WHEN RHINOS ARE SACRED: WHY SOME COUNTRIES CONTROL POACHING __________ A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies University of Denver __________ In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy __________ by Paul F. Tanghe June 2017 Advisor: Deborah D. Avant ©Copyright by Paul F. Tanghe 2017 All Rights Reserved The views expressed are the author’s own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Military Academy, the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Author: Paul F. Tanghe Title: WHEN RHINOS ARE SACRED: WHY SOME COUNTRIES CONTROL POACHING Advisor: Deborah D. Avant Degree Date: June 2017 ABSTRACT Why are some countries more effective than others at controlling rhino poaching? Rhinos are being poached to extinction throughout much of the world, yet some weak and poor countries have successfully controlled rhino poaching. This dissertation presents a theory accounting for divergent patterns in the control of rhino poaching, explaining why rhino poaching has been controlled in some countries yet increases exponentially in others. It does so by examining the relational models predominant in each country with wild rhino populations, including institutional analysis of all rhino range states, detailed analysis of social constructions used by nearly two hundred conservationists in Nepal, Swaziland, and South Africa, and an analytic narrative exploring why Nepal effectively controlled poaching. This dissertation shows that when individuals relate to rhinos in a non-economic manner, rhino poaching can be controlled despite weak police capacity and huge profit incentives to participate in poaching. This dissertation thus demonstrates how constructing wildlife with non-economic social dimensions can enable even a weak and poor country to successful conserve highly endangered species. ii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This dissertation, and the graduate studies it reflects, occurred because of the counsel and mentorship of my advisor, Deborah Avant. She took risks on me since I first applied to grad school, and I am deeply grateful for her advice and example. She and her colleagues at the University of Denver welcomed me to a space where I could engage with significant puzzles in global governance and the environment. Many in that community of practice kindly influenced this work, including Rachel Epstein, Martin Rhodes, Dale Rothman, Mariano Torcal, Suisheng Zhao, Alan Gilbert, Jack Donnelly, Tim Sisk, Erica Chenoweth, Karin Wedig, and classmates like Callum Forster, Albin Sikora, Graham Miller, and Steve Hedden. Others at the Korbel School and Sié Center instrumentally facilitated my studies, including Brad Miller, Susan Rivera, and Jill Schmieder Hereau. My committee members bridged the roles of teachers and facilitators by personally inspiring and supporting this project: members Frank Laird, Cullen Hendrix, Oliver Kaplan, and chair Annecoos Wiersema. Ideational and material generosity critically enabled this research. Representatively magnanimous were conservationists and U.S. Government colleagues in the U.S., South Africa, Swaziland, and Nepal, including Dave Johnson, Denver Zoo; Tim Wittig, Wildlife Conservation Society; Peik Andersen; Wendell and Tanya Berry; the Explorers Club, especially Laurie Marker; and West Point’s Department of Social Sciences, including Jay Parker, Rob Gordon, Cindy Jebb, Suzanne Nielsen, Scott Silverstone, Tania Chacho, Scott Handler, Heidi and Jeff Demarest, Jeff Bonheim, and Ryan Boeka. Finally, the Falenczykowski and Tanghe families spark this all. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter One: Introduction .................................................................................................. 1 The Puzzle ........................................................................................................................... 4 The Argument ................................................................................................................... 10 The Evidence .................................................................................................................... 13 Why Study Rhinos? .......................................................................................................... 16 Policy Implications ........................................................................................................... 19 Plan of the Dissertation ..................................................................................................... 20 Chapter Two: A Social Theory of Controlling Poaching ................................................. 22 Major Approaches to Understanding Wildlife Policy and Conservation ......................... 23 How Relational Models Can Explain the Control of Poaching ........................................ 37 A Social Theory of Poaching ............................................................................................ 49 Hypotheses ........................................................................................................................ 52 Research Design................................................................................................................ 53 Chapter Three: Relational Models and the Control of Poaching ...................................... 56 Assumptions ...................................................................................................................... 58 Outcome Variable: The Control of Rhino Poaching......................................................... 60 Explanatory Variable: Relational Models ......................................................................... 61 General Hypotheses .......................................................................................................... 64 Institutional Rules as Proxy Measures .............................................................................. 64 Causal Mechanisms .......................................................................................................... 67 Data ................................................................................................................................... 69 Results and Discussion ..................................................................................................... 70 Control of Poaching .......................................................................................................... 70 Relational Model ............................................................................................................... 73 State Capacity and Tourism .............................................................................................. 75 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 77 Chapter Four: Manifestations of Controlling Poaching .................................................... 80 Manifestations of Relational Models ................................................................................ 82 Authority Ranking: Relationships Based on Authoritative Hierarchy ............................. 84 Market Pricing: Relationships Based on Ratios................................................................ 86 Research Design................................................................................................................ 88 Results ............................................................................................................................... 93 Nepal: Manifestations of Communal Sharing................................................................... 94 Swaziland: Manifestations of Authority Ranking............................................................. 98 South Africa: Manifestations of Market Pricing ............................................................. 101 Discussion ....................................................................................................................... 103 Chapter Five: Analytic Narrative of Nepal’s Control of Poaching ................................. 106 Modeling Rhino Poaching .............................................................................................. 108 Equilibrium Outcome 1: Market Pricing Relational Model ........................................... 119 iv Equilibrium Outcome 2: Non-Market Pricing Relational ............................................... 121 Observable Implications of Equilibrium Outcomes ....................................................... 122 Analytic Narrative of Nepal’s Control of Poaching ....................................................... 125 History............................................................................................................................. 126 Nepal's Response to the Epidemic .................................................................................. 133 Analysis........................................................................................................................... 143 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 148 Chapter Six: Conclusion ................................................................................................. 152 Literature Explaining Conservation Outcomes ............................................................... 152 Findings..........................................................................................................................