ISSN 1451-3455 UDC 1:2 е-ISSN 2620-0163 PHILOTHEOS International Journal for Philosophy and Theology Philotheos (Φιλόθεος) is an international scholarly jour- nal that provides a forum for a dialogue in philosophy and in theology respectively, with a special focus on the dialogue between the two. Founded in 2001, it brings together articles and book reviews of philosophical and 19.1 (2018) theological interest in the broader Christian tradition. Contributions are published in several European languag- es and they cover diverse field of inquiry from antiquity to the present. The overarching goal is to overcome the disciplinarian entrenchments in philosophy and theolo- gy and reintegrate professional questions with the need to answer to problems placed before us by life itself. PHILOTHEOS 19.1 2019 ΦΙΛΟΘΕΟΣ 19.1 (2019) PHILOTHEOS International Journal for Philosophy and Theology 19.1 2019 Sebastian Press GNOMON Center for Philosophy Los Angeles Center for the Humanities and Theology, Trebinje Belgrade 2019 ISSN 1451-3455 UDC 1:2 е-ISSN 2620-0163 International Journal for Philosophy and Theology Founding Editor and Editor-in-Chief Bogoljub Šijaković (Belgrade) Executive Editors Georgios Arabatzis (Athens), David Bradshaw (Lexington, KY), Predrag Čičovački (Worcester, MA), Alexey G. Dunaev (Moscow), Markus Enders (Freiburg i. Br.), Jens Halfwassen (Heidelberg), Andrej Jeftić (Belgrade), Dmitriy Makarov (Ekaterinburg), Mikonja Knežević (Kosovska Mitrovica), Vladan Perišić (Belgrade), Marko Vilotić (Belgrade) Book Review Editors Rade Kisić (Belgrade), Bogdan Lubardić (Belgrade) Editorial Board Petar Bojanić (Belgrade), Jean-François Colosimo (Paris), Ingolf Ulrich Dalferth (Claremont, CA), John A. Demetracopoulos (Patras), Darko Djogo (Foča), Christophe Erismann (Wien), Thomas Sören offmannH (Hagen), Vittorio Hösle (Notre Dame, IN), Georgi Kapriev (Sofia), Basil Lourié (Saint Petersburg), Krzysztof Narecki (Lublin), Gorazd Kocijančič (Ljubljana), Časlav Koprivica (Belgrade), Nicholaos Loudovikos (Thessaloniki), Dragan Prole (Novi Sad), Philipp W. Rosemann (Maynooth), Christos Terezis (Patras), Werner Theobald (Kiel), Maksim Vasiljević (Belgrade / Los Angeles) Editorial Assistant and Secretary Jovana Šijaković (Belgrade) Advisory Board Konstantine Boudouris (Athens), Thomas Bremer (Münster), Grigorije Durić (Düsseldorf ), Alois Maria Haas (Zürich), Christoph Jamme (Lüneburg), Václav Ježek (Prešov), Andrew Louth (Darlington), Klaus Müller (Münster), Friedo Ricken (München), Josef Seifert (Granada), Walter Sparn (Erlangen), Wolfgang Speyer (Salzburg), Torstein Theodor ollefsenT (Oslo), Christos Yannaras (Athens) ISSN 1451-3455 UDC 1:2 е-ISSN 2620-0163 International Journal for Philosophy and Theology PHILOTHEOS Vol. 19.1 (2019) pp. 1–144 L. Scott Smith: A Christian View of “Faith” in God: a Bi-Modal Interpretation .......................... 5 Bogdan Lubardić: Missiological Dimensions of Philosophy: St Paul, the Greek Philosophers and contact-point making (Acts 17:16-34) ........ 22 Dionysios Skliris: Ambiguities in Plotinus’ Account of the Generation of the Intellect from the One ............................................................................. 76 Jeffrey Dirk Wilson: A Proposed Solution of St. Thomas Aquinas’s “Third Way” ThroughPros Hen Analogy ............................................................................... 85 Werner Theobald: Trauma und Transzendenz. Zur Existenzphilosophie Kierkegaards ..................... 106 Predrag Čičovački: Leo Tolstoy on the Purpose of Art ..................................................................... 116 Ivana Noble, Zdenko Širka: Doctrine of Deification in the Works of Cardinal Tomáš Špidlík and His Pupils .................................................................................................. 125 L. Scott Smith: A Christian View of “Faith” in God: a Bi-Modal Interpretation Philotheos 19.1 (2019) 5–21 L. Scott Smith McGregor, TX, USA A Christian View of “Faith” in God: a Bi-Modal Interpretation Abstract: While central to the Christian religion, the act of faith has been notoriously difficult to de- fine. This essay is an attempt to illuminate, with the aid of insights from cognitive science and pro- cess philosophy, what it means for a Christian to have faith, specifically in God. In doing so, the apri- ori and aposteriori aspects of faith are explored, along with its connections to science and empirical evidence, revelation, knowledge, doubt, morality, and additional Christian beliefs. Key words: process philosophy, cognitive science, epistemology, a priori, nonreflective belief, reflec- tive belief, knowledge, modes of faith In the Christian religion, as in others, the idea of faith is front and center. St. Paul instructs Christians that the righteousness of God is revealed “through faith for faith” (Rom 1:17) and that “what is not of faith is sin” (14:23). Jesus ruefully referred to his closest disciples as “men of little faith” when they feared perishing in a storm at sea (Matt 8:26), and on an- other occasion explained to them that they would be able to move mountains if they had “faith as a grain of mustard seed” (Matt 17:20). It is also clear that Christians are to stand firm in their faith (I Cor 16:13). The Christian religion, from beginning to end, treats faith as a cardinal virtue of both thought and action. Yet defining the term defies easy consensus. It has been described,inter alia, as “a feel- ing of absolute dependence” and “God consciousness” (Friedrich Schleiermacher), an “ul- timate concern” (Paul Tillich), a “leap” (Soren Kierkegaard), the “will to believe” (William James), a “moral disposition” (Immanuel Kant), an “encounter” (Emil Brunner), an act of trust (Martin Buber), an experience of “the holy” (Rudolf Otto). and even of knowledge (Dallas Willard). While plausible arguments can be made to support these descriptions as highlighting aspects of faith, none alone captures the quintessence of the term. In some re- spects, it may appear that jettisoning it because of its vagueness would be a prudent course. But the Christian tradition supports the idea of faith and, moreover, is dependent upon it. It is incumbent upon Christians to retain and to use the term, yet in the most informed manner possible. Synthesizing insights from cognitive science and process philosophy, I will attempt to advance and to defend a novel view of faith, arguing that it is bi-modal, or manifested in two ways. No claim is being made that what is offered herein should be regarded as defin- itive or that it, ipso facto, precludes other definitions of the term. This essay is instead pre- L. Scott Smith 6 sented in the modest hope that it will be helpful to those attempting to understand and to defend the term. Throughout this treatment of the matter, I will assume that the act of faith (fide qua creditur) and its content (fide quae creditur) are mutually implicative. Since many readers may be unfamiliar with relevant findings from cognitive science, I will begin with an explanation of them. From Intuition to Rational Theology When considering faith, one must distinguish between its modes. There are two modes, one primal and basic and the other expansive and developed. Faith in its more elemental mode is a vague nonreflective belief,1 from which flowers an intellectually reflective one.2 Cognitive scientist Justin L. Barrett explains the difference between the two kinds of belief. The former occurs instantaneously and often below immediate conscious apprehension and is guided by “our information processing, speech, and other actions,”3 whereas the lat- ter is ponderous and involves deliberation or instruction,4 and represents the “higher-or- der” or “executive functions”5 of the mind. Reflective beliefs are those that we “consciously hold and explicitly endorse”6 One who is hungry may, for example, believe nonreflectively that she should eat. She may also believe reflectively, either through examination of nutri- tional data or explicit instruction, that she should consume mostly foods high in protein. Tools of the human mind categorize, describe, and facilitate what we encounter in experience, and do so unconsciously with amazing fluidity.7 They represent, according to Barrett, the fundamental tools of human cognition. The “categorizers” receive information from the senses and determine the character of what is perceived, such as whether it is a plant, an animal, or a human artifact.8 One such categorizer detects the agency of others on the basis of their beliefs and desires. If an individual, for instance, places a tool in a stor- age shed and soon thereafter opens the shed only to discover that the tool is not there, the mind’s “agency detection device” is instantly activated, forming the conclusion that some- one opened the shed and removed the tool. The “describers”9 determine the properties of an object once identified by a catego- rizer. They accomplish this in a variety of ways. When a small child, for example, recog- nizes an object as a ball, the child automatically assumes that the object has all the prop- erties of a ball; meaning that it occupies a single location at a given time, is unable to pass through other solid objects, is subject to gravity, and is movable by contact. When the cat- 1 Justin L. Barrett, Cognitive Science, Religion, and Theology (West Conshohocken, PA: Templeton Press, 2011), 47. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 48. 4 Justin L. Barrett, Why Would Anyone Believe in God? (Boulder: AltaMira Press, 2004), 1-2. 5 Ibid., 7. 6 Barrett, Cognitive Science,