Annex L Annotated bibliography of all references consulted Note: this list does not include the majority of the programme documents consulted, but concentrates mainly on external documents. Editor's Note. (1996). American Journal of Evaluation, 17 (2), 169-171. Last viewed on 2 December 2011. URL: http://aje.sagepub.com/content/17/2/169.abstract Notes: This note looks at the origins of Theory Based Evaluation and introduces both an excerpt for Weiss’s 1972 book and Fitz-Gibbons and Morris’s 1975 paper that were reprinted in the same issue. Abdela, L., Frogh, W., & Okumu-Alya, F. (2010). From Resolution to Reality: Lessons learned from Afghanistan, Nepal and Uganda on women’s participation in peacebuilding and post-conflict governance (pp. 48). London: CARE UK. Last viewed on 18 February 2012. URL: http://www.care.org/newsroom/specialreports/UNSCR-1325/CARE-1325-Report-Women- Peace-Participation.pdf Notes: Report analyses women's role in peacebuilding. UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (in 2000) was hailed a victory for women’s rights activists around the world. The adoption of the resolution represented a significant step forward in recognising the strategic contribution that women can make to peace and security policy, as well as acknowledging the increasing use of violence against women as a tactic of war. Yet a decade later, women are still largely absent from peace negotiations. How can the policy be turned into practice, which impacts on the lives of women most affected by conflict? ACE Electoral Project. Parliamentary Size. ACE Encyclopaedia Version 1.0 Retrieved 7 April, 2013, from http://aceproject.org/main/english/es/esc03.htm Notes: How large should a country's representative assembly be? The question is not trivial. Assembly size has measurable effects on the representation of political parties. Especially, in smaller magnitude systems (such as single- member districts, but also small multimember districts) having more seats means more districts in which smaller parties with localized support have greater chances for representation. An assembly that is too small for the country may thus shut out important interests. Regardless of district magnitude, a small assembly may create a feeling of 'distance' between representatives and voters, even voters who favour large parties. On the other hand, an assembly that is overly large may create an unwieldy legislative process and generate a need for more complex intra-assembly committee structures or encourage the delegation of more legislative authority to the executive branch. The page discussed the cube root law for legislative size. ACHR. (2009). Nepal: Pax Indianus Crumbles (Briefing Paper on Nepal, pp. 10). New Delhi: Asian Centre for Human Rights Notes: This report argues that "with relations between parties already at their nadir, the Indian position is only contributing to adding fuel to the fire. As a nation that has the greatest stake in a stable Nepal, Delhi should instead be following a policy of conciliation – not confrontation – between parties." It urges the Indian government to support the formation of a national unity government in the spirit of the peace process. The risk of escalating violence was said to be very real. ACHR. (2010). The withdrawal of OHCHR-Nepal: Agreeing an alibi for violation? (Briefing Paper on Nepal 5). New Delhi: Asian Centre for Human Rights. Last viewed on 18 December 2012. URL: http://www.achrweb.org/briefingpapers/BPNepal-01-10.pdf Notes: On 9th June 2010 the mandate of the OHCHR-Nepal expires. The Prime Minister MK Nepal has said that a decision will be taken soon, but most observers and media reports suggest that the government is considering three options: no extension to the mandate, OHCHR moving to a limited advisory role to the NHRC, and thirdly, a three to six month extension with a limited mandate. From 2003 civil society fought and won the battle to introduce international monitors in the face of failing national mechanisms and oppressive government. Now opinions in civil society are more divided. This paper examines the case for a withdrawal of external monitoring. It notes that the much of the Government, members of the NHRC, are particularly the army were opposed to any extension. Of the political parties only the Maoists were in favour. It finds that the NHRC is extremely weak and unable to fulfil its mandate and that the ending of the OHCHR mandate would worsen HR monitoring. 1 ACHR. (2011). OHCHR Nepal and the log frame for impunity (pp. 21). New Delhi: Asian Centre for Human Rights. Last viewed on 18 December 2012. URL: http://www.achrweb.org/countries/nepal/OHCHR-NEPAL2011.pdf Notes: This review of OHCHR role in Nepal is highly critical of the performance of the office and of the High Commissioner. OHCHR-Nepal’s extraordinary political bungling of the NHRAP and its silence on the government’s withdrawal of cases is confirmation of the ‘absences of political capacity’, strategy and leadership; something evaluators have been underlining for years. Demonstrating a marked disinclination for accountability, OHCHR-Nepal has failed to reform. But perhaps most seriously the HC has consistently failed to let strategy be guided by her own field Office monitoring. If OHCHR-Nepal is to have any meaningful role it must now demonstrate willingness to undergo urgent reform. Despite its unsatisfactory performance, it would be wrong for OHCHR to withdraw now as this would imply that the concerns over human rights in Nepal had been addressed. The reality is the opposite; national institutions to promote and protect human rights are as weak as or weaker than in 2005, a low point for human rights in Nepal. Human rights defenders are reporting increasing concern over their security suggestive of levels similar to the takeover of 2005 which triggered the establishment of the deployment in the first place. To withdraw OHCHCR-Nepal now or to simply extend it with its current lack of strategy and leadership would be to publicly acknowledge that five years of funding since mid 2006 has been wasted. This outcome would reflect badly both on the HC and also on donors who have failed to insist on a serious standard of work by the Nepal office. Adam Smith International. (2011). Local Governance & Community Development Programme: Topping-Up Grants: Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (pp. 62). London: Adam Smith International Notes: The report discusses the findings of a Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) for the Topping-Up Grants of the Local Governance and Community Development Programme. Available funds generally appear to be reaching their intended destinations, with amounts of fund flows reported consistent among the FCGO, municipality, DDC and VDC. Over 80% of citizens interviewed reported that they were reasonably happy with their level of participation in LGCDP planning with 95% indicating that it represents the freely expressed wishes of the community. Addressing corruption, improving contractor quality, initiating surprise audits and improving procurement processes were viewed by citizens as well as project managers as a prioritised series of steps that would improve value for money. There appears to be material leakage risk, primarily attributed to PFM practices, accompanied by the challenge in achieving sustainable results. Observed PFM weaknesses centre on budget credibility, corruption and procurement risk, outstanding payments and loans and related control activities, all of which diminish reporting and assurance quality. The report concludes that levels of assurance can be improved by initiating actions that would immediately complement the internal control structure in the shorter-term while augmenting the PFM framework over the longer term. Adhikari, A. (2008, October). Shackled or unleashed UNMIN in Nepal's peace process. Himal Southasian. Notes: Essay on UNMIN's role in Nepal. Southasia’s only full-fledged United Nations political mission is again being extended as the situation in Nepal – and the country’s relationship with UNMIN remains in flux. In July, the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) was extended for a third time, the Indian ambassador to the United Nations, Nirupam Sen, while supporting a six-month extension, criticised the Mission for a “consistent effort to expand the definition of what Nepal sought in terms of support”, and implied that UNMIN was trying to force on the Kathmandu government a political mission, one led by a special representative of the secretary-general, with the ability to use ‘good offices’ functions to mediate between parties. Underlying Sen’s statement was a history of suspicion towards UNMIN, which India had harboured from the Mission’s very beginning, in January 2007. As a secondary actor, UNMIN’s ability to perform its role was completely dependent on the political parties’ ability to take the peace process forward. Given the constraints within which it had to operate, with its responsibilities limited mostly to technical issues, its tenure in Nepal has been a success. Adhikari, B. (2009). A History of Japanese Official Development Assistance to Nepal. Research Report, Graduate School of Modern Society, Aichi Shukutoku University (4), 73-96. Last viewed on 16 January 2012. URL: http://www2.aasa.ac.jp/graduate/gsscs/reports01/PDF/04-006.pdf Notes: The purpose of this paper is to analyse the Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) and shading lights on its role in the process of economic development of Nepal. The study traces the Japanese aid trend to Nepal since the last half of the 1960s, and examines in what ways Japan has managed to emerge as a major donor. It reviews briefly the evolution of the Japanese ODA policy, its size and sectoral allocation in light of past trend and motivation to Nepal. To this end, the paper turns to discuss the failure of the development process receiving Japanese assistance is not only due to the donor’s aid policy, but also the overall socio-economic environment of recipients country like Nepal.