Foreign Policy at BROOKINGS Incorporating Unmanned Aerial Systems Into The Japan Air Self-Defense Force Colonel Ryoji Shirai, Japan Air Self-Defense Force INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FELLOW st CENTER FOR 21 CENTURY SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE POLICY PAPER September 2014 Foreign Policy at BROOKINGS The views expressed in this monograph are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Government of Japan or Japan Ministry of Defense. COVER PHOTO COURTESY OF THE U.S. AIR FORCE FLICKR, SENIOR AIRMAN NICHELLE ANDERSON HTTPS://CREATIVECOMMONS.ORG/LICENSES/BY-NC/2.0/LEGALCODE CONTENTS ILLUSTRATIONS ............................................................................................................... IV ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................................................................................................... V EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................... VI CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 1 CHAPTER 2: CONSIDERATIONS FOR INCORPORATING UAS INTO JASDF ...... 4 Background and Definition of UAS ............................................................................. 4 What Kind of Equipment Should the JASDF Acquire? ............................................ 6 For What Purposes and Missions Should UAS Be Utilized? ................................... 8 How Should the JASDF Organize UAS Force Structure? ....................................... 10 Who Should Control UAS, and What Kind of Training and Personnel Systems Should the JASDF Implement? .............................................................. 11 Which Service Should be in Charge of the UAS Sector? ......................................... 12 Summary and Assumptions: What are the Best UAS for the JSDF? ..................... 12 CHAPTER 3: CASE STUDY I: THE U.S. MILITARY'S COMMITMENT TO UAS.... 15 The United States Army .............................................................................................. 15 The United States Navy and Marine Corps .............................................................. 16 The United States Air Force ........................................................................................ 18 Department of Defense Efforts ................................................................................... 19 Summary and Lessons for the JASDF ........................................................................ 20 CHAPTER 4: CASE STUDY II: LESSONS FROM OTHER ALLIED AIR FORCES ... 23 The United Kingdom's Royal Air Force .................................................................... 23 The French Air Force .................................................................................................... 24 The German Air Force .................................................................................................. 25 The Royal Australian Air Force .................................................................................. 26 The Israeli Air Force ..................................................................................................... 27 Summary of Allied Air Forces' Experiences ............................................................. 28 CHAPTER 5: REVIEW OF THE EAST ASIA SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ............. 30 Political Considerations and Assumptions ............................................................... 30 Current JASDF Force Structure .................................................................................. 32 Japan's Current Perspective and Commitment to UAS .......................................... 33 Challenges and Dilemmas in Implementing UAS into the JSDF ........................... 34 CHAPTER 6: RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................ 36 CENTER FOR 21ST CENTURY SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE AT BROOKINGS ii JASDF UAS Doctrine .................................................................................................... 36 Leadership, Education and Personnel ....................................................................... 37 Cultivating a Unique UAS Culture Within JASDF .................................................. 37 CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION ............................................................................................ 39 GLOSSARY .......................................................................................................................... 42 BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................. 44 ABOUT THE AUTHOR ..................................................................................................... 47 CENTER FOR 21ST CENTURY SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE AT BROOKINGS iii ILLUSTRATIONS FIGURE 1. Midterm Defense Program .............................................................................. 5 FIGURE 2. Types of UAS (DOD Groupings) .................................................................... 8 TABLE 1. Classification of UAS in the U.S. Miliary ....................................................... 22 TABLE 2. Classification of UAS in Allied Air Forces .................................................... 29 FIGURE 3. Population of Japan......................................................................................... 31 FIGURE 4. TACOM Systems ............................................................................................. 33 CENTER FOR 21ST CENTURY SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE AT BROOKINGS iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author would like to thank Peter W. Singer, Tom “Boot” Hill, Col. Cyril Carcy, Grp. Capt. Jez Milne, Col. Pedro Renn, Wg. Cmdr. Phil Arms, Cmdr. Thomas King (USCG), Col. Kenneth Ekman (USAF), Col. Johnnie Johnson (USA), Krista Couture (NCTC), Cmdr. Robert DeBuse (USN), Col. Aaron Marx (ret., USMC), Cmdr. Greg Knepper (USN), and Maj. Gen. Atsushi Hikita for their helpful comments on this paper. CENTER FOR 21ST CENTURY SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE AT BROOKINGS v EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This paper seeks to provide military policy makers and planners with constructive suggestions for the acquisition of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) given the regional strategic environment in East Asia and Japanese military culture. The strategic environment around Japan has grown more complicated with the rapid expansion of military activity in the sea and airspace surrounding Japan, including incursions into Japanese territory. One of Japan’s most important military modernization plans is the Japan Air Self-Defense Force’s (JASDF) replacement of the F-4 fighter jet with the Joint Strike Fighter (F-35). Although this requires considerable funding, JASDF also plans to acquire airborne radar and tanker aircraft. At the same time, JASDF must reinforce its ISR capabilities to keep watch over the East China Sea. If Japan pursues both fighter and ISR upgrades, it might create a military imbalance in the East Asian theater over the next decade and strain fiscal and human resources. Thus, Japan should focus on acquiring new systems that can be quickly deployed to the front and will cost less than conventional weapons. It must be UAS. This paper argues that UAS will fully support the modernization of the JASDF. But which systems should Japan acquire and for which missions? The U.S. Air Force (USAF) model is pilot-based, but the U.S. Army also operates UAS equipped with sensors and weapons. JASDF should consider the USAF as a model and operate the same UAVs so it can fully benefit from American expertise. Nowadays, UAS not only provide intelligence with their sensors, but they also play a decisive role in combat. The USAF has improved the UAS contribution to joint warfighting operations. Given these developments, Japan must focus on Chinese and South Korean responses in case Japan starts to operate UAS and consider how to create a UAS culture both within and without Japan’s borders. In the end, I suggest three important concepts related to “doctrine, leadership and culture.” It is critical that the doctrine highlight the need to adapt to increased missions without extra cost and overloads. When formulating UAV doctrine, Japan must include an operational concept for the future mission and alternative plans for delayed modernization programs. An autonomously controlled UAV such as UCAV could compensate for conventional air power. Second, in order to implement UAVs effectively, leaders must be fluent in UAV capabilities and have a future vision for UAV contributions to war. The JASDF also needs to create a new UAV culture. All JASDF members should learn about UAVs to help eliminate prejudices against them. The Japanese military should create a joint operations research team for UAVs in the Joint Chief of Staff, cooperate with the Joint UAS Center of Excellence to learn from U.S. CENTER FOR 21ST CENTURY SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE AT BROOKINGS vi military expertise and enhance interoperability. The JASDF should also expand UAV culture outside their organization in order to execute ISR missions efficiently with allied forces. NATO already has these kinds of organizations, known as JCGISR and JCGUAV. Furthermore, Japan has been forced to deal with the unilateral creation of the Chinese air defense identification zone. The JASDF must take into consideration the need to avoid an unexpected accident, such as a midair collision. We need to establish a risk-averting mechanism as well, such as a multilateral