BACK TO BASICS A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD Lieutenant Colonel Scott C. Farquhar General Editor Combat Studies Institute Press US Army Combined Arms Center Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Form Approved Report Documentation Page OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. 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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 156 unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR) Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 BACK TO BASICS A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD Lieutenant Colonel Scott C. Farquhar General Editor Combat Studies Institute Press US Army Combined Arms Center Fort Leavenworth, Kansas Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Back to basics : a study of the second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD / Scott C. Farquhar, general editor. p. cm. ISBN 978-0-9823283-3-0 1. Israel--Military policy. 2. Gaza War, 2008-2009. 3. Lebanon War, 2006--Infl uence. 4. Israel. Tseva haganah le-Yisra’el--Drill and tactics. 5. Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyah. 6. Hizballah (Lebanon) I. Farquhar, Scott C. II. Title. DS119.767.B33 2009 956.9405’4--dc22 2009015841 First printing, May 2009 CSI Press publications cover a variety of military history topics. The views expressed in this CSI Press publication are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense. A full list of CSI Press publications, many of them available for downloading, can be found at http:// usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/RandPTeam.asp The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document as an offi cial publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to use CSI’s offi cial seal on any republication of this material without the written permission of the Director of CSI. Foreword The Israeli incursions into Lebanon in mid-2006 and into Gaza in late 2008/early 2009 are important studies in contrasts. During the first, often termed “the Second Lebanon War,” Hezbollah fought Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) seeking hostage rescue and retribution to a bloody standstill. During the second, Hamas enjoyed far less success against the same forces avowedly in pursuit of only self-defense. These and other differences notwithstanding, the two conflicts are both similar and linked in several important respects. Each witnessed protagonists that were anxious—even desperate—to win prestige and demonstrate the ca­ pacity to safeguard survival. Each also confronted a conventional armed force with antagonists, Hezbollah and Hamas, which are possible prototypes for the non-state adversaries the US could face in the future. Moreover, each conflict witnessed the successful prosecution of information operations in ways that highlighted the importance of the “new media” in contemporary war. At the same time, the conflicts were linked intellectually, to the extent that the IDF studied lessons learned from the first, especially in the realm of information operations, to condition planning and application for the second. The current work metaphorically extends IDF lessons learned to distill in­ sights from the two conflicts for the education of US Army leaders. Produced in a short period of time, this anthology represents the collaborative effort of several organizations, including CAC’s Center for Army Lessons Learned, the Combat Studies Institute, the US Army’s Information Operations Proponent, the Command and General Staff College, and TRADOC’s Intelligence Sup­ port Activity. Relying on a mixture of primary and secondary materials from a variety of sources and agencies, the authors have combined multiple perspec­ tives under the roof of a single unclassified study. Like the classics, it reaffirms the importance of basics and constant introspection as important prerequisites for military success. William B. Caldwell, IV Lieutenant General, US Army Commanding iii Contents Page Foreword ................................................................................................ iii Introduction ....................................................................................... 1 Chapter 1. Hard Lessons Learned ......................................................... 5 The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War ........................................... 6 “Training, Training and Training As Well As Innovative Thinking”: The IDF Response to the 2006 War With Hezbollah ............................................................... 21 The Gaza Conflict .............................................................. 24 Conclusion ......................................................................... 34 Chapter 2. Hamas and Hezbollah: A Comparison of Tactics .............. 45 Introduction ...................................................................... 45 Applicati on of the PMESII+PT Variables ............................ 46 Hamas and Hezbollah ....................................................... 46 Politi cal .............................................................................. 48 Military .............................................................................. 50 Economic ........................................................................... 53 Social ................................................................................. 55 Infrastructure .................................................................... 56 Information ....................................................................... 57 Physical Environment ........................................................ 58 Time .................................................................................. 60 The 2006 Second Lebanon War ........................................ 60 Hezbollah TTPs .................................................................. 61 2008-2009 Hamas/Israeli Conflict ..................................... 67 Hamas TTPs ....................................................................... 68 Conclusion ......................................................................... 73 v Chapter 3. The Tacti cs of Operati on CAST LEAD ................................ 83 Scope ................................................................................. 83 Revisiti ng the Second Lebanon War .................................. 83 The Intervening Years, 2006-2008 ..................................... 86 Operati on CAST LEAD—Implementing Lessons Learned .................................................... 89 Conclusion ......................................................................... 97 Chapter 4. Informati on Strategies Against A Hybrid Threat ............ 103 Introduction .................................................................... 103 The Rising Importance of the Informati on Battle ............ 103 The Adversary’s Strategy ................................................. 106 The Second Lebanon War: A Batt le of Strategic Narrati ves ............................................. 114 Emerging Lessons for the United States Army ................ 131 An Initi al Review of the Implications ............................... 134 Conclusion ....................................................................... 142 vi Introduction Recently the Economist magazine referred to the Arab-Israeli conflicts as “The Hundred Years’ War” in its coverage of the Israeli Defense Forces’ as­ sault on Hamas in the Gaza Strip during Operation CAST LEAD. Comparing this seemingly intractable ethno-sectarian conflict to Europe’s fratricidal wars is taking the long view and is apt to explain it to interested readers. This study does not try to encapsulate the origins nor predict the future of this long and on-going conflict; instead it examines the combat actions in two of the most recent operations in Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. The common denominator in these fights is the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Consequently the writing team focused