Essays – peer-reviewed USAbroad – Journal of American History and Politics. Vol. 2 (2019) https://doi.org/10.6092/issn.2611-2752/8549 ISSN 2611-2752 Exporting Americanism: Arthur Bullard and American Propaganda in Russia Stefano Livi Submitted: September 13, 2018 – Revised version: November 30, 2018; January 25, 2019 Accepted: January 28, 2019 – Published: March 1, 2019 Abstract The essay provides a broader understanding of American propaganda abroad during World War I and its aftermath by analyzing the role of the Committee on Public Information in revolutionary Russia through one of its directors, Arthur Bullard. While the main goal of the CPI was to keep Russia in the war, his view went beyond the conflict and looked at emphasizing the desire of friendly relations between the American and Russian peoples by appealing to the admiration that many Russians felt for the American lifestyle, in order to contain the spread of Bolshevism in Russian territories. Keywords: Bullard; Committe on Public Information; Public Diplomacy; Propaganda; Bolshevik Revolution. Stefano Livi: Sapienza University of Rome (Italy) [email protected] The author is a Ph.D candidate in History of Europe in the Department of History, Culture, Religions at Sapienza University of Rome. He graduated at the same university in International Relations with a dissertation on the image of Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia in American political thought. His current researches concern the development of the idea of containment of Soviet Russia in American political thought from the Bolshevik Revolution to the ascendancy of George F. Kennan in US foreign policy. Copyright © 2019 Stefano Livi Art. #8549 This work is licensed under the Creative Commons BY License. p. 1 https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ Exporting Americanism USAbroad. Vol. 2 (2019) 1 Introduction When the United States joined World War I in April 1917, the need to support participation in the conflict emerged. For this purpose, a few days after the declaration of war on Germany, andbasedon the advice of the progressive journalist George Creel, Wilson created the first propaganda agency, the Committee on Public Information (CPI). The CPI organized the first mass propaganda campaign in history aiming to “sell the war” to the American public opinion, as well as to publicize the American war aims around the globe by presenting the image of America and its president in a positive light. In a short period, it opened divisions in various locations worldwide.1 It was in Russia where the CPI’s Russian Division, directed by the socialist journalist and freelancer Arthur Bullard, faced the most complex situation, and employed the greatest number of agents in an effort to launch a cultural attack against Bolshevism. This article seeks to provide a broader understanding of American propaganda abroad during, and in the aftermath, of World War I.2 Drawing largely on material from the Papers of Arthur Bullard, this essay focuses on Bullard’s role outlining the basis of American “democratic diplomacy” and his efforts to promote American values and principles in Russia through it. In the eyes of scholarsof Soviet-American relations, Bullard has often been relegated to a subordinate role, overshadowed by more notable figures like ambassador David R. Francis or the head of the CPI, George Creel. Although some scholars, like Kennan and Vaughn, reassessed the role of Bullard,3 too little credit has been given to his ideas on public diplomacy and education as propaganda tools in order to limit the spread of Bolshevism among the lower echelons of Russian society. 2 The birth of the CPI In April 1917, George Creel wrote Wilson complaining about the fact that censorship intervened too frequently to hide or suppress information concerning American war aims. Simultaneously, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, Secretary of War Newton Baker and Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels, asked the president to create a “committee on public information” which would have combined the two functions of publicity and censorship.4 As a result, the CPI was established by an executive order issued by Wilson on April 14, 1917, a few days after the American intervention.5 Even though the CPI anticipated the colossal propaganda machines established by the European totalitarian regimes during the twentieth century, it was the direct outcome of the affirmation of the notion of “publicity,” in which American progressives placed their faith. According to them, a mere statement of the fact was sufficient to obtain public support. Therefore, it was not about propaganda, but about information, instruction and education. George 1. For decades, the only thorough works about American foreign propaganda have been George Creel, How We Advertised America (New York: Harp & Brothers, 1920); Idem, Complete Report of the Committee on Public Information, 1917:1918:1919 (Washington D.C.: Govt. print. off., 1920); Cedric Larson and James R. Mock, Words that Won the War: The Story of the Committee on Public Information, 1917–1919 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939). For one of the most recent works about the CPI is Alan Axelrod, Selling the Great War: the making of American Propaganda (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009). Axelrod provides a narrative history of the CPI, but, by placing the figure of Creel at the center of his account, he overlooks the efforts of other relevant members of the CPI. The best book about Creel’s agency remains Stephen Vaughn, Holding Fast the Inner Lines. Democracy, Nationalism and the Committee on Public Information (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), which focuses on the domestic activities of the CPI and Bullard’s contribution to its formation. 2. For specific analysis of the CPI’s activities in some of the involved countries, see Gregg Wolper, “Woodrow Wilson’sNew Diplomacy: Vira Whitehouse in Switzerland, 1918,” Prologue, 24, 3 (Fall 1992): 227–239; Idem, “Wilsonian Public Diplomacy: The Committee on Public Information in Spain,” Diplomatic History, 17, 1 ( January 1993): 17–34; Daniela Rossini, “The Italian Rediscovery of America During World War I,” North Dakota Quarterly, 60, 1 (Winter 1992): 226–254. 3. George F. Kennan, Russia Leaves the War, Vol. 1 of Soviet-American Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), 46– 50; Idem, The Decision to Intervene, Vol. 2 of Soviet American Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), 190–207; Vaughn, Holding Fast, 3–22. 4. Cedric Larson and James R. Mock, Words that Won the War, 10–11, 48. 5. Executive Order 2594, April 14, 1917, in The Papers of Woodrow Wilson (hereinafter PWW), ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966–1993), Vol. 42, 59. https://doi.org/10.6092/issn.2611-2752/8549 Art. #8549 p. 2 Exporting Americanism USAbroad. Vol. 2 (2019) Creel’s attempt was to purge the notion of propaganda from its classic negative meaning that “in German hands, had come to be associated with lies and corruptions,”6 when he stated that “our effort was educational and informative throughout, for we had such confidence in our case as to feel thatno other argument was needed than the simple, straightforward presentation of facts.”7 Behind the success obtained by the CPI during its short life (April 1917–December 1918), laid the development of a new political communication based on a number of innovative elements in soci- ety at the time. First, the expansion of suffrage, which extended the political competition to social groups previously ignored by political forces. Second, the advent of mass society, that produced a new political space and compelled the political forces to renew their language and the channels— lower-class-oriented magazines, political cartoons and motion pictures—through which the language was conveyed. Third, the involvement of the civilians in the conflict, which brought about the need to keep the morale high, not only of those who were fighting at the front, but also of those who remained at home. While the initial project of what also came to be known as the “Creel Committee” only involved propaganda at home, subsequently it has endowed itself two branches, the Domestic Section and the Foreign Section. The first was an important vehicle of nationalization of the masses through thepro- motion of a development of a mass ideology which anticipated the spread of the last century’s power- ful communication tools. The latter was created to export American ideals and to present American war aims to the other countries by advertising the image of the United States and Wilson policy abroad, both in enemy and especially allied countries. CPI’s field of action extended itself to the entire globe, and in it was transferred the enthusiasm for the spread of the Wilsonian gospel. As Creel affirmed in his report: “We fought indifference and disaffection in the United States and we fought falsehood abroad. We strove for the maintenance of our own morale by every process of stimulation; we sought the verdict of mankind by truth telling.”8 What Creel later defined as the “world’s greatest adventure in advertising,”9 opened several branches both in warring and neutral countries in Europe, South America and Asia, including Eng- land, France, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, Holland, Sweden, Denmark, Poland and Russia. The Russian Division operated under the guidance of Edgar Sisson until March 1918, when he returned to the United States to abdicate the leadership to Arthur Bullard. 3 Bullard’s vision of the