The Ethical Image in a Topological Perspective: the Poetics of Gaston Bachelard by Kuam-Min Huang 1 − CONCEPT OF THE ETHICAL IMAGE The term “ethical image” is derived from the term “moral imagination”, used by Gaston Bachelard. In this conceptual derivation, two moments are immediately to explain. In a first moment, as principle, the image is taken semantically related to the imagination, while being attentive to the theoretical consequences thereof. In this sense, the line of Bergson-Deleuze tending to separate the image from the imagination is meaningful in opening another direction of considering the images as fundamental units for an ontology of multiplicity. Similarly, the priority of perception may endorse the distance between the visual experience in the images and the psychical function elaborated by the imagination. On the contrary, guided by the transcendental subjectivity, the focus on a certain productive imagination from Kant to Schelling (even to Heidegger) is relevant in this philosophical tradition. Within such a framework, the position of Bachelard in crediting a high esteem of the imagination, inscribed in the metaphysics of the subjectivity. In a second moment, the emphasis lies on the connection of the aesthetical with the ethical (or the moral)1, at least on a certain correspondence of the two due to the foundation of imagination. 1 I assimilate the ethical and the moral in taking the “ethical imagination” not being different from “moral imagination”. The distinction between the ethical from the moral may introduce some other theoretical discussions such as the position of Hegel that I will not consider here. Saggi /Ensayos/Essais/Essays 47 Bachelard – 16/10/2012 This idea is not innovatory, but can be found in a Kantian idea that the beauty is a moral symbol, even though Kant himself did not allow the confusion of type (Typus)2 with symbol and endorsed a use of reason rather than that of imagination in a moral action. In Bachelard, the moral imagination as a philosophical term was mentioned in relation to the awaking dream of Robert Desoille, and then in the analysis of Nietzsche. Bachelard affirms, in the method of Desoille, “a transformation from oneiric energy to moral energy” (Bachelard 1988: 112). Bypassing the function of the intelligence in the moral action, Bachelard talks about the moral heroism provided by the moral imagination. As Desoille affirms it, the sublimation of the subject works together with the oneiric image of ascension. The ascension incarnates “the verticality of aerial imagination” (Ibidem: 111). Bachelard goes further to assent that “imaginary lines are the real life lines”. The verticality is not taken as a geometrical index but as a living indication or a dynamic direction of life. The concept of moral imagination, besides its Ascensional Psychology in Desoille’s use, joins together the imaginary line and the life line; but its presupposition is that the working together of imagination and the will, or their unity, as Bachelard comments it: Imagination and Will are two aspects of a single profound force. Anyone who can imagine can will. To the imagination that informs our will is coupled a will to imagine, a will to live what is imagined. (Ibidem: 111-112). Being attentive to the coupling of the will and the imagination, a reader will find again a trace of subjectivity as presented without hesitation. The subject of the will is a continual aspect in Bachelard, based on a metaphysics of will, of action, and of force. In a similar way, he takes the moral imagination as a key term to interpret Nietzsche, especially the aerial images. But Bachelard makes also a distinction between the will to power and the will to work in his later studies on the terrestrial images (Bachelard 2002: 23). However, in principle, Bachelard continues to affirm the affinity or even an identity of the imagination and the will: It is not my intention to study these psychological activities in isolation. On the contrary, I intend to establish that the imagination with the will, which could in a simplistic view pass for antithetical, are in truth profoundly interdependent. (Bachelard 2002: 6).3 2 That is “ the type of the moral law (Typus des Sittengesetzes)”. (Kant 1985: 81-82). 3 In the original text, the sense of “au fond, étroitement solodaires” may be stronger than the English Saggi /Ensayos/Essais/Essays 48 Bachelard – 16/10/2012 Between L’air et les songes (1943) and La terre et les rêveries de la volonté (1947), Bachelard didn’t change his idea; the equation of the imagination and the will is ontological. The formula of Schelling may be useful in giving a determination of the metaphysics of the will: “In the final and highest instant, there is no other being than willing. Willing is original Being”4. But for Bachelard, the intention is to explore the poetical dimension of morality, which can evoke the function of human will. He does not follow a speculative formulation of moral reasoning, but rather leans to a certain moral intuition implied in the poetic images. The philosophical significance is to recognize that “the aestheticization of ethics (l’esthétisation de la morale) is not something superficial”; this aestheticization is “not a metaphor that can be removed without risk”, it is “a profound and urgent need” (Bachelard 1988: 144)5. With the poetic image of ascension in Nietzsche, and more generally, with “the aestheticization of ethics”, Bachelard confirms again the function of moral imagination: “it is the imagination in this case that raises being to a higher level.” One can also recognize here the ontological dimension of the engaged imagination. Furthermore the imagination for Bachelard is not static6 but dynamic, which is in concordance with the idea of re-evaluation of all values in Nietzsche. The concept of moral imagination is adequate in both senses: in one way, it catches the aerial direction, “to the height”, central to Nietzsche; in another way, it releases the dynamic forces implied in the violent transformation of values by a contact with the poetic images. So the moral imagination is justified in a second level in so far as a moral image is integrated in the process of evaluation. Bachelard gives his echo to Nietzsche in appreciating his image of “weigher (peseur)” related to the verticality of height and depth, of ascension and falling: “Nothing escapes this weighing by the soul; everything is value, life is valorization. What vertical life there is in this knowledge of a verticalized soul!” (Bachelard 1988: 158). In ascribing Nietzsche an idealism of force, Bachelard elaborates also the ontological significance: “Here is the axiom of this idealism: the being who ascends or descends is the being through whom everything ascends or descends”. (Bachelard 1988: 144)7. An aestheticization of ethics does not contribute to restoring a banal ethical order, as happened in any pro-institutional aesthetics, for which the poetry is dependent on the translation “interdependent”. 4 “Es gibt in der letzten und höchsten Instanz gar kein anderes Seyn als Wollen. Wollen ist Urseyn, und auf dieses allein passen alle Prädicate desselben: Grundlosigkeit, Ewigkeit, Unabhängigkeit von der Zeit, Selbstbejahung. Die ganze Philosophie strebt nur dahin, diesen höchsten Ausdruck zu finden.“ (Schelling 1856-1861/7: 350). 5 The English translator does not distinguish the two terms moral and ethic. 6 Durand makes a remarkable distinction in this sense, he assigns to Bachelard “la phénoménologie dynamique et ‘amplificatrice’”, and to Sartre “la phénoménologie statique et nihiliste”. (Durand 1968: 72). 7 Italics in the original text. Saggi /Ensayos/Essais/Essays 49 Bachelard – 16/10/2012 ethical order. Within the philosophical tradition, one has in mind the accusation of Plato counter the poets in the state. No, this idea of aestheticization of ethics gives respect to the independence of poetry, but admits a precedence of poetry in founding ethics, in guiding ethical action. A poem evokes a certain ethical image in a dynamic way and surpasses reason by activating ethical sense for action. Bachelard comments on a Nietzschean image of “constellation of being (constellation de l’être)” by consenting that “an aerial voyage … yields to the poet constellation of being, the ‘eternal necessity’ of being, the ‘stellar’ witness to his ethical orientation (l’évidence « stellaire » de l’orientation morale)” (Bachelard 1988:152). The constellation in the sky shines with the moral laws in the human mind. But the “constellation of being” joins together the ontological, the cosmic, and the ethical. An ethical image can then give orientation for an ethical action, an ethical life. Again this is a function of psychosynthesis (Bachelard 1988: 113) that Bachelard prefers to psychoanalysis. In contrast to the analytical position, an ethical image is synthetic in animating actions and senses of value: “Matter, motion, valorization are all bound up in the same images” (Bachelard 1988: 152). The image actually engages the actor in the world in relating him to the connection with the concrete matters (in a cosmological dimension). Another formula is more audacious: “The imagination, more than reason, is a unifying force in the human soul” (Bachelard 1988: 152). The poetic synthesis unifies the theoretical (matter and motion) and the practical (valorization). A person in the universe would no longer be solitary in his pure law-giving status, but will act with other persons and other beings in the same world. One question left: is this view of unifying imagination akin to that of Nietzsche? It seems that the “unifying force in the human soul” is not the major concern of Nietzsche. To seek the theoretical affinity in the high esteem of function of the imagination, one can find a possibility in Heidegger’s interpretation of the Critique of pure reason, and another in Schelling’s specific view of Imagination (Ein-bildung, Hineinbildung or In-eins-bildung)8.