From Nature as Source to Nature as Ethos The Making of Natural Man in Rousseau’s Dialogues Marco di Palma (University College, London) Thesis submitted for the degree of Ph.D. (October 1999) ProQuest Number: 10608884 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com plete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. uest ProQuest 10608884 Published by ProQuest LLC(2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. ProQuest LLC. 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346 fo r Miriam Abstract Challenging Jean Starobinski’s critique of Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques, Dialogues, this thesis locates arguments for the Rousseauian synthesis and its ideal of Natural Man in the philosophies of nature, habit and the will. Rousseau’s concept of nature represents both a given, timeless inheritance or moral source, but also a unity which individuals actualise through reason and acts of the ethical will. The philosophy of habit suggested in Emile eliminates the concepts of demturation and second nature invoked by commentators to clarify the relation between nature and habit. Authentic, permanent habits disclose nature; nature transcends itself through habit. A philosophy of the will, meanwhile, specifies the enlightened initiatives that fulfil the human telos, sponsoring the Form nature assumes through habit The modalities of nature, habit and will thereby establish a continuity between the natural and ethical selves. Nature, habit and will also define the conditions of possibility for Natural Man exemplified by “Jean-Jacques”. The Dialogues strive to remain intellectually coherent, but Rousseau’s self­ representation via an objective, third-person perspective proves rhetorically infelicitous for these conditions. The conflict of truth and method at the heart of autobiography abstracts the origins and history that mediate the synthesis that is Natural Man. Readers face a transcendental problem that must account for the points of transition needed for the synthesis to emerge. This account derives from an analysis of Rousseau’s naturel, a spontaneity that, in fact, corresponds to a moral condition or ethos generated by sedimented acts of the ethical will. The thesis concludes that the Dialogues belong to and advance the Rousseau’s ‘system’. By internalising his own ethical construct, Rousseau and his works coincide. An ethical vision that reconciles goodness and virtue, nature and history demonstrates how Natural Man is possible. Contents CONTENTS iv NOTE ON REFERENCES vi PREFACE vii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ix 1 Introduction 1 [1.1] From the Doctrinal Works to the Dialogues 2 [1.2] Phenomenology: Inescapable Horizons 11 [1.3] Nature, Habit and Will in the Dialogues 22 2 Nature 26 [2.1] Nature as Teleology and Moral Source 28 [2.2] Nature and History 39 [2.3] Nature’s Finalism: Necessity and Absence of the Good 50 3 Habit 57 [3.1] Nature, Habit and Second Nature 60 [3.2] The Nature of Habit, the Habit of Nature 68 [3.3] Natural and Ethical Selves 75 4 The Will 86 [4.1] Orientation of the Will 88 [4.2] The Will in Time: la volonte constante 98 [4.3] Spiritual Progress 108 iv 5 Truth and Method: Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques: Dialogues 119 [5.1] The Problem of the Dialogues'. Starobinski’s Critique 121 [5.2] ‘Du Sujet de de la forme de cet ecrit’ 133 [5.3] Objectivity, Freedom and Agency 150 6 “Jean-Jacques” or Natural Man 161 [6.1] Reflexivity or Weakness 163 [6.2] The Conditions of Possibility 168 [6.3] Philosophie: le naturel and habitude 172 [6.4] Histoire: Rousseau’s Reformation 180 [6.5] ‘Un Soin que je me dois’: the Care of the Self 187 7 System and Synthesis 199 [7.1] Ethics and Phenomenology: La Morale sensitive 202 [7.2] After Reflexivity: Moral Sensibility 213 [7.3] B onti and vertu 223 8 The Dialogues Re-assessed 237 Bibliography 246 Note on References All references to Rousseau are taken from the five-volume (Euvres completes, edited by Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond (Paris: Pleiade, 1959-1995). Quotations will be followed by a parenthetical citation of volume number indicated by a Roman numeral followed by page number given in Arabic numbering. References to Rousseau’s correspondence are taken from Ralph Leigh’s edition, Correspondance complete, 51 vols (Oxford: Institut et Mu see Voltaire & Geneva: Les Delices, 1965-1971; Oxford: The Voltaire Foundation, 1972-1995) and indicated with the abbreviation CC followed by volume number and page number given parenthetically in the text All references to the Annales de la Societe Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Geneva: Julien, 1905-) will be abbreviated to Annales. Rousseau’s orthography has been modernised throughout, while the punctuation given by Leigh and the Pleaide editors has been retained. Modem orthography has also been preferred for other French authors quoted. Preface I first read Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques after Finals when it was suggested that this relatively neglected text might yield new opportunities for research on Rousseau. A year later, I left my abandoned project for one of Rousseau’s own, La Morale sensitive, ou le materialisme du sage. My examination of this unfinished work provided my arguments to establish a synthesis between the ideas of materialism and morals in Rousseau’s works, and the University of Oxford with an M.Litt. thesis. During this period, like all novice students of Rousseau, I came to discover and appreciate the brilliant work of Jean Starobinski. After choosing to embark on research in this area of French studies, I recall a tutor remarking that I had set myself too difficult a task since, in his view, Starobinski had virtually pronounced the final word on Rousseau. Although not quite consigning future generations of Rousseau scholars to silence, the importance of Starobinski’s ground­ breaking contribution, particularly for the French critical school, remains immense. His classic, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: La Transparence et Vobstacle, anticipates Derrida’s formidable Heideggerian reading by over a decade. A later article on Rousseauian autobiography, meanwhile, furthers aspects of the original project by arguing that writing metaphorically displaces and disturbs self-interpretation.1 In many respects, the subsequent progress of my own work has continued to represent an exchange, a triadic dialogue uncannily similar to that of the text I have chosen to explore, between Starobinski, myself and the voices that speak from Rousseau juge de Jean-Jacques. 1 ‘Le Style de l’autobiographie’, Podtique, I (1970), 257-65. In a previous incarnation, this thesis had set out to analyse the Dialogues and Les Reveries du promeneur solitaire within the framework of the synthesis between morals and materialism I had previously outlined for the doctrinal works. I have had to abandon this original format, my research having lingered on the Dialogues for far longer than I ever anticipated. Whether or not this prolonged visit reflects the subtle and intricate complexity of Rousseau’s problematic work will be for readers of this thesis to decide. Acknowledgements This thesis owes a debt to several persons who have offered invaluable encouragement and opportunities for defining and clarifying my ideas. In particular, I would like to recall my thanks to my friends: to Alan Overd and Paul Selden for their advice and long-standing interest in my work; to Kevin Davy for his tremendous inspiration; and to Philip Jenkins for offering constant enthusiasm and intellectual stimulation. It is also a pleasure to acknowledge my indebtedness to David Lee who generously devoted his time to attentively reading my material and to whom I owe a deeper understanding of philosophy. This thesis also owes a huge deal to my family, especially my long-suffering parents Aldo and Lina, whose emotional and financial support throughout my postgraduate years has been unstinting. I would like to thank Professor Timothy Mathews for kindly offering to steer my project towards completion when my supervisor became unavailable, and the British Academy who funded my research with two Major Studentships between 1997 and 1999. In dedicating this thesis to my companion, Miriam Simonetti, I express my gratitude for her sustaining love and support. Chapter One Introduction The enigmatic, unsystematic character of Rousseau’s writings has proved irresistible to many scholars who have sought in them a unity or coherent ‘system’. The attempt to draw a synthesis first arises in connection with Rousseau’s political theories and the perceived confrontations between the incompatible demands of liberty and authority, of individualism and collectivism.1 Since then, the question has assumed a different, but far more intimate form, assisted by the growth of interest in Rousseauian autobiography, that tries to reconcile the man and his work. Of course, there has never been a shortage of critics who have voiced the incompatibilities between the author’s life and the staunch values his writings proclaim; biographical facts have often been deployed to discredit the validity of Rousseau’s ideas.2 This tendency has subsided but a related discontinuity has taken over, arising from the manner in which Rousseau presents himself in the autobiographies, a self-representation which some consider discredits the system worked out between 1759 and 1762 as the solution to the dilemmas laid bare in the two Discours. Although there exists the undoubted danger that the urge for synthesis may in fact attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable, Rousseau himself insists that the body of his work constitutes a coherent whole.