The Social Origins of State Power in China by Daniel Christopher Mattingly A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kevin J. O'Brien, Chair Professor Ruth Berins Collier Professor Peter L. Lorentzen Professor Noam Yuchtman Summer 2016 The Social Origins of State Power in China Copyright 2016 by Daniel Christopher Mattingly 1 Abstract The Social Origins of State Power in China by Daniel Christopher Mattingly Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, Berkeley Professor Kevin J. O'Brien, Chair This dissertation investigates the origins of state power and political accountability. How do states exercise political control over their populations and implement policies that have clear winners and losers? Do democratic institutions in combination with a strong civil society strengthen political accountability? I examine these questions in the context of rural China, which combines limited local democracy and vibrant non-state groups such as kinship associations, temples, and neighborhood groups. Many argue that strong civil society institutions and local elections can curb the power of the state and hold government officials accountable. However, in this dissertation I argue that in China, strong civil society groups and village elections have expanded state power and helped officials confiscate wealth. The first part of the dissertation develops my theory of state power. Drawing on new data from rural China, I show that citizens distrust the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and believe that local party cadres do not represent their interests. On the other hand, the leaders of local civil society, especially the leaders of clans and neighborhood groups, enjoy high degrees of trust and moral authority. I argue that in this context, elected village councils and other participatory institutions are a mechanism for the state to identify local elites with significant informal authority within social groups. Once they join local political institutions, rent-sharing gives these social elites incentives to use their informal authority to help the CCP elicit compliance with potentially unpopular policies. In subsequent chapters, I draw on a mix of structured case studies and a unique national dataset to show how co-opting civil society elites has helped the CCP seize land from vil- lage collectives. These land expropriations have redistributed trillions of dollars of wealth from village collectives to the state and to local elites, and are one of the central political 2 issues in contemporary China. I show how the leaders of clans, religious groups, and neigh- borhoods use their informal authority within their groups to elicit compliance with land confiscations. When these civil society leaders are included in village political institutions, land expropriations are more likely and the compensation for these expropriations is lower. These findings cast doubt on theories that hold that the main consequence of civil society institutions is to enhance political accountability. I argue that grassroots civil society insti- tutions are encouraged and nurtured by the powerful because they reinforce the authority of local elites and because they help elites to control society. I also challenge theories that hold that democratic and participatory institutions curb the power of the state. Instead, these institutions can be used by authoritarian regimes to co-opt civil society leaders, who can help the state implement policies that redistribute wealth from the grassroots to elites. i For my parents, Kristi and Kevin. ii Contents Contents ii List of Figures iv List of Tables v 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Key Actors and Interests . 5 1.2 A Preview of the Findings . 8 1.3 Property Rights and Land Redistribution in China . 9 1.4 When Do Elections Curb State Power? . 13 1.5 Can Civil Society Strengthen Accountability? . 16 1.6 The Social Origins of State Power in China . 19 1.7 Research Design . 24 1.8 Chapter Overview . 25 2 How Local Elections Empower Civil Society Groups 28 2.1 Elections in China and Other Non-Democracies . 29 2.2 Design of the Survey Experiment . 34 2.3 Party Ties, Social Ties, and Political Mobilization . 36 2.4 Conclusion . 40 3 A Theory of State Power 42 3.1 The Politics of Compliance . 43 3.2 Moral Authority and Political Obedience: The Case of Xiaogang Village . 47 3.3 Information and Collective Action Problems: The Case of Beiyan Village . 49 3.4 Autonomous Elites: The Case of Wukan Village . 50 3.5 A Formal Model of Political Compliance . 53 3.6 Conclusion . 56 4 Elite Betrayal: Lineage Groups 57 4.1 Lineage Groups and State Power in Rural China . 57 4.2 The Informal Authority of Lineage Elites . 61 iii 4.3 Elites and Land Expropriations . 64 4.4 Extractive or Developmental Expropriations? . 68 4.5 Who Gets Expropriated? . 70 4.6 Compensation for Land Takings . 72 4.7 Norms of Obedience . 76 4.8 Conclusion . 79 5 The Strength of Weak Ties? Religious Groups 81 5.1 Temples and Temple Fairs in China . 82 5.2 The Weakness of Religious Ties in China . 85 5.3 Survey Evidence on Religion . 91 5.4 How Folk Religion Empowers Clan Elites . 93 5.5 Survey Evidence on Bridging Ties . 102 5.6 Conclusion . 104 6 The Reach of the State: Neighborhood Groups 106 6.1 The Reach of the State Revisited . 108 6.2 Neighborhood Ties in Service of the State . 113 6.3 Survey Evidence for the Importance of Neighborhood Networks . 120 6.4 Evidence from a Natural Experiment . 122 6.5 Conclusion . 125 7 China in Comparative Perspective 127 7.1 Elite Co-optation During Everyday Politics . 128 7.2 Elite Co-optation During Critical Junctures . 132 7.3 Conclusion . 138 8 Conclusion 140 8.1 The End of the Village? . 142 8.2 Implications for the Future . 144 Bibliography 148 A Additional Figures and Tables 161 iv List of Figures 2.1 Point estimates of marginal effect of candidate attributes on vote choice with 95 percent confidence intervals. 36 2.2 Point estimates of marginal effect of candidate attributes on assessment of whether the candidate cares about the material interests of voters with 95 percent confi- dence intervals. 39 3.1 A lineage group's ancestral hall in Wukan village. 52 3.2 A sequential game of political compliance under uncertainty. 54 4.1 Survey experiment results. Percentage expressing confidence in statement sup- porting expropriation plan, by type of leader endorsement. Dark lines show 90 percent confidence intervals and light lines 95 percent confidence intervals. 64 4.2 Surname fragmentation and land expropriation. Points are binned means and the solid line is a loess estimate using weighted least squares; the dotted lines are the 95 percent confidence intervals. 71 4.3 \Fighting the relocation compensation shows a lack of filial piety and a hard heart." 78 4.4 \Refuse relocation and be censured by the elders; shirk responsibility and people point." . 78 4.5 \Show respect and filial piety; move early for a better environment and peaceful late years" . 78 5.1 The distribution of Buddhist temples in China in 1820. Darker shading indicates more temples. 84 5.2 A combine harvesting wheat in Jiangsu Province. 87 6.1 How Chen village neighborhoods were divided into production teams, 1962. Fig- ure reproduced from Chan, Madsen, and Unger (2009, p. 33). 110 A.1 Festival participation in China by province in 2005. Darker shading indicates higher levels of participation. 161 v List of Tables 1.1 Key village institutions of self-government in China. Data on leader tenure and institution size from Martinez-Bravo et al. 2011. 7 4.1 Headwater and Peng Village case studies. 59 4.2 Ordinary least squares regression estimates for effect of lineage leader inclusion, where the dependent variable is an dummy variable for land expropriation occur- ring in the village. 66 4.3 Ordinary least squares regression estimates for effect of lineages with formal re- sources, where the dependent variable is an indicator for land expropriation oc- curring in the village . 68 4.4 Ordinary least squares regression, where the dependent variable is an indicator for whether or not villagers have participated in a collective petitioning incident. 69 4.5 Wucun and Rivertown case studies. 72 5.1 Chalong and Kaijia case studies. 85 5.2 Least-squares regression estimates of the relationship between festivals and land seizures. The dependent variable is an indicator for land expropriation. 94 5.3 Least-squares regression estimates of the impact of religious festivals and lineage leader incorporation. The dependent variable is an indicator for land expropriation.103 6.1 Rural administrative structure in China in the imperial, Maoist, and reform eras. 111 6.2 Wujia and Taiping case studies. 114 6.3 Ordinary least squares regression estimates of the relationship between the neigh- borhood decentralization index and land seizures. The dependent variable is an indicator for land expropriation. 121 6.4 Two stage least squares regression estimates of the relationship between the neigh- borhood decentralization index and land seizures, instrumented by weather shocks during village collectivization. The dependent variable is an indicator for land expropriation. 124 A.1 Percentage of villagers reporting participation in festival and religious groups by region. 162 vi A.2 Ordinary least squares regression estimates for effect of land seizures in highly decentralized villages, where the dependent variable is average income. 163 A.3 Ordinary least squares regression estimates for effect of land seizures in villages with embedded cadres, where the dependent variable is average income. 164 vii Acknowledgments I would not have finished this project without a great deal of help from advisors, colleagues, family, and friends.