Meanings of A Good 54 Other Problems 61 j 4. Shared Understandings And Moral Relativism 65 Is Walzer A Conventionalist? 65 Equal Citizenship And Democracy 72 Walzer's Benign Relativism 76 ：！ ！1 J ！ 5. Interpretation 86 Walzer's Thesis of Interpretation 86 Walzer and Marx. 93 j: Conclusion 98 ij BIBLIOGRAPHY 102 j Abstract of thesis entitled: In this thesis, I focus on Walzer's ideas about distributive justice. According to Walzer, 'justice,' on the one hand, represents the opposition of 'domination'. On the other hand, it is relative to social meanings of goods. The doctrine of 'complex equality' is stipulated by Walzer to demonstrate that justice as well as equality is in opposition to domination. The doctrine of 'social meanings of goods' is developed to give respect to the shared understandings of people. For Walzer, the just distribution of a good is simply the distribution in accordance with the good's social meaning. Actually, what Walzer wants is, by use of these two doctrines, to establish a benign relativist theory of justice. However, these two doctrines of justice are problematic and encounter lots of criticisms. Some, like Richard Ameson, criticize that Walzer's ‘complex equality' is a principle of non-equality and cannot prevent the widespread inequalities. Some others，like Amy Gutmann, Brian Barry, and Ronald Dworkin, concentrate their criticisms on the shared social meanings of goods. Some of them see what Walzer promotes is an unnecessarily restrictive thesis of sphere-specificity. Some others criticize that Walzer grounds distributive justice on unreflective conventions and overlooks the disagreements over social meanings of goods. In this thesis, I will first give a brief summary on Walzer's theory of justice. Then I will discuss those criticisms on Walzer's view of justice and Walzer's probable responses to these challenges. Finally, I will demonstrate what further problems are left unsolved in Walzer's theory and see whether Walzer can go forwards to solve these problems. Submitted by Wong Fan for the degree of M.Phil, in Philosophy at The Chinese University of Hong Kong in June, 2000 i i 內容提要 這篇論文旨在硏究及評論米高•禾爾沙（Michael Walzer)有關「分配公正」 (distributive justice)的一些獨特見解。依禾爾沙之見，厂公正」這個詞有兩種用法。 一方面，它是用來反對一切無理的操控°禾爾沙的「複雜平等�(comple equalityx ) 理論正是用來講解人們如何才能避免及防止不合理的管制。另一方面，「公正」 乃指正確的社會價値分配。「物之社會共享意義」(Shared Social meanings of goods) 理論指出凡依據「物之社會共享意義」來進行的分配才是公正的分配°禾爾沙提 出上述的見解，主要是想建立一套具規範性的相對主義道德學說。但禾爾沙這套 學說並不完善，而且遭受不少批評。有些學者批評他的「複雜平等」理論對解決 不平等問題沒有帮助。至於他的「物之社會共享意義」理論，有些學者認爲這理 論對分配行爲作出的限制是不必要的。另有些學者則認爲禾爾沙所言之「物之社 會共享意義」，其實是指一切約定俗成之社會意識；但他們質疑道德及公正標準 之建立是否應以約定俗成的東西作爲基礎。在這篇論文中，我首先會扼要地闡述 禾爾沙有關「分配公正」的見解，隨之會討論各方對這套見解的批評及禾爾沙對 各種批評可能作出的答覆，最後會探討禾爾沙這套公正理論所殘留的問題及有助 解決這些問題的方法。 Submitted by Wong Fan (王凡 i) for the degree of M.Phil, in Philosophy at The Chinese University of Hong Kong in June, 2000 ii Preface Unlike Rawls in A Theory of Justice, Michael Walzer disbelieves that universal moral principles can help solve the distributive problems. He holds that those invented transcendental moral principles are not something new. They are abstract, but they are abstracted from what people in a particular political community really share. As Walzer says, “[i]f such a society isn't here --- hidden, as it were, in our concepts and categories --- we will never know it concretely or realize it."^ In Walzer's view, when we understand deeply what people share in a particular society and realize the fact that members of different political communities have different shared understandings on social meanings of goods, we will find that the invented transcendental principles are not generally available in making moral judgements on distributions in different societies. Hence, Walzer tries to ground distributive justice on "shared social meanings of goods." He believes that as long as we distribute social goods in accordance with their social meanings, this kind of distribution is a just distribution and will bring us with "complex equality" or make us free from I domination. Therefore, in dealing with the problem of distributive justice, what a I philosopher has to do is to interpret to the meanings of social goods shared by his 1 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, Blackwell, Oxford, 1983, p.xiv. iii V fellow citizens. When I first read Walzer's Spheres of Justice, Walzer's particular view on distributive justice and his approach in doing moral philosophy — the use of a rich variety of examples in cultural and historical reference — gave me a deep impression. It was interested to know whether Walzer could successfully establish a normative theory of justice, which is relativistic in character. However, in my study, I found that Walzer's theory of justice encounters lots of challenges and difficulties. In this thesis, I shall demonstrate what I discover in this study and try to give my critique on Walzer's view of justice. Chapter one is an introductory chapter in which I try to give a brief summary on Walzer's view of distributive justice. I shall show how Walzer puts those ideas like shared social meanings of goods, complex equality, simple equality, autonomy, dominance, and so on into a systematic expression. I shall explain what Walzer wants to argue for. In my view, Walzer's position is relativist in character and what he holds is a nonskeptical moral relativism. In the second Chapter, I deal with the doctrine of "complex equality", which is the moral ideal pursued by Walzer. I shall discuss Ameson's criticism on this doctrine and try to show that this criticism is partial and fails to argue against Walzer's "complex equality". Despite of this, it seems to me that there are some other problems i iv concerning the power of the state and democracy that constitute a great challenge to the thesis of "complex equality." In Chapters Three and Four, I try to discuss the doctrine of "shared social meanings of goods，，, the most controversial issue in Walzer's theory of justice. Some criticisms on this doctrine focus on the possibility of the restriction on distribution given by the social meanings of goods. Amy Gutmaim provides one good argument in concerning the influence of the boundary-crossing personal morality on distribution and leads Walzer to make concession in his holding. Some other criticisms concern the nature of social meanings of goods. Some critics see that the term, "shared social meanings of goods" is merely another expression of our conventions or people's false consciousnesses. There are some arguments raised by other authors to help Walzer fight against above criticisms. However, I don't believe that Walzer, as a relativist, will accept these suggestions. For me, it is possible for Walzer to defend against those criticisms on the shared social meanings of goods as long as he can establish a concrete and convincing thesis of interpretation. In Chapter Five, I mainly deal with Walzer's view on interpretation. In order to respond to Dworkin and Gutmann's criticism, Walzer seems to make a change in his view on the nature of social meanings of goods and the work of interpretation. Shared social meanings of goods are not longer some obvious ideas that we can immediately V I V know in interpretation, but some deep accounts of our social life, which we have to work out by putting all social factors into consideration and present in a persuasive way in a process of interpretation. However, for me, this change raises some problems about the source of giving meanings and the relation between what we share and what we interpret. For me, Marx's theory of history can help to give a systematic account on the historical development of people's shared understandings in a particular society, and hence is more comprehensive and attractive than that provided by Walzer. Finally, in the chapter of Conclusion, I shall make a brief summary on Walzer's approach in dealing with the problem of justice and restate what major problems he has to solve if he wants to save his theory form implausibility. Although I try to give my criticism on Walzer's theory of justice, I must regard that a detailed study on Walzer's writings makes me have a deep and comprehensive understanding on the issue of distributive justice. As a Marxist, I agree to some of Walzer's ideas that parallel Marx's critique of capitalism. For me, Walzer's theory is ！ problematic not because it is relativistic, but because it is normative. What I am going I to criticize is Walzer's move to establish a normative theory of justice on the basis of j 'interpretation.. ' In my view, Marx's theory of history, as it can give a clear account on I the historical development of people's collective consciousnesses, is more attractive 丨i \ and comprehensive than the thesis of interpretation provided by Walzer, which lacks a t 1 •j t I vi i1 1 distinct exposure on the construction of social meanings of goods.