CULTURE, RELIGION AND COGNITION: BUDDHISM AND HOLISTIC VERSUS ANALYTIC THOUGHT by Alain Samson A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) 2007 University of London The London School of Economics and Political Science Institute of Social Psychology UMI Number: U615882 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U615882 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without the prior written consent of the author. I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of 2 British ity<;(. ann^ca'i.vi, Abstract Some cross-cultural psychologists have shown differences in cognition between Eastern and Western cultures, described as holistic versus analytic (H-A) systems of thought. It is widely assumed that Buddhism has contributed to holistic cognition. This thesis explores holistic thought among Western Buddhists by integrating methods and theories mainly from cross-cultural and social psychology, but also the cognitive anthropology of religion. H-A reasoning among Buddhists, Anglicans and Secular-Humanists in the UK is investigated in a main experiment, providing good backing for hypothesised H-A group differences. Moreover, it supports a hypothesis about the effect of meditation on the categorisation of visual stimuli and strength of holistic beliefs. However, only explicit H-A measures are subject to religious context effects, as evident in their association with religiosity, the religious self-concept and religious integration. Inducing a Buddhist context through religious priming does not result in a holism shift. A follow-up study (2) uses pictorial primes and shows an interaction effect between priming condition and strength o f Buddhist self-concepts on holistic beliefs. Study 3 clarifies religious versus secular differences that were found for the grouping measure used in Study 1 in a correlational design with measures of independence- interdependence, religious identification as well as attraction to Buddhist and Secular- Humanist ideas. It indicates that both self-selection and learning effects may account for secular vs religious H-A differences. The last experiment (Study 4) further develops so-called 'tolerance of contradictions' (TC) as an aspect of H-A cognition and introduces the cognitive anthropological concept of counterintuitive (Cl) beliefs. As expected, results show that religious groups have a higher tolerance of CL Furthermore, compared to normal or bizarre concepts, Cl content reduces TC only among secular individuals, and to some degree Anglicans, but has no such effect on Buddhists. Implications for cross-cultural psychology, the psychology of religion as well as the interdisciplinary field o f ‘cognition and culture’ are discussed. 3 To Adrian Acknowledgements I would like to thank Judy, Adrian and the rest of my family, especially my mother, brother and father, for the great support (both moral and practical) I received during my PhD years. I am particularly grateful for the superior guidance and encouragement received from my PhD supervisor at the LSE, Dr Bradley Franks, during this long intellectual journey, as well as Prof Catherine Loewenthal (Royal Holloway, University of London) and Prof Harvey Whitehouse (University of Oxford) for agreeing to be my examiners. Further thanks go to the members of my upgrading committee, Dr Andrew Wells and Dr Derek Hook, for their valuable feedback, as well as to all fellow PhD students, especially those in the culture and cognition group. I am most thankful for the funding provided by the Institute of Social Psychology and the LSE over the years. A big ‘thank you’ also goes to the hundreds of research participants who have been involved in my pilot research, surveys and experiments, as well as various British Buddhist organisations, Anglican churches, the British Humanist Association and National Secular Society. I am grateful for the practical help, such as research instruments, and feedback I’ve received from numerous academics, including Pascal Boyer, Incheol Choi, Li-Jun Ji, Charles Kalish, Janxin Leu, Catherine Lido, Richard Nisbett, Ara Norenzayan and Dan Sperber. Last but not least, I would like to acknowledge past teachers and mentors at DVC, UC Berkeley and the University of Michigan who provided me with inspiration and intellectual curiosity, particularly Andy Barlow, Steve Johnson, Fenno Ogutu, Jim Stockinger, Joseph Palacios, David Nasatir, Neil Fligstein, Dan Slobin, George Steinmetz, James House, Andre Modigliani, Howard Kimeldorf and Deborah Carr. 5 TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter 1 - Introduction .......................................................................................................... 10 1.1 Cognition, Culture and Religion ............................................................................................10 1.2 Cross-Cultural Differences in Cognition ............................................................................... 10 1.3 Why Religion? Why Buddhism?............................................................................................11 1.4 Thesis Outline ........................................................................................................................ 13 1.4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................13 1.4.2 Theoretical Chapters................................................................................................... 14 1.4.3 Empirical Work...........................................................................................................15 Chapter 2 - Holistic versus Analytic Cognition: Cross-Cultural and Social Psychological Contexts .......................................................................................................................................17 2.1 Holistic versus Analytic Cognition: Empirical Dimensions .................................................. 17 2.1.1 The Social Inference Level of Holistic versus Analytic Cognition: Social Attribution and Prediction ......................................................................................................................17 2.1.2 The Perceptual Level of Holistic versus Analytic Cognition......................................19 2.1.3 The Middle Range of Holistic versus Analytic Cognition: Categorisation, Induction and Conceptual Structure .....................................................................................................21 2.1.4 Formal versus Dialectical Reasoning and Tolerance of Contradiction ...................... 23 2.2 Holistic versus Analytic Cognition: A Typology with Shortcomings...................................26 2.2.1 Tolerance of Contradictions—A Special Case of Holistic versus Analytic Thought .26 2.2.2 Interrelations Between Dimensions of Holistic versus Analytic Cognition ............... 26 2.2.3 What Holistic versus Analytic Cognition Is Not ........................................................27 2.3 Values and Self Traditions of Culture and Cognition ........................................................... 29 2.3.1 Individualism-Collectivism and Independence-Interdependence ...............................30 2.4 Biculturalism and Holistic versus Analytic Cognition .......................................................... 32 2.4.1 Biculturalism and Priming ..........................................................................................34 2.4.2 Priming and Holistic versus Analytic Reasoning ....................................................... 35 2.5 Cultural Differences in Holistic versus Analytic Cognition: Theoretical Considerations 39 2.5.1 Models of Culture and Cognition in Psychology ........................................................ 39 2.5.2 Contributions from Sociological Social Psychology: House's Principles.................. 43 2.6 Culture in Holistic versus Analytic Thought.........................................................................45 2.7 Summary and Implications ....................................................................................................47 Chapter 3 - Religion and Cognition .........................................................................................49 3.1 Religion as a Component of Culture and Psychology.......................................................... 49 3.1.1 The Psychology of Religion........................................................................................50