Fordham Law Review Volume 62 Issue 4 Article 4 1994 Will the Rule of Law End? Challenging Grants of Amnesty for the Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime: Chile's New Model Robert J. Quinn Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Robert J. Quinn, Will the Rule of Law End? Challenging Grants of Amnesty for the Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime: Chile's New Model, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 905 (1994). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol62/iss4/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Will the Rule of Law End? Challenging Grants of Amnesty for the Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime: Chile's New Model Cover Page Footnote I thank the Fordham-MCI International Legal Fellowship for funding the research for this Note. I thank Carmen Rohland, Doris and Marcello Montealegre, Hernán Montealegre Klenner, and the many individuals in Chile and the United States who assisted me with interviews and guidance. I also thank Kenneth Anderson, Manuel DelValle, and José Miguel Vivanco for their advice on sections of the text. This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol62/iss4/4 NOTE WILL THE RULE OF LAW END?* CHALLENGING GRANTS OF AMNESTY FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS OF A PRIOR REGIME: CHILE'S NEW MODEL ROBERTJ. QUINN** INTRODUCTION From 1973 until now, we have lived always counting how many were dead and how many were detained. If a moment came when there were fewer dead and fewer detained, we always said, "Ah, the situa- tion is better for human rights." But that was a deeply erroneous statement. The problem is not one of numbers. The problem is who decides who lives and who dies, who is in jail and who is free.' On September 11, 1973, a military junta led by General Augusto Pi- nochet Ugarte shattered Chile's long history of civilian rule by over- throwing the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende. In the subsequent years of military rule, the Junta systematically vio- lated the fundamental human rights of thousands of Chilean citizens. In 1978, in order to shield its agents responsible for the worst of the viola- tions, the Junta issued an amnesty decree. Chilean Decree Law No. 21912 is a blanket amnesty3 law covering acts committed during the first * Responding to the possibility of prosecutions of military officers for their involvement in the human rights violations of the past, General Pinochet, former leader of the military Junta and still Commander-in-Chief, stated "No one is going to touch my people. The day they do, the rule of law will come to an end." Americas Watch, Human Rights and the "Politics of Agreements:" Chile During President Aylwin's First Year 48 (1991). This Note suggests that, rather than threaten it, the dismantling of the amnesty decree would strengthen the rule of law, both with regard to the crimes of the past, and as a deterrent to future violations. ** I thank the Fordham-MCI International Legal Fellowship for funding the re- search for this Note. I thank Carmen Rohland, Doris and Marcello Montealegre, Hernfin Montealegre Klenner, and the many individuals in Chile and the United States who assisted me with interviews and guidance. I also thank Kenneth Anderson, Manuel DelValle, and Jos6 Miguel Vivanco for their advice on sections of the text. 1. Claudia Drewifus, Freedom is the Best Revenge; Interview with Chilean human rights activist Roberto Garreton Merino, Nation, Aug. 13, 1990, at 162 (remarks of Ro- berto Garreton, former national legal director of the Vicarib de Solidaridad, one of Chile's leading human rights organizations, and current head of the Office of Human Rights in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). 2. Decree Law No. 2191 (Apr. 18, 1978), published in Diario Oficial, No. 30,042 (Apr. 19, 1978). A decree law is a norm "dictated by a de facto government-one not constitutionally established which has assumed legislative branch powers." Report of the National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation 74 note j (Phillip F. Berryman, trans., 1993) [hereinafter Report] (translation of the official government report: Informe de la Comisidn Nacional de Verdady Reconciliacidn (also known as the Informe Rettig [Rettig Report])). Diario Oficial is "Chile's journal in which all presidential decrees and laws must be FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 five years of military rule, from September 11, 1973, the date of the mili- tary coup, through March 10, 1978.' During that period, agents of the Chilean government killed over 2115 civilians.' Thousands more had property taken or destroyed, were detained, beaten and tortured, or forced into exile. The State has punished no one.6 published, and therefore made public, within five working days following processing. It is published daily." Id. at 13 note a. But cf infra note 122 (asserting that publication is not necessary once a law has been properly ratified). 3. Amnesty is "the abolition and forgetfulness of the offense." Black's Law Dic- tionary 83 (6th ed. 1990). When amnesty is granted "both the crime and punishment are abrogated." Id. Amnesty and pardon "are of a different character and have different purposes." Id. at 1113. Pardon is "lain executive action that mitigates or sets aside punishment for a crime." Id. Amnesty, therefore, "overlooks [the] offense; [pardon] remits punishment. [Amnesty] is usually addressed to crimes against the sovereignty of the state, to political offenses, forgiveness being deemed more expedient for the public welfare than prosecu- tion and punishment. [Pardon] condones infractions of the peace of the state." Id. This Note does not question the power of a state to grant amnesty for crimes against its sovereignty, such as treason, sedition, and rebellion. This Note suggests, however, that states may not properly grant amnesty for grave violations of individual human rights committed by the state or state agents. The state is restricted in this manner because the power to amnesty "those who have infracted its sovereignty by rebellion or otherwise flows from the role of the State as the victim." Robert K. Goldman, Amnesty Laws, InternationalLaw and the American Convention on Human Rights, 6 Law Group Docket (Int'l Hum. Rts. L. Group), Summer 1989, at 3. While the state may properly issue pardons after investigation and identification of offending parties, only the victims themselves may forgive or otherwise eliminate the wrongfulness of acts in violation of their individual rights. See id. 4. The vast majority of the human rights violations committed under the Junta occurred from September 1973 through 1978, the first five years of military rule. This Note, therefore, does not examine the violations that occurred during the 12 years of military rule following the passage of the March 1978 amnesty decree and ending with the election of a civilian government in March 1990. See generally Report, supra note 2, at 635-775 (discussing acts committed between August 1977 and March 1990). 5. See Report, supra note 2, at 899. A total of 3877 confirmed or unresolved cases of death or disappearance were officially recorded between September 1973 and March 1990. See id. This total represents roughly .04% of Chile's total population at the time. The same percentage in the United States today would equal roughly 108,000 lives lost. 6. In addition to the amnesty decree, the military regime ensured itself impunity by expanding the jurisdiction and use of military courts in cases involving civilians arising from events before and after the 1978 amnesty decree. See generally Watson W. Gal- leher, State Repression's Facadeof Legality: The Military Courts in Chile, 2 Temp. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 183, 188-96 (1988) (describing expanded use of military courts in govern- ment repression); Thomas A. O'Keefe, The Use of the Military Justice System to Try Civilians in Chile, N.Y. St. B.J., Nov. 1989, at 43, 46-47. Proposals to restrict the juris- diction of these courts are progressing in the Chilean legislature. See Robert G. Vaughn, Proposalsfor JudicialReform in Chile, 16 Fordham Int'l L.J. 577, 579-87, 590-93 (1992- 93). Article 4 of the amnesty decree provides the only exception to this total impunity. Article 4 specifically exempts from protection those implicated in the 1976 assassination of former Chilean foreign minister Orlando Letelier and his American aide, Ronni Mof- fit. See infra note 47. On November 12, 1993, Chilean Supreme Court Judge Adolfo Banados convicted two high ranking military officers in the murders. See Don Podesta, 2 Generals Convicted In Killing of Letelier; Chileans to be Jailedfor Washington Murder, Wash. Post, Nov. 13, 1993, at A19. Judge Banados sentenced retired general Manuel Contreras, former head of the secret police for the military regime, to seven years in 1994] CHALLENGING GRANTS OF AMNESTY The Junta ceded power in March of 1990. The victims of offenses covered by the Junta's amnesty decree are now challenging its validity under both domestic and international law. The outcome of these chal- lenges is significant not only for Chile, but for the many nations with similar histories who look to Chile for an acceptable model for address- ing the crimes of a prior regime.7 This Note asserts that the amnesty decree violates Chile's interna- tional treaty obligations to provide victims with effective remedies, ac- cess to hearings, and compensation.8 At the same time, however, this Note suggests that the international community should not altogether reject the Chilean model.