A/HRC/29/CRP.3 Distr.: Restricted 23 June 2015 English only Human Rights Council Twenty Ninth session Agenda item 4 Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention Oral Update of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic * * Reproduced as received. GE.12-14522 A/HRC/26/CRP.1 I. Introduction 1. The war in Syria has entered its fifth year and shows no signs of abating. It has mutated into a multi-sided and highly fluid war of attrition where the belligerents have repeatedly experienced surges and setbacks. This has served only to fuel the illusion that a military victory remains possible. 2. Civilians are the main victims of an ever-accelerating cycle of violence. Syrians continue to lose their lives, homes, and livelihoods in a conflict in which there is little, if any, attempt to adhere to international law. Beyond their failure to protect civilians, the warring parties’ seemingly deliberate decision to put civilians in harm’s way has led to unspeakable suffering. 3. This update covers the period from 15 March to 15 June 2015. It examines the impact of the conduct of the warring parties and lack of humanitarian access on civilians. More recently documented incidents reinforce earlier findings that the main cause of civilian casualties, mass displacement, and destruction is the deliberate targeting of civilians, indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks, attacks on civilian and protected objects, and the punitive imposition of sieges and blockades. 4. While this update focuses on violations committed during the conduct of hostilities, it must be emphasised that mass violations concerning the treatment of civilians and hors de combat fighters continued to be received. In particular, corroborated accounts of unlawful killing, torture, sexual violence, enforced disappearance, and the taking of hostages have been documented. Centres of violence include Government detention centres, prisons and checkpoints; ISIS-controlled territory; and recent ground attacks in northern and southern Syria by anti-Government armed groups, sometimes operating in conjunction with Jabhat Al-Nusra. These violations will be detailed in the Commission’s official report to the 30 th Session of the UN Human Council. II. Political Situation 5. Over the last three months – and despite efforts on multiple political tracks – prospects for a political solution continued to stall as military activities intensified amongst the various belligerents. 6. Since April 2015, UN Special Envoy to Syria, Staffan De Mistura, has held a number of discussions with local, regional and international actors to gauge their current positions and visions for a political solution. The Special Envoy is expected to present his findings to the Secretary-General in the near future. He has been holding discussions with the Syrian Government in Damascus. 7. Separately, some members of the Syria opposition met in Cairo on 6 June 2015 and produced a road map to reach a political solution. Another conference, attended by a broader pool of political and military actors within the opposition, is anticipated to take place in Riyadh in July 2015. 8. The US and Russia have continued to urge a political solution. The latest meeting between US Secretary of State, John Kerry, and the Russian President Vladimir Putin took place in Sochi on 12 May 2015. Their meeting reportedly focused on avenues for bringing a close to the conflict and means to confront ISIS. 9. The increased polarisation amongst influential regional actors – against the backdrop of the crisis in Yemen – has further weakened the prospect of dialogue on Syria. However, 2 A/HRC/26/CRP.1 these regional actors continue to play a key and invaluable role in pushing for a political solution. 10. While parties have emphasised the fact that the June 2012 Geneva Communiqué remains the basis for a negotiated settlement, the prospects for the necessary inclusive political dialogue amongst the parties appears to be even further out of reach. Instead, latest developments suggest that some belligerents believe that an armed resolution to the conflict remains possible. 11. In this context, it is ever more urgent for influential states to promote a political solution as the sole means of bringing an end to the war. III. Military Situation 12. Armed confrontations continue to rage on a multitude of distinct frontlines involving an increased number of armed actors on all sides. Long-lasting stalemates in the governorates of Idlib, Homs, and Hasakah have been recently interrupted by brutal outbreaks of fighting that expanded to new localities such as Idlib city (Idlib) and Tadmor (Homs). 13. Conflict dynamics have been further complicated by the deepening external interference, accentuating the internationalisation of the conflict. Different states and non- State actors in the region have continued to support militarily their respective protégés and allies among Syrian belligerents, contributing to the constant escalation of armed confrontations. Many have increasingly engaged in mobilising, training, and equipping as well as financing Syrian or foreign fighters engaged on all sides. 14. Even while searching for a political solution to the conflict, different influential international stakeholders have intensified their military and logistical support both to the Syrian Government and to the anti-Government armed groups in order to exert more military pressure on the opposing side and force it into the compromise considered as a prerequisite for any political process to succeed. While doing so, they have fed a brutal escalation of armed violence that has taken, and will continue to take, the lives of Syrian civilians. Government forces 15. Syrian Government forces, alongside their supporting local and foreign militia, have recently suffered a series of military setbacks. Except for consolidating their defensive positions around Damascus, Homs and coastal governorates, they have shown a declining ability and willingness to operate outside of these strategic areas. Their strategy, based on preserving footholds in every possible region of the country through reliance on extensive use of fire power and irregular forces, has proven to be unsustainable, both in terms of human and material resources. 16. Due to a shortage of manpower, Government forces have increasingly relied on pro- regime Syrian paramilitary and, more importantly, on foreign fighters who play a central role on the most critical battlegrounds. Government forces have also relied on ground and aerial bombardment in targeting rebel strongholds, causing extensive damage to these areas and scores of casualties among the rebels and their presumed popular base. Anti-Government armed groups 17. In recent weeks, anti-Government armed groups have achieved key tactical gains, pressuring the Syrian Government on several fronts. Their improved strategic planning and operational performance allowed them to capture the city of Idlib and win a series of strategic victories in Dara’a and Idlib governorates. 3 A/HRC/26/CRP.1 18. These armed groups have recently developed their level of coordination to larger operations and benefitted from increased logistical support provided by their external backers. As political and ideological differences seem to have been at least temporarily disregarded, the coordination and collaboration have been significantly enhanced among different factions, ranging from FSA-affiliated groups to Al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al- Nusra. 19. External backers have ameliorated their level of financial and logistical support to the anti-Government armed groups, either as part of direct bilateral initiatives or through joint entities such as the international “Military Operations Rooms” coordinating the provision of lethal and non-lethal support to vetted opposition groups. Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS) 20. The self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS), or Daesh, has continued to battle simultaneously Syrian Government forces, anti-Government armed groups, and the Kurdish armed group (YPG) on a number of distinct fronts. Since the beginning of the year, the organisation has suffered a string of losses in northeastern Syria at the hands of the YPG, which has been supported by the international coalition airstrikes and a multitude of armed militia including Assyrian and Arab tribal groups. 21. ISIS, however, has recently captured strategic areas in central Syria around the city of Tadmor (Homs), further isolating Government forces in eastern Syria. This has allowed it to open better lines of communications with its positions in the central and southern governorates where it has significantly increased its presence and activities. The group has also conducted attacks in regions beyond the areas targeted to date by the international coalition aerial campaign. It attempted to seize the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp in Damascus city’s southern suburbs, attacked rebels in eastern Aleppo governorate, and expanded in areas in Suweida and Dara’a governorates. People’s Protection Units (YPG) 22. YPG has continued to battle ISIS militants for the control of areas around the Kurdish regions of northeastern Syria. Fighting alongside multiple local armed groups, the YPG have benefitted from the international coalition airstrikes in repelling successive ISIS attacks on Ain Al-Arab (Kobane) and Al-Jazire enclaves. Besides recapturing most of Kobane district, they have recently expanded their control over a large swathe