CHINA’S RULERS: THE FIFTH GENERATION TAKES POWER (2012–13) Michael Dillon This project is funded by A project implemented by The European Union Steinbeis GmbH & Co. KG für Technologietransfer © Europe China Research and Advice Network, 2012 This publication may be reproduced for personal and educational use only. Commercial copying, hiring or lending of this publication is strictly prohibited. Europe China Research and Advice Network 10 St James’s Square London SW1Y 4LE +44 (0) 20 7314 3659 [email protected] www.euecran.eu Contents Foreword ........................................................................................................ 4 ExecutIve Summary ........................................................................................ 6 Key PRC PolItIcal BodIes .................................................................................. 7 Timetable for Leadership Changes .................................................................. 8 Introduction ................................................................................................... 9 1 Change and ContInuity ............................................................................... 11 2 Senior PolItIcal Appointments .................................................................... 14 3 PolItIcal GeneratIons In China .................................................................... 16 4 CCP FactIons and the SuccessIon Process ................................................... 17 5 Key Issues .................................................................................................. 19 5.1 Taiwan .......................................................................................................... 19 5.2 Corruption and rural protests ....................................................................... 20 5.3 Popular protest and demands for democracy .............................................. 22 5.4 China and the EU .......................................................................................... 23 6 Key Players ................................................................................................ 24 6.1 The third generation ..................................................................................... 24 6.1.1 Jiang Zemin ................................................................................................ 24 6.2 The fourth generation .................................................................................. 26 6.2.1 Hu Jintao .................................................................................................... 26 6.2.2 Wen Jiabao ................................................................................................ 27 6.3 The fifth generation ...................................................................................... 29 6.3.1 Xi Jinping .................................................................................................... 29 6.3.2 Li Keqiang .................................................................................................. 40 6.3.3 The fifth-generation leadership: the Politburo Standing Committee ........ 47 6.3.3.1 Li Yuanchao ........................................................................................ 47 6.3.3.2 Wang Qishan ...................................................................................... 48 6.3.3.3 Wang Yang ......................................................................................... 49 6.3.3.4 Yu Zhengsheng ................................................................................... 50 6.3.3.5 Zhang Dejiang .................................................................................... 52 6.3.3.6 Other possible promotions ................................................................ 52 6.3.4 The Bo Xilai affair ....................................................................................... 52 Select BIblIography ....................................................................................... 56 3 Foreword The leadership transition from what has come to be called the ‘fourth generation’ of Chinese leaders (although this is a term that, at least in the official Chinese press, has never formally been accorded to President Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao and the colleagues around them) to that of the fifth has become one of the most carefully watched issues in recent Chinese studies. This is a little odd, given the stress placed by the current leaders on the idea of collective leadership, the importance of policy over personality, and efforts to conceal the individual personalities and interests of elite political leaders behind a unified Party front. The Communist Party of China has been preparing for a transition of elite leadership for some years. As Michael Dillon makes clear in this paper, part of this is because of the trauma of previous leadership changes. Since 1949, the record has been patchy. Mao struggled to identify a successor, and the individual he finally selected (Hua Guofeng) lasted only a few years before being gently supplanted by Deng Xiaoping. Deng’s own attempts ended in failure, twice. But since the era of Jiang Zemin, things have got better. A focus on institutionalising the transition process has made it more rules-based and predictable. Despite this, the process remains complex. In this paper, Dillon thus focuses on two critical areas: process and personalities. The process by which the new leadership is appointed is important as, after all, it will be central to the new leadership’s legitimacy. Getting it right matters and will offer a precedent for the future. In terms of personalities, the grey technocratic facade of modern China looks likely to break up. There are new leaders who we will need to become very familiar with who, from their provincial records and their previous career paths, show distinct differences from one another. Dillon offers interesting data on where these individuals come from, what their interests might be, and how they might differ when they are elevated into the supreme decision making body of modern China – the Standing Committee of the Politburo. As Dillon comprehensively shows, while the leadership transition is an internal issue for China, its implications extend way beyond China’s shores. As and when the transition occurs, the new leaders will begin a decade of stewardship over the world’s second largest economy and one of its major geopolitical players. We must try to understand these individuals, as the ways in which they decide 4 to deal with China’s problems will impact on us. By giving insights, flesh and form to the sometimes illusive figures at the centre of this political universe, Dillon does great service in shedding light on one of the most interesting, but possibly least understood, aspects of modern China’s remarkable and continuing rise. He does so with an unparalleled knowledge of China’s recent history, using a range of Chinese and English sources. Kerry Brown Team Leader, ECRAN August 2012 5 ExecutIve Summary • The planned transition to the fifth-generation leadership will take place between autumn 2012 and spring 2013. • Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang will succeed Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao as President/General Secretary and Premier respectively. • Hu Jintao is expected to retain control of the Central Military Commission for some time after the transition. • The identity of the new members to be selected for the powerful Politburo Standing Committee and the size of the committee are less certain. • Li Yuanchao, Wang Qishan, Wang Yang, Yu Zhengsheng and Zhang Dejiang are serious contenders for membership of the Politburo Standing Committee. • The candidates for membership of the Politburo Standing Committee are skilled in central and provincial CCP politics but few have significant international experience. • Bo Xilai is no longer a contender since the attempted defection of his Chongqing assistant Wang Lijun and the allegations of Bo’s involvement in the death of Neil Heywood. • There will be no immediate alteration of Beijing’s policies or attitudes as a result of the changes. • The emphasis will remain on economic growth and the robust defence of China’s interests internationally. • In the longer term, some concessions to democracy within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and, more widely, in society are possible. 6 CHINA’S RULERS: THE FIFTH GENERATION TAKES POWER (2012–13) Key PRC PolItIcal Bodies* CCP Chinese Communist Party CC Central CommIttee Its 350 members and alternate members meet annually in full (plenary) session. CCP NatIonal Congress Formally the highest authority of the CCP; it meets every five years. CMC Central Military Commission. Its 12 members exercise CCP control over the People’s Liberation Army. CPPCC Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. The advisory ‘second chamber’. It represents non-Party and minority interests and meets annually. NPC National People’s Congress. The 3,000 members of this quasi-parliamentary legislature meet annually. PolItburo Its 25 members meet monthly. PolItburo StandIng CommIttee The centre of real political power; its currently nine members meet weekly. *Membership figures are approximate and vary from time to time. 7 Timetable for Leadership Changes Date MeetIng GeneratIon Leadership 2017 19th CCP Congress Sixth-generation core Autumn/winter leadership provisionally announced 2013 National People’s Congress Fifth-generation Xi takes office as Spring leadership to be President and Li as