The Rise of Partisan Rigidity: The Nature and Origins of Partisan Extremism in American Politics A Dissertation SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA BY Matthew D. Luttig IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Howard Lavine January 2016 © Matthew D. Luttig, 2016 Acknowledgements This project has benefited from the support, advice, and insight of many individuals and organizations. For starters, a number of people have given extensive and attentive comments on numerous drafts of this work, and have improved the final product immeasurably. First, let me say thank you to John Bullock, Paul Goren, Chris Federico, and Joanne Miller. Each of these individuals have provided numerous and thoughtful comments on this project. Their counsel permeates throughout this research, and the final product is much better for it. My advisor, Howie Lavine, deserves special recognition for the patience and foresight to guide my ideas from rough guesses to testable hypotheses to a (hopefully) clear argument. His wisdom has prevented many missteps along the way. I am grateful for his continuing professional advice, his willing feedback, and his constant encouragement and unwavering confidence in my capabilities. This project has benefitted tremendously from his time, support, and guidance. I would also like to thank the many other people who have commented on or otherwise contributed to this research. Toby Bolsen, Anne Cizmar, Bill Jacoby, Andrew Owen, and Brian Schaffner have all given thoughtful and helpful comments on various drafts presented at professional conferences. Samantha Luks at YouGov worked patiently and diligently with me to get the main survey administered. I also want to thank a number of friends whose encouragement and advice has made graduate school an even more rewarding experience: Tim Callaghan, Phil Chen, Ashley English, Christina Farhart, Maggie and Bobby Gambrel, Matt Motta, Adam Olson, Geoff Sheagley, Brianna i Smith, and many others have provided friendship and helpful advice throughout the past five-plus years. This project has also benefited from research funds provided by the National Science Foundation (Grant Award # 1424049) and the Center for the Study of Political Psychology. Without the financial support of both organizations, the following research would not have been possible. An Interdisciplinary Dissertation Fellowship and a Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship in the final two years of graduate school gave me the extra time I needed to develop and complete this dissertation. Finally, I would like to thank my family. Karen, Estelle, and Thelma—without you, this project would not have been possible. I am grateful for your presence in my life every day. Both my parents, Dave and Diane Luttig, and my in-laws, Mark and Ann Pienkos, provide a constant source of support and encouragement. Thank you to all of you for your love and support. ii Dedication To Karen and Estelle. iii Abstract As political elites have polarized, the American public has become more strongly partisan. Why has the American public become more extremely partisan, and what does this transformation of the electorate imply for the health of American democracy? In this thesis, I argue that elite polarization has strengthened the relationship between a basic psychological motivation for group membership—the need for certainty—and partisan strength, in-party favoritism, out-party derogation, and conformity to group leaders. Because the need for certainty is a form of motivated closed-mindedness, I argue that the American electorate today is increasingly composed of rigid partisans : partisans who are uncritically extremist, biased, and intolerant. Across a number of distinct empirical studies, this thesis demonstrates that, (1) partisan strength, in-group favoritism, out-group derogation and partisan sorting have a strong basis in the psychological need for certainty, (2) in many cases this pre-political psychological variable has larger effects on partisan strength than explicitly political variables such as policy preferences, (3) that this effect occurs among both Democrats and Republicans, (4) that this has caused politically engaged respondents in particular to be rigid in their partisan identity, and (5) that this relationship has grown stronger over time as political elites have polarized and become more internally cohesive and distinct. In conclusion, I argue that the transformation of the public into rigid partisans weakens the competence of the American electorate and threatens the foundations of American democracy. iv Table of Contents List of Tables ..............................................................................................................v List of Figures .............................................................................................................vi Chapter 1 .....................................................................................................................1 Chapter 2 .....................................................................................................................24 Chapter 3 .....................................................................................................................55 Chapter 4 .....................................................................................................................84 Chapter 5 ......................................................................................................................131 Bibliography 142 Appendix Chapter 2 .....................................................................................................157 Appendix Chapter 3 .....................................................................................................182 Appendix Chapter 4 .....................................................................................................190 v List of Tables Table 2.1, "The Effect of Polarization on Partisan Sorting" .............................................50 Table 2.2, "The Effect of Need for Closure on Partisan Sorting" .....................................51 Table 3.1, "Authoritarianism, Partisan Strength, & Affective Polarization: Democrats- 2012 ANES" .........................................................................................................81 Table 3.2, "Authoritarianism, Partisan Strength, & Affective Polarization: Republicans – 2012 ANES" .........................................................................................................82 Table 3.3, "Authoritarianism, Partisanship, & Ideological Values – 2012 ANES" .........83 Table 3.4, "Authoritarianism, Partisan Strength, & Affective Polarization, 1992-2008 ANES" ..................................................................................................................84 Table 4.1, "The Need for Certainty and Partisan Rigidity (YouGov Study)" ...............122 Table 4.2, "The Need for Certainty, Political Engagement, and Partisan Rigidity (YouGov Study)" ................................................................................................123 Table 4.3, "The Need for Certainty, Political Engagement, and Partisan Rigidity (KN Study)" ................................................................................................................124 Table 4.4, "The Need for Certainty, Political Engagement, and Partisan Rigidity (2012 ANES)" ...............................................................................................................125 Table 4.5, "The Effect of the Need for Certainty on Partisan Strength, Over Time (General Social Survey)" ....................................................................................126 Table 4.6, "Psychological Certainty Reduces Partisan Rigidity" ...................................127 vi List of Figures Figure 2.1, "Example of Low and High Polarization Treatments" ...................................52 Figure 2.2, "Counter-Stereotypical Party Cue-Taking in Non-Polarized and Polarized Conditions" ...........................................................................................................53 Figure 2.3, "The Effect of Need for Closure and Partisan Social Identity on Counter- Stereotypical Party Cue-Taking" ..........................................................................54 Figure 4.1, "Changes in Partisan Rigidity across Need for Closure, Partisan Sorting, and Policy Extremism" ..............................................................................................127 Figure 4.2, "Need for Closure Increases Partisan Rigidity for both Democrats and Republicans" .......................................................................................................128 Figure 4.3, "Psychological Certainty Reduces Affective Polarization among the Less Engaged" .............................................................................................................129 Figure 4.4, "Psychological Certainty Weakens the Link between Elite and Mass Polarization" ........................................................................................................130 vii Chapter 1 The Rise of Partisan Rigidity in American Politics "Every generation gets the theory of party identification that it deserves." —Sniderman and Stiglitz (2012, 4) In the summer of 2014, the Pew Research Center published a report on "Political Polarization in the American Public." This report concluded that, "Republicans and Democrats are more divided along ideological