A FUTURE FOR SOCIALISM IN THE USSR? Justin Schwartz The fate of socialism is linked to the crisis in the USSR, the first nation to profess socialism as an ideal. But as the Soviet Union prepares to drop "socialist" from its name, ' it is opportune to inquire whether there is a future for socialism in the USSR. Whether we think so, however, depends in part on whether we think it had a past. "Actually existing socialism" - we need a new term, perhaps "formerly existing socialism" - is not socialism as historically understood, for example, by Marx, involving a democratically controlled economy and a state subordinate to society. The Soviet system is not socialist in this sense but is essentially Stalinist, both in its historical origin and its character, involving a command economy and a dictatorial state. The Stalinist system forfeited its moral authority by repressiveness and lost its economic legitimacy by unsuccessfully competing with the West on the consumerist grounds that favour capitalism instead of the democratic ones that favour socialism. Having delivered neither prosperity nor democracy, it is in disintegration. Socialism in the USSR would thus require not reclaiming a lost revolutionary achieve- ment, for, despite the early aspirations of the Bolsheviks, the USSR was never socialist, but a systematic transformation of society, not a restructuring (perestroika) but a revolutionary reconstruction. In a crisis situation prediction is speculative, but the short-term prospects for a socialist reconstruction of Soviet society, in the classical sense of the term, are slim. Such a project finds support in some sectors of an increasingly organized and mobilized working class, at least in the Slavic republics, but Soviet workers are sharply divided along ethnic and national lines. Moreover, socialism is not on the agenda of the main groups struggling for mastery in the Soviet elite. Gorbachev's programme of perestroika appears to have run its course as he turns to force to maintain the Union against nationalist separatism. The increasingly dominant liberal intelligentsia, rallying around Boris Yeltsin in the Russian Republic, are explicitly pro- capitalist. But the split in interests between the working class and the new middle classes as well as growing centrifugal nationalism 68 THE SOCIALIST REGISTER 1991 threatens a liberal capitalist reconstitution of Soviet society as much as a socialist one. To many Soviets, political deadlock, civil war, and authoritarian nationalism seem more probable for the present than either a socialist or a liberal outcome. Any happier resolution of the crisis will have to overcome these tendencies. Stalinism versus Socialism Given the current doubts in the USSR and elsewhere about whether "socialism7' has any definite meaning, it is worthwhile to explain why that sense fails to apply to the USSR. Both analytical clarity and the prospects of the left require a sharp distinction between Stalinism and classical or Marxist socialism. This distinction has a long tradition on the non-Stalinist left and is widely echoed in the USSR today. Most of the leading Gorbachev supporters interviewed by Stephen Cohen and Katrina vanden Heuvel in 1989 agreed that the Soviet system was not socialist.' No society fully lives up to its ideals, but the USSR was at best an authoritarian welfare state. If we say it was "backward" or "deformed7' socialism, we will need a new term for what Marx meant. While noncapitalist because it abolished private property in the means of production, Stalinism is closer to what Marx dismisses as "crude communism", a "levelling down to a preconceived minimum", an "abstract negation of the whole world of culture and ci~ilization".~ The essential features of the Soviet system were constructed by the Stalinist bureaucracy in the 1930~~They involved: (1) a single party dictatorship, in which all public life was dominated by a Party bureaucracy and (2) a command economy, in which decisions about production and investment were made by bureaucratic fiat. Rather than being the expression or result of workers' self-rule, the establishment of the system was due, as Soviet economists Nikolai Shmelev and Vladimir Popov argue, to the dominance of the Soviet bureaucracy, a stratum whose interests "directly opposed [the] interests" of the workers and peasants, as shown by the tremendous resistance broken only by forced collectivization and the Great Terror of the 1930s. "The command-administrative system", Shmelev and Popov argue, "was the logical way for the bureaucracy to develop, given the absence of effective control from below".' In an isolated and relatively backward country, lacking strong democratic traditions, and where a militant but extremely small working class had been decimated by civil war, the bureaucracy was able to impose Stalinism as a noncapitalist crash modernization programme. Contrast this to Marx's socialism, not out of deference to the Master's Voice but to undermine the Soviets' claim to Marx's legacy and because the ideal of socialism has, to this day, no more powerful proponent. With respect to politics, Marx gave the party no special 68 THE SOCIALIST REGISTER 1991 threatens a liberal capitalist reconstitution of Soviet society as much as a socialist one. To many Soviets, political deadlock, civil war, and authoritarian nationalism seem more probable for the present than either a socialist or a liberal outcome. Any happier resolution of the crisis will have to overcome these tendencies. Stalinism versus Socialism Given the current doubts in the USSR and elsewhere about whether "socialism" has any definite meaning, it is worthwhile to explain why that sense fails to apply to the USSR. Both analytical clarity and the prospects of the left require a sharp distinction between Stalinism and classical or Marxist socialism. This distinction has a long tradition on the non-Stalinist left and is widely echoed in the USSR today. Most of the leading Gorbachev supporters interviewed by Stephen Cohen and Katrina vanden Heuvel in 1989 agreed that the Soviet system was not socialist. No society fully lives up to its ideals, but the USSR was at best an authoritarian welfare state. If we say it was "backward" or "deformed" socialism, we will need a new term for what Marx meant. While noncapitalist because it abolished private property in the means of production, Stalinism is closer to what Marx dismisses as ''crude communism", a "levelling down to a preconceived minimum", an "abstract negation of the whole world of culture and civilization". The essential features of the Soviet system were constructed by the Stalinist bureaucracy in the 1930s. They involved: (1) a single party dictatorship, in which all public life was dominated by a Party bureaucracy and (2) a command economy, in which decisions about production and investment were made by bureaucratic fiat. Rather than being the expression or result of workers' self-rule, the establishment of the system was due, as Soviet economists Nikolai Shmelev and Vladimir Popov argue, to the dominance of the Soviet bureaucracy, a stratum whose interests "directly opposed [the] interests" of the workers and peasants, as shown by the tremendous resistance broken only by forced collectivization and the Great Terror of the 1930s. "The command-administrative system", Shmelev and Popov argue, "was the logical way for the bureaucracy to develop, given the absence of effective control from below".' In an isolated and relatively backward country, lacking strong democratic traditions, and where a militant but extremely small working class had been decimated by civil war, the bureaucracy was able to impose Stalinism as a noncapitalist crash modernization programme. Contrast this to Marx's socialism, not out of deference to the Master's Voice but to undermine the Soviets' claim to Marx's legacy and because the ideal of socialism has, to this day, no more powerful proponent. With respect to politics, Marx gave the party no special A FUTURE FOR SOCIALISM IN THE USSR? 69 role (much less a monopoly one) in a socialist society. He was deeply suspicious of state power. He opposed setrtingl the state 'free'. as in Russia. Freedom consists in converting the state from an organ superimposed upon society into one completely subordinate to it, and even today forms of the state are more or less free to the extent that they restrict the 'freedom of the ~tate'.~ Rather than creating an omnipotent dictatorship, the workers' state, in Marx's account of the Paris Commune, would "amputate" the "merely repressive organs of the old governmental power" [the army and the police], returning its "legitimate functions" to the responsible agents of society, democratically elected and modestly compensated. "Nothing could be more foreign to the spirit of the Commune to supersede universal suffrage by hierarchic inve~titure,"'~i.e., by the principle of nomenklatura or bureaucratic rule which underpins Stalinist politics. With respect to economics, Marx does suggest wresting "by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie. centraliz[ingl all instruments of production in the hands of the State. ." But given his view of the revolutionary state as "the proletariat organized as ruling class", " the proposal is best read as urging extensive workers' control rather than Stalinist nationalization. Abolition of markets, moreover, is not mentioned in the list of suggested measures in the Manifesto; market relations among worker-controlled enterprises are consistent with Marx's account of "the