The epistemic value of ‘κατά τόν λόγον’: Meteorology 1.7 By Eleftheria Rotsia Dimou Submitted to Central European University Department of Philosophy In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the one year MA degree of Philosophy Supervisor: Associate Professor István Bodnár Budapest, Hungary 2018 CEU eTD Collection © Copyright by Eleftheria Rotsia Dimou, 2018 1 Τὸν μὲν οὖν Ἀναξαγόραν φασὶν ἀποκρίνασθαι πρός τινα διαποροῦντα τοιαῦτ ̓ ἄττα καὶ διερωτῶντα τίνος ἕνεκ ̓ ἄν τις ἕλοιτο γενέσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ γενέσθαι ‘τοῦ’ φάναι “θεωρῆσαι τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν περὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον τάξιν”. (Aristotle, E.E Ι, 1216a12–14). CEU eTD Collection 2 Contents 1. Abstract ……………………………………………………….……4 2. Acknowledgments……………………………………..……………5 3. Introduction……………………………………………..…………..6 4. Part I: An Ontological Question…………………………...……….9 5. Part II: An Epistemological Question……………………………..14 6. Concluding Remarks…………………………………………..…..38 7. Bibliography………………………………………………………40 CEU eTD Collection 3 Abstract Ι will attempt to shed some light on the troubling matter of the obscure particulars ― treated by Aristotle in Meteorology ― (τῶν ἀφανῶν τῇ αἰσθήσει), that is, phenomena which are not apparent to the senses in their full extent (Meteorology 344a5). In the framework of the present paper, the aim is to highlight the use of κατά τόν λόγον which appears in the first lines of chapter I.7 of Aristotle’s Meteorology, by focusing on two philosophical questions: one ontological (what is the ontological status of obscure phenomena?) and one epistemological (can we come to the knowledge of such phenomena, and if so, in which way?). Aristotle proposes two answers to these questions in the text, respectively: The meteora (and therefore the comets discussed in chapter I.7 of Meteorology) are natural entities. However, phenomena discussed in Meteorology, although particulars, cannot be fully observed by the senses. Also, one can come to the knowledge of them by giving a reasonable account (κατά τόν λόγον) which requires the use of analogy. I will show that Aristotle, indeed, places comets in the sublunary world and that the reasonable account ― which includes an analogy ― is of epistemic value. Such arguments are not justification arguments; however, rather they are a part of Aristotle’s method of discovery, and they serve as something more than an explanation and/or illustration. I am confident that this reasonable account lies in the context of a ‘heuristic process’. I will show that when it comes to justification in terms of a ‘correctness’ of a theory Aristotle turns to empirical observations, since we cannot speak of justifying something that is so prone to error as phenomena hidden from our senses, such as comets. CEU eTD Collection 4 Acknowledgments I would first and foremost like to thank my thesis advisor Professor István Bodnár. His door was always open whenever I was in need. He consistently allowed this paper to be my own work, but steered me in the right direction whenever he thought I needed it. I specifically thank him for his generosity and his eagerness to always listen to what I have to say. I would also like to thank the whole CEU Department of Philosophy for all the fruitful discussions during this year; especially, but not limited to, Associate Professor Maria Kronfeldner, Associate Professor Mike Griffin, and Professor Katalin Farkas. Last but not least, I thank Professor Hanoch Ben-Yami for his encouragement. I would also like to acknowledge Professor Benjamin Morison of the Department of Philosophy at Princeton University as the second (unofficial) reader of this thesis, and I am gratefully indebted to his very valuable comments on this thesis. Finally, I must express my very profound gratitude to my parents and to my best friend Georgia for providing me with unfailing psychological support throughout my years of study and through the process of researching and writing this thesis. This accomplishment would not have been possible without you. CEU eTD Collection Thank you. Eleftheria Rotsia Dimou 5 Introduction I strongly believe that Aristotle’s Meteorology is relevant to anyone working on Aristotle’s natural philosophy since it can give us insights which were for a long time disregarded by other scholars. The most prominent one (within the contents of Meteorology) is that of the difference of approach between obscure and non- obscure phenomena. A fine example is one regarding Aristotle’s epistemology. Michael Frede in his paper ‘Aristotle’s rationalism’ does not — for sure — dismiss the role of perception in Aristotle’s natural philosophy, nor does he think little of its role in the process of natural investigation. However, the case he makes is that Aristotle is a rationalist and goes as far as arguing, that for Aristotle, knowledge without perception would have been possible. If that was really the case then Meteorology — which does not rely much on perception — would have been one of the most interesting texts of the Aristotelian corpus in terms of the fine and positive complexity of its arguments. However, it is not. Frede argues that for Aristotle knowledge (properly speaking) is based causally and not epistemically on perception and experience, but the textual evidence throughout the Aristotelian corpus suggests otherwise, and this interpretation can be compromised. 1 For Aristotle’s claim in the CEU eTD Collection Generation of Animals is “we should accept what is evident to the senses rather than [mere] reasoning, and reasoning only if it agrees with the observed facts” 1 Michael Frede, ‘Aristotle’s rationalism’ in eds. Michael Frede and Gisela Striker, Rationality in Greek Thought, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 157-173. 6 (GA 760b29-33). This last passage from the Generation of Animals is also very useful for my purposes here because it is there where Aristotle discusses the generation of bees — for which he had limited observational data. This is the case also in Meteorology 1.7. The opening lines from Aristotle’s Meteorology 1.7 read: ‘Ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀφανῶν τῇ αἰσθήσει νομίζομεν ἱκανῶς ἀποδεδεῖχθαι κατά τόν λόγον, ἐάν εἰς τό δυνατόν ἀναγάγωμεν, ἔκ τε τῶν νῦν φαινομένων ὑπολάβοι τις ἂν ὧδε περὶ τούτων μάλιστα συμβαίνειν.’ ‘Since, we believe, with respect to those which are hidden from our sense, that we have sufficiently made known according to reason (κατά τόν λόγον), when we reduce (our thoughts) to what is possible. Even from phenomena now available someone would assume that this happens with respect to these things especially’ (Meteorology 1.7, 344a5- 8).2 ‘Kατά τόν λόγον’ appears in Aristotle’s treatment of obscure phenomena (τῶν ἀφανῶν τῇ αἰσθήσει), viz. phenomena which are not apparent to the senses (Metr. 344a5). In the present paper, my aim is to highlight the use of ‘κατά τόν λόγον’ in I.7 of Aristotle’s Meteorology by focusing on two philosophical questions, one ontological and one epistemological: i) what is the ontological status of obscure phenomena? CEU eTD Collection 2 From now on, ‘Metr.’. I use Aristotle’s Meteorology, revised text, with Index of Words, by F. H. Fobes, printed by Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A., 1919. This translation is mine. All the other translations I use here are from Aristotle, Meteorology, trans. E. W. Webster, in Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. J. Barnes, 2 vols. (Princeton, 1984). 7 ii) can we come to the knowledge3 of such phenomena, and if so, in which way? Aristotle proposes two answers to these questions in the text, respectively: i) The meteora (and therefore the comets discussed in chapter I.7 of Meteorology) are natural bodies. ii) One can come to the knowledge of such phenomena by giving a reasonable account (κατά τόν λόγον, ἐάν εἰς τό δυνατόν ἀναγάγωμεν) which requires the use of analogy by likeness. Regarding the ontological question one can be puzzled over the status of comets; because comets, unlike most sensible particulars, are not apparent to the senses in their full extent; but this is not the only peculiarity they present when compared to other sensible particulars, as their occurrence is also irregular. I will respond to Wilson’s claim that Aristotle is not explicit regarding the region of occurrence of obscure phenomena.4 I argue (in part I of this essay) that meteora, including comets ― which are the subject matter of my inquiry ― cannot be celestial bodies but are rather particulars occurring in the sublunary world; and Aristotle is explicit about this matter. Regarding the epistemological question, I will show (in part II of this essay) that, regarding obscure particulars, it is not clear whether and how the principles of natural investigation outlined in other parts of the corpus are to be extended CEU eTD Collection to Meteorology. The problem, therefore, is one of identifying the appropriate 3 By ‘knowledge’ here I mean ‘some knowledge’ in distinction to ‘knowledge strictly speaking’ i.e, science. 4 Malcolm Wilson, Structure and Method in Aristotle’s ‘Meteorologica’: A More Disorderly Nature (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 135. 8 epistemic access to the relevant natural bodies that otherwise remain inaccessible via perception. I will agree with Karbowski that κατά τόν λόγον §is of great epistemic value but I will also respond to Karbowski’s claim that the use of ‘κατά τόν λόγον’ is justificatory 5 and argue that it is not metatheoretical, but rather is a part of the heuristic process.6 I An Ontological Question Meteorology is one of Aristotle’s treatises concerning issues that fall under the general title ‘Natural Philosophy’ ― as Aristotle places this work after Physics, On the Heavens and On Generation and Corruption (Metr. 338a20- 26).7 This work deals with the meteora, viz. natural phenomena which occur in the sublunary world; however, their region of occurrence borders most nearly with the region in which the heavenly bodies occur (Metr.