April 30, 2010 SUMMARY - GULF ROUNDTABLE SERIES Regional Reverberations: What If Israel Strikes Iran? PARTICIPATING SCHOLARS ................................................................................... Gary Sick is a senior research If Israel struck Iran militarily, experts say, Iran would likely seek to retaliate against scholar at Columbia Univer- U.S. and GCC interests in the Gulf, Iran and Afghanistan. While Dr. Gary Sick sity’s Middle East Institute and argued that the aftermath of such a strike would be so profound as to make it both also is the executive director undesirable and unlikely, Dr. Kenneth Katzman suggested that contingencies are al- of Gulf/2000, an international ready in place to help manage the consequences. Both men spoke at a Gulf Round- online research project on po- table hosted by the CSIS Middle East Program on April 21, 2010. litical, economic and security Sick claimed that Iran’s regional clout, coupled with decades of asymmetric war- developments in the Persian fare planning by its Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), have enhanced the coun- Gulf. Sick served on the Na- try’s “capacity to absorb punishment.” He asserted the U.S.-led invasions of Iraq tional Security Council under and Afghanistan strengthened Iran’s position in the region as its enemies became Presidents Ford, Carter, and embroiled in sectarian conflict. Additionally, Iran’s financial and military ties with Reagan, and was the principal Hamas, Hizbullah, and a host of insurgent groups in Iraq have ensured that it re- White House aide for Iran dur- mains consequential in the region. ing the Iranian Revolution and Internally, Sick asserted that “Iran is ready [for an external attack] and has devel- the hostage crisis. Kenneth oped layers of defense inside its borders.” The IRGC pervades the political and Katzman works as a Middle security bureaucracy and has undisputed control over the Iranian economy. Ad- East specialist for the Congres- ditionally, the IRGC’s leader, General Jafari, was an avid student of asymmetrical sional Research Service. He warfare and has devoted extensive resources to developing Iran’s unconventional served on the staff of the House warfare tactics. International Relations Com- As a result of these factors, both Sick and Katzman agreed that if attacked by Is- mittee during 1996 and 2001- rael, Iran would not only be able to absorb the blow, but also inflict punishment in 2002. In addition to numerous return. The Arab Gulf states would feel this pain first. Sick argued that their close CRS studies, he authored two relationship with the United States would implicate them in the strike and make major Atlantic Council reports them targets for Iranian reprisal. He predicted that Iran would dispatch speedboat on U.S. sanctions against Iran fleets to swarm strategic points in the Gulf, and use submarines to lay mines near oil and Libya and The Warriors ports. It would also target cruise missiles at the Gulf landmass itself and send elite of Islam, a book about Iran’s teams of soldiers to infiltrate beaches and cities. Katzman added that Iran might try Revolutionary Guard. ■ to replicate an attack like the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, which targeted foreign THE GULF ROUNDTABLE SERIES The CSIS Middle East Program launched the Gulf Roundtable in April 2007 to examine the strategic importance of a broad range of social, political, and economic trends in the Gulf region and to identify opportunities for constructive U.S. engage- ment. The roundtable defines the Gulf as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, and Iran. The roundtable convenes monthly, assembling a diverse group of regional experts, policymakers, academics, and busi- ness leaders seeking to build a greater understanding of the complexities of the region. Topics for discussion include the role of Islamist movements in politics, the war on terror, democratization and the limits of civil society, the strategic importance of Gulf energy, media trends, trade liberalization, and prospects for greater regional integration. The Gulf Roundtable series is made possible in part through the generous support of the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates.■ 1800 K Street NW, Washington DC 20006 | p. 202.775.3179 | f. 202.466.4739 | www.csis.org/mideast 2 | CSIS Middle East Program | Gulf Roundtable Summary military personnel residing near the Saudi Aramco head- Gulf states are purely passive and would hide behind the quarters in Dhahran. U.S. if targeted.” Although they would expect the Unit- Sick judged that as Israel’s closest ally, the United States ed States to take the lead in staving off an Iranian threat, would also be subject to Iranian retaliation. In particu- historical precedent suggests that “they have options and lar, he predicted that it would attempt to undermine U.S. they will respond.” He cited an October 1987 example progress in Iraq and Afghanistan by amplifying its mili- when Saudi Arabia sent its Air Force to intercept a flotilla tary and financial support for Al Qaeda and the Taliban, of Iranian boats amassing along its coast and successfully and activating its “huge” number of sleeper cells in Iraq. turned them back. Additionally, the IRGC would capitalize on their con- While both men acknowledged that an Israeli strike on trol of smuggling routes across the Iran-Iraq border and Iran was unlikely in the near future, they stressed that their throughout the region and funnel weapons and equipment hypotheses provided insights into how the United States to Shiite insurgent groups. At a minimum, Sick contend- should calibrate its relationship with the Islamic Republic ed, these activities would increase U.S. casualty rates and going forward. Sick argued that the United States and the delay U.S. timeframe for withdrawal. international community should focus less on eliminat- As one of the world’s top oil producers, Iran also has the ing Iran’s nuclear capability and more on lengthening the potential to affect the global economy. Sick asserted that amount of time it takes it to acquire a bomb. He stressed Iran could withdraw up to two million barrels of oil per that Iran’s current strategy was to pursue its nuclear pro- day from the international oil market, causing prices to gram short of a weapon and then use the threat of produc- skyrocket for an indefinite period and throwing the world ing a bomb as negotiating leverage. Sick emphasized that back into a “second recession.” Significantly, he posit- the United States should also incentivize greater transpar- ed, the United States and Israel would incur much of the ency in Iran’s nuclear program. While neither Sick nor blame for the economic downturn. Katzman believed that Iran had a “bomb in the base- ment,” Sick posited that if Iran withdrew from the NPT or While Katzman concurred that an Israeli strike on Iran the IAEA, it would likely take its program underground would have unpalatable consequences for the region, he and increase Israel’s paranoia. If Israel or another country contended that the United States and the GCC countries launched a surgical strike against Iran, Sick warned the were well-equipped to deal with the aftermath. The Gulf escalatory cycle would be such that it would “end up in states in particular have significant military and economic combat.” He explained that in order to definitively end leverage over the Islamic Republic. He highlighted their Iran’s program, an attacker “would have to clean out the twenty-year track record of strategic collaboration with decision-making people . and that means boots on the the United States through the Gulf Security Dialogue ground.”■ and their purchase of the latest defense technologies. Katzman argued that these foundations would allow the The Gulf Roundtable Summary is an electronic news- GCC to put up its own defenses against Iran and call for letter is produced by the Center for Strategic and In- additional U.S. assistance in securing the Gulf in the wake ternational Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt insti- of an Israeli strike. tution focusing on international public policy issues. He asserted that the GCC could also retaliate against Iran Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, economically: Gulf banks could freeze or drop Iranian as- all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this sets and refuse to continue financing Iran’s regional busi- publication should be understood to be solely those of nesses; with sanctions on Western banks already in place, the author(s). © 2010 by the Center for Strategic and the Iranian financial sector would spiral. Gulf states could International Studies. also cut off natural gas supplies to Iran—which imports The CSIS Middle East Program 30%-40% of its gas—and cripple the country’s energy sector, given that companies like Lukoil, Petronas and Jon B. Alterman Haim Malka Glencore are already boycotting gas sales to Iran. Director Deputy Director Michael Dziuban Allison Hutchings Katzman appeared optimistic about the likelihood of Research Assistant Program Coordina the GCC countries capitalizing on this leverage. He re- Whitney Purdum tor/Research Assistant marked that “there exists a perception around here that the Intern Center for Strategic and International Studies | Middle East Program .