Further written evidence from 51M (HSR 109B) This supplementary evidence is submitted to update the Committee on issues related to the “Optimised Alternative”, as described in Chapter 1 of our main submission, and to respond to the supplementary evidence submitted to the Committee by DfT and HS2 Ltd this week. Given the time constraints we have provided a detailed response on the Optimised Alternative and overview responses on a number of the issues raised in the DfT and HS2 Ltd supplementary evidence. We may provide a more detailed response to the Committee on certain items of the supplementary evidence in the near future. Optimised Alternative Neither DfT nor HS2 Ltd has made any attempt to engage with us directly on our proposed approach or the Optimised Alternative. DfT acknowledge that they have not carried out a full analysis of 51m’s alternative, despite its higher capacity and its lower capital costs than Atkins’ Rail Package 2. This is somewhat surprising since it has now been in the public domain for some 3 months. Below we respond to the statements made by DfT and HS2 Ltd in their supplementary evidence and the “Yes to High Speed Rail” campaign paper from William Barter, which purports to analyse the Optimised Alternative. • Both the DfT’s supplementary evidence and the William Barter paper assert that much of the 215% additional capacity set out in the Optimised Alternative doesn’t count, as any calculation of capacity increases should be based on the capacity after completion of the existing project to lengthen some of the current 52 Pendolino trains from 9 to 11 cars. This is fundamentally wrong as the HS2 Ltd business case has a 2007/8 base, from which the HS2 forecast of 102% background growth has been made, and any comparison clearly has to start from this same base, the capacity available in 2007/08. • In addition the DfT response asserts that the Optimised Alternative only provides around 30% more capacity than the capacity available following completion of the committed Pendolino lengthening project. However, the correct figure is 57%, as set out in Table 1.1 of Chapter 11 of our initial submission to the Committee. • The Barter paper claims that converting one first class car to standard ignores peak first class loadings. But first class passenger numbers have declined significantly in recent years, reflecting cut-backs in travel costs by both the private and public sectors, even though most first class passengers 1 http://www.51m.co.uk/sites/default/files/uploads/ch1.pdf are now using discounted, advance purchase fares – in some cases lower than standard class on the same train. First class loadings are not high even in the business peaks, and numbers on the great majority of trains don’t fill one first class coach, let alone four. • We are also accused of ignoring peak loadings generally. But the Network Rail WCML Route Utilisation Strategy2 shows only 2 out of 287 trains daily with standing passengers on the route, at around 1900 in the evening, reflecting time restrictions for regulated off-peak (“saver”) fares. This is an artificial peak – are “Yes to High Speed Rail” really saying that we should spend £32 billion on HS2 because of overcrowding caused by time restrictions on off-peak fares? The Optimised Alternative fully meets forecast background growth in peak periods, with a 138% increase in standard class capacity compared with the 2007/8 base. The Optimised Alternative is described in detail in Appendix 1 of 51m’s consultation response at www.51m.co.uk. – this updates and amplifies Chapter 1 of our original submission, and includes a detailed analysis of peak capacity 51m are criticised for not costing or scoping investment in additional vehicles, depot facilities, platform lengthening and any necessary track and signalling alterations to enable 12 car operations. Similarly, we are criticised for not carrying out a cost-benefit analysis of the alternative. We would strongly argue that it is DfT’s responsibility to ensure that all alternatives are properly considered before embarking on a project of the scale of HS2, and 51m do not have the technical and financial resources to undertake such work. However, it is clear from analysis of Atkins’ previous work for DfT3 that 12 car operations (except to Liverpool) would be achievable at a fraction of the cost of HS2. DfT challenge our view that there would be no adverse impact on performance as a result of increased services in the Optimised Alternative. But we propose investment to eliminate bottlenecks such as Ledburn Junction, and this approach is supported by Atkins’ previous work for DfT, which concluded: “Even with higher levels of train frequency, the packages may enhance train performance at a network level…..these locations may more than 2 http://www.networkrail.co.uk/browse%20documents/rus%20documents/route%20utilisatio n%20strategies/west%20coast%20main%20line/westcoastmainlinerus.pdf page 48 3 Rail Interventions Report March 2010 Appendix C pages 35 – 39 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspee drail/alternativestudy/pdf/railintervention.pdf compensate for other areas where there will be an enhanced train frequency but no infrastructure enhancements” 4 DfT’s response contains factual inaccuracies: the correct position is that (1) the illustrative service pattern for the Optimised Alternative has fewer peak hour trains than Rail Package 2 and (2) no additional trains are proposed on the Coventry – Birmingham section of the route We are criticised for assuming that no additional platforms are necessary at Euston. However, HS2’s supplementary evidence claims that the current level of service can be maintained during Euston reconstruction with only 14 platforms. Our proposal only envisages an extra 2/3 peak trains an hour over present levels with the current 18 platforms – on the basis of HS2’s own submission, this is clearly achievable. DfT supplementary evidence (30th August) Oxera question 3 – Reliability of Conventional Services We would reiterate that the published service plans for HS2 have major reliability risks. In contrast, the Optimised Alternative envisages investment at key locations to remove conflicting movements (Ledburn Junction) and improve segregation between InterCity and freight trains (Colwich/Stafford). The reliability impacts are set out in Chapter 4 of our original submission.5 Oxera question 7 – Productive Time on Trains DfT imply in their response that HS2 will reduce crowding. This may be true on average, but we have shown (Chapter 8)6, that HS2’s planned capacity on key routes (Manchester [Phase1], Preston/Glasgow and York/Newcastle) is clearly inadequate, almost certainly resulting in a higher proportion of overcrowded trains overall, with inadequate capacity on some routes balanced by massive over- capacity to Birmingham as detailed in the 51m’s consultation response - Appendix 17. Oxera question 14 – Disruption Impacts The Optimised Alternative will result in significantly less overall disruption because of the impact of HS2’s major reconstruction construction at Euston (Chapter 10)7 4 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/highspeedrail/alter nativestudy/pdf/railintervention.pdf Appendix B Section 1.1.1 page 16 5 http://www.51m.co.uk/sites/default/files/uploads/ch4.pdf 6 http://www.51m.co.uk/sites/default/files/uploads/ch8.pdf 7 http://www.51m.co.uk/sites/default/files/uploads/ch10.pdf HS2 supplementary evidence (30th August) HS2’s evidence starts with the statement that “the Committee asked a question on the proposed 18 trains per hour service level. We are aware that this has been raised as an issue during the consultation and we have begun further work in this area”. The delivery of 18 trains per hour is clearly a vital part of the HS2 business case, and we consider that it is extraordinary that HS2 Ltd and DfT had not satisfied themselves on the deliverability of the claimed capacity of HS2 prior to commencing consultation. Question 1 – when will WCML capacity be exhausted? HS2 state that actual growth on Virgin has been around 10% per year between 2008 and 2011, and imply that this high level of growth is likely to continue. We believe this is wrong; the route upgrade was completed in 2008, with major reductions in journey time and frequency increases, so high levels of growth would certainly be expected for three or four years, particularly after years of disruption during the upgrade – but this level of growth is most unlikely to continue. HS2 seek to dismiss pricing as a means of smoothing demand on the basis of a 2006/7 AECOM study for DfT – but it appears that this was focussed on commuter, not long distance flows, which have different characteristics. Question 4 – Implications of Evergreen 3 HS2 Ltd confirms they have not modelled the impact of Evergreen 3. This project, completed on 4th September, provides an attractive alternative to the WCML route to the West Midlands, with only slightly longer journey times and peak fares little more than half Virgin’s. Evergreen 3 has been carried out at the franchisee’s risk, at no cost to the taxpayer, and will certainly free up capacity on the current Virgin service, yet this significant upgrade has effectively been dismissed as irrelevant. HS2 Ltd also state that the Chiltern route is only a viable alternative for passenger travelling from London to Birmingham but this is vitally important as the first phase of HS2 is only from London to Birmingham and is the only phase upon which HS2 have produced any information or detailed analysis Question 7 – Disruption Impacts of HS2 Euston Works We note that, in contrast to their previous evidence of July 2011 which identified that they would be able to provide the off peak service during the reconstruction, this in itself being a 40% reduction from the peak service (ref), HS2 Ltd are now saying that they expect to maintain current service levels throughout the Euston reconstruction period, except for major closures at Bank Holiday periods, despite a reduction from 18 to 14 platforms and wholesale reconstruction of the approach tracks.