Self-Punishment as Guilt Evasion: Theoretical Issues1 Donald L. Carveth Whereas Freud commonly associates guilt with the self-directed aggression of the punitive superego and invariably equates unconscious guilt with the unconscious need for punishment expressed in patterns of self-torment and self-sabotage, Klein views guilt as what Winnicott called “the capacity for concern,” the depressive anxiety that our hate may damage or destroy the good object and self. Without calling into question Freud’s equation of unconscious guilt with the unconscious need for punishment, writers in the Kleinian tradition have addressed the ways in which self-torment, rather than being a manifestation of guilt, serves as a defence against it. As a guilt-substitute, the unconscious need for punishment should not be conflated with the guilt it evades. As depressive anxiety or concern for the object, guilt is a manifestation of attachment and love (Eros) and moti- vates the desire to make reparation. In contrast, the unconscious need for punishment involves the persecutory anxiety and shame characterizing the paranoid-schizoid position and is a manifestation of narcissism and hate (Thanatos). The discontent Freud links with civilization is not a manifestation of guilt but of the self-torment resulting from its evasion. The enlarged capacity to experience and bear guilt (i.e., to love and thereby have conscience) that is a mark of civilization reflects the healing, not the deepening, of our cultural malaise. 1. Presented to the Toronto Psychoanalytic Society, September 13, 2006, this paper is a much revised and expanded version of a paper entitled “The Unconscious Need for Punishment: Expression or Evasion of the Sense of Guilt?” first pre- sented at an International Symposium on Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents (McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario, September 1999) and subsequently published in Psychoanalytic Studies, 3(1), 9–21. Canadian Journal of Psychoanalysis Vol. 14, No. 2 Revue canadienne de psychanalyse Self-Punishment Alors que Freud associe généralement la culpabilité à l’agression d’un sur- moi punitif dirigée contre le moi, et assimile invariablement la culpabilité inconsciente à un besoin inconscient de punition qui s’exprime dans des tendances à l’autoflagellation et à l’autosabotage, Klein considère la culpa- bilité comme ce que Winnicott a appelé « la capacité de s’inquiéter », ou l’anxiété dépressive provoquée par la crainte que notre haine n’endommage ou ne détruise le bon objet et le moi. Sans remettre en question le concept freudien, les auteurs de tradition kleinienne se sont penchés sur diverses manières d’interpréter l’autoflagellation non comme une manifestation de la culpabilité, mais plutôt comme un mécanisme de défense contre celle-ci. Le besoin inconscient de punition, en tant que substitut à la culpabilité, ne doit pas être confondu avec la culpabilité même à laquelle il tente de sous- traire le moi. En tant qu’anxiété dépressive ou inquiétude envers l’objet, la culpabilité est une manifestation d’attachement et d’amour (Eros), qui motive le désir de réparation. En revanche, le besoin inconscient de puni- tion renvoie à l’anxiété persécutrice et la honte sous-jacentes à la position paranoïde-schizoïde, et constitue une manifestation de narcissisme et de haine (Thanatos). Le malaise que Freud associe à la civilisation n’est pas une manifestation de culpabilité, mais l’autoflagellation qu’entraîne la fuite devant cette culpabilité. La capacité plus large de vivre et de tolérer la culpabilité (à savoir, d’aimer et par conséquent d’avoir conscience d’exister) est une marque de civilisation qui tend vers la guérison plutôt que vers l’aggravation de notre malaise culturel. In the end we come to see that we are dealing with what may be called a “moral” factor . which is finding its satisfaction in the illness and refuses to give up the punishment of suffering . But as far as the patient is concerned this sense of guilt is dumb; it does not tell him he is guilty; he does not feel guilty, he feels ill. — Sigmund Freud A person will spend his whole life writhing in the clutches of the super- ficial, psychological symptoms of guilt unless he learns to speak its true language. —James Carroll n the final section (vii) of Civilization and Its Discontents, Freud (1930) states that the primary intention of this work is “to represent the sense Iof guilt as the most important problem in the development of civiliza- tion and to show that the price we pay for our advance in civilization is a loss of happiness through the heightening of the sense of guilt” (p. 134). 177 Donald L. Carveth According to Freud, “men are not gentle creatures who want to be loved, and who at the most can defend themselves if they are attacked,” but are, on the contrary, “creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness . Homo homini lupus. Who, in the face of all his experience of life and of history, will have the courage to dispute this assertion?” (p. 111). It follows that if a Hobbesian “war of each against all” in which life is, of necessity, “nasty, brutish and short” is to give way to civilized order, such “cruel aggressiveness,” this “primary mutual hostility of human beings” (p. 112), must in some way or another be inhibited.2 Freud offers us three options by which this may be achieved: repres- sion, suppression, and sublimation. Since most of us do not possess the strength of character for conscious suppression and self-mastery without self-deception, and lack the talent for much sublimation, the majority will be forced to fall back on repression, with the disguised return of the repressed that this choice inevitably entails. A major manifestation of the disguised return of our repressed aggressiveness is in the operations of the punitive superego that retroflects id aggression away from the object world against the ego. This results in diverse forms of self-punishment, the “moral masochism” Freud (1916) described in “the criminal from a sense of guilt,” “those wrecked by success,” and other self-sabotaging and self-tormenting character-types. Freud (1916, 1920, 1923, 1924, 1930) equates the unconscious need for punishment expressed in patterns of self-torment and self-sabotage that result from retroflected aggression with an unconscious sense of guilt, which operates in people’s lives without any accompanying consciousness of guilt. Freud (1930) points out that even where, as in some cases of obsessional neurosis, “the sense of guilt makes itself noisily heard in consciousness . in most other cases and forms of neurosis it remains completely unconscious, without on that account producing any less important effects” (p. 135). 2. As to whether such hostility is innate or acquired, I have elsewhere (Carveth 1996) advocated an existentialist position that, while acknowledging the influ- ence of both nature and nurture, views aggression as irreducible to either factor or even to their combination. The frustration arising from the birth of a sibling can generate hostility causing intense guilt or guilt-evading self-punishment, yet such hostility can hardly be viewed as a simple drive (however biologically based the aggressive reaction to frustration may be), or attributed to environmental fail- ure, although parental behaviour can either mitigate or intensify it. 178 Self-Punishment When the sense of guilt “makes itself noisily heard in consciousness,” it often turns out that the ostensible sins of omission or commission with which it is consciously linked bear only the remotest connection to the true, unconscious sources of the guilt feeling—the true crimes, if you will, whether these be acts or merely wishes and phantasies. In The Ego and the Id, Freud (1923) writes, In certain forms of obsessional neurosis the sense of guilt is over-noisy but cannot justify itself to the ego. Consequently the patient’s ego rebels against the imputation of guilt and seeks the physician’s support in repu- diating it. It would be folly to acquiesce in this, for to do so would have no effect. Analysis eventually shows that the super-ego is being influenced by processes that have remained unknown to the ego. It is possible to discover the repressed impulses which are really at the bottom of the sense of guilt. Thus in this case the super-ego knew more than the ego about the unconscious id. (p. 51) In pointing out that such over-noisy self-reproach often bears little relation to its true unconscious sources, Freud comes close to recogniz- ing the defensive nature of such self-reproach, disconnected as it is from its unconscious grounds. He nevertheless continues to consider such self-reproach as guilt, as distinct from a defence against it. Freud (1930) writes, “Our patients do not believe us when we attribute an ‘unconscious sense of guilt’ to them” (p. 135). But this does not deter him. “In order to make ourselves at all intelligible to them, we tell them of an unconscious need for punishment, in which the sense of guilt finds expression” (p. 135). The self-damaging or self-tormenting behaviours are observable, and although at first patients may be unconscious of the role they themselves are playing in bringing such suffering on themselves, they can often come to recognize their own unconscious agency in their misfortune when it is pointed out to them. Since Freud assumes that self- punishing behaviour is driven by and a manifestation of guilt, and since conscious guilt is absent, he postulates the existence of unconscious guilt, equating this with the unconscious need for punishment. Just as the sense of guilt (which Freud most commonly views as fear of the superego) may not be conscious in the moral masochist, so “it is very conceivable,” Freud (1930) writes, “that the sense of guilt produced by civilization is not perceived as such either, and remains to a large extent unconscious, or appears as a sort of malaise, a dissatisfaction, for which people seek other motivations” (pp.