Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna DOTTORATO DI RICERCA IN European Doctorate in Law and Economics (EDLE) Ciclo XXV Settore Concorsuale di afferenza: 13 A 1 Settore Scientifico disciplinare: SECS-P/01 TITOLO TESI A threshold hypothesis of institutional change: collective action in the Italian Alps during the 13th - 19th centuries. Presentata da: CLAUDIO TAGLIAPIETRA Coordinatore Dottorato Relatore Prof. Luigi A. Franzoni Prof. Marco Casari iii Abstract This dissertation is about collective action issues in common property resources. Its focus is the “threshold hypothesis,” which posits the existence of a threshold in group size that drives the process of institutional change. This hypothesis is tested using a six-century dataset concerning the management of the commons by hundreds of communities in the Italian Alps. The analysis seeks to determine the group size threshold and the institutional changes that occur when groups cross this threshold. There are five main findings. First, the number of individuals in villages remained stable for six centuries, despite the population in the region tripling in the same period. Second, the longitudinal analysis of face-to-face assemblies and community size led to the empirical identification of a threshold size that triggered the transition from informal to more formal regimes to manage common property resources. Third, when groups increased in size, gradual organizational changes took place: large groups split into independent subgroups or structured interactions into multiple layers while maintaining a single formal organization. Fourth, resource heterogeneity seemed to have had no significant impact on various institutional characteristics. Fifth, social heterogeneity showed statistically significant impacts, especially on institutional complexity, consensus, and the relative importance of governance rules versus resource management rules. Overall, the empirical evidence from this research supports the “threshold hypothesis.” These findings shed light on the rationale of institutional change in common property regimes, and clarify the mechanisms of collective action in traditional societies. Further research may generalize these conclusions to other domains of collective action and to present-day applications. iv Samenvatting Dit proefschrift bespreekt collectieve actie problemen inzake gemeenschappelijke bronnen. De focus is de “drempelhypothese”, die het bestaan van een drempel in groepsgrootte veronderstelt die het proces van institutionele verandering stuurt. Deze hypothese is getest middels een dataset betreffende zes eeuwen beheer van gemeenschappelijke middelen bij honderden gemeenschappen in the Italiaanse Alpen. De analyse probeert de drempelwaarde van de groepsgrootte te bepalen, alsmede de institutionele veranderingen die plaatsvinden wanneer groepen deze drempel overschrijden. Er zijn vijf hoofdbevindingen. Ten eerste, het aantal inwoners in de dorpen bleef stabiel gedurende zes eeuwen, ondanks dat de bevolking in deze regio in dezelfde periode verdrievoudigde. Ten tweede, de longitudinale analyse van face-to-face bijeenkomsten en de gemeenschapsgrootte hebben tot de empirische identificatie van een drempelwaarde geleid, die de overgang van informele naar formele regimes om gemeenschappelijke bronnen te regelen heeft veroorzaakt. Ten derde, wanneer de groepen groter werden, bleken er geleidelijke organisatieveranderingen plaats te vinden: grote groepen splitsen zich in onafhankelijke subgroepen of gestructureerde interacties in verschillende lagen, terwijl wel werd vastgehouden aan één formele organisatie. Ten vierde, heterogeniteit van de bronnen leek geen significante invloed op de verschillende institutionele karakteristieken te hebben. Ten vijfde, sociale heterogeniteit liet statistisch significante invloed zien, in het bijzonder op institutionele complexiteit, consensus, en het relatieve belang van governance regels versus regels ten behoeve van het management van de middelen. In het algemeen ondersteunt het empirische bewijs in dit onderzoek de “drempelhypothese”. Deze uitkomsten werpen licht op de rationale van institutionele verandering in gemeenschappelijke bronnen regimes en verklaren de mechanismes van collectieve actie in traditionele samenlevingen. Verder onderzoek zou deze conclusies kunnen uitbreiden naar andere terreinen van collectieve actie en hedendaagse toepassingen. v Table of Contents Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iii Samenvatting...................................................................................................................... iv Table of Contents .................................................................................................................v List of Figures .................................................................................................................... xi List of Tables ................................................................................................................... xiii Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................... xvi CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................1 1.1 Introduction ...............................................................................................................1 1.2 Background of the Problem ......................................................................................2 1.2.1 Historical case studies .......................................................................................3 1.2.2 The Carte di Regola case study .........................................................................3 1.3 The “threshold hypothesis” .......................................................................................4 1.3.1 The analysis. .....................................................................................................5 1.3.2 The framework. .................................................................................................5 1.4 Statement of the Problem ..........................................................................................7 1.5 Purpose of the Study .................................................................................................7 1.6 Significance of the Study ..........................................................................................8 1.7 Methodology .............................................................................................................9 1.7.1 Group size thresholds in institutions ...............................................................10 1.7.2 Group fission and fusion in institutions ..........................................................11 1.7.3 Effects of group heterogeneity and size on institutional design .....................12 1.8 Main results .............................................................................................................13 vi 1.9 Assumptions and Limitations ......................................................................................13 1.9.1 Assumptions ....................................................................................................13 1.9.2 Limitations ......................................................................................................17 1.10 Structure of the Remainder of the Dissertation .....................................................19 CHAPTER 2: THE CARTE DI REGOLA CASE STUDY ................................................21 2.1 The Governance of Upland Commons ...................................................................21 2.2. Village Communities in the Italian Alps, c. 1200–1800 ........................................27 2.2.1 The rise of the rural community in the Italian Alps ........................................29 2.2.2 Village economics ...........................................................................................31 2.2.3 Land tenure system .........................................................................................36 2.2.4 Regional-scale shocks .....................................................................................40 2.3 The Carte Di Regola ...............................................................................................45 2.4 Conclusions .............................................................................................................50 CHAPTER 3: DATA SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS...................................................52 3.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................52 3.2 Sources ....................................................................................................................54 3.2.1 Property rights .................................................................................................56 3.2.2 Content of documents .....................................................................................58 3.2.3 Organization of communities ..........................................................................61 3.2.4 Population, households, and assemblies .........................................................63 3.2.5. Land resources, climate, and topography ......................................................75 3.3. Datasets ..................................................................................................................79