avk L 1, 24 61, 4 tomr ,11,14-41- ca-401, t vid two 122 STEPHEN G. RABE 1A vkd 6 kg vv,h4 Vi 4 4, As such, "the United States chose a policy in the Northeast of coopera• 11 tion with regional elites and justified the policy in terms of a communis- tic threat." The United States had "contributed to the retention of power by the traditional oligarchy" and "destroyed" a Brazilian pro- gram to modernize the political structure of the Northeast.64 The course of United States reform policies in Honduras and Brazil Fixation with Cuba: pointed to a tension between the Administration's talk of middle- class revolution and its search for anti-Communist stability. As Assis- The Bay of Pigs, Missile Crisis, tant Secretary Martin noted to Schlesinger in 1963, the Alliance for Progress contained "major flaws." Its "laudable social goals" encour- and Covert War Against Castro aged political instability, yet their achievement demanded an 8o per- cent private investment "which cannot be attracted amid political THOMAS G. PATERSON instability."65 President Kennedy recognized the problem, noting, near the end of his administration, that the United States would have to learn to live in a "dangerous, untidy world."66 But little in the President's action's or his Administration's policies indicated that the United States was prepared to identify with progressive social revolu- "My God," muttered Richard Helms of the Central Intelligence tions. The Administration and the President, Bowles concluded, Agency, "these Kennedys keep the pressure on about Castro."! An- never "had the real courage to face up to the implications" of the other CIA officer heard it straight from the Kennedy brothers: "Get principles of the Alliance for Progress.67 off your ass about Cuba."2 About a year after John F. Kennedy's That the Alliance for Progress was a Cold War policy was never a inauguration, a member of Congress applauded "the way you are subject of dispute. But, in Schlesinger's words, "answering Castro gradually strangling Castro and Communism in Cuba."3 In 1963 the was a byproduct, not the purpose, of the Alliance." What presum- President still sought to "dig Castro out of there."4 Defense Secretary ably distinguished the Latin American policy of John F. Kennedy Robert McNamara remembered that "we were hysterical about Cas- was the belief that the key to stability and anti-communism was tro at the time of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter."5 As someone said, democracy, economic growth and development, and social change. Cuba was one of the four-letter words of the 196os. The Alliance for Progress, as one observer put it, was "enlightened President Kennedy spent as much or more time on Cuba as on any anti-communism."68 An examination of the course of inter-Ameri- other foreign policy problem. Cuba stood at the center of his Adminis- can relations between 1961 and 1963 points, however, to the need to tration's admitted greatest failure, the Bay of Pigs, and its alleged separate the President's words from his decisions and his Administra- greatest success, the missile crisis. A multitude of government agen- tion's deeds. Through its recognition policy, internal security initia- cies enlisted in the crusade against revolutionary Cuba: the Com- tives, and military and economic aid programs, the Administration merce Department administered trade restrictions; the State Depart- demonstrably bolstered regimes and groups that were undemocratic, ment labored to rally the Organization of American States and North conservative, and frequently repressive. The short-term security that Atlantic Treaty Organization allies against Cuba; the Federal Bureau anti-Communist elites could provide was purchased at the expense of Investigation spied on pro- and anti-Castro groups; the Immigra- of long-term political and social democracy. • tion and Naturalization Service, Coast Guard, and Department of Health, Education, and Welfare handled the steady flow of exiles from the turbulent island; and the CIA launched covert operations designed to topple the Cuban government and to assassinate its leader Fidel Castro. Contrary to some Kennedy inenioitists and schol- 123 14," tmolhaiii 14c ot, 111414.1 it( AVirlIA:0144 G1/(1,11 04/141 - VF' 'WV) AA4:0 ' r-L4.14,140;) 124 THOMAS G. PATERSON Cuba 125 ars who have claimed that Kennedy was often trapped by a bureau- Hitler's and Stalin's dreaded totalitarianism. The President rejected cracy he could not control and distracted by other time-consuming the idea that intense United States hostility to the Cuban Revolution issues, the President was knowledgeable, engaged, and influential on may have contributed to Castro's tightening political grip and flirta- matters Cuban.6 tion with the Soviet Union. Nor did Kennedy and other Americans wish to acknowledge the measurable benefits of the revolution— ky; 1i8:1 4/r, Why did President Kennedy and his chief advisers indulge such a ,1 fixation with Cuba and direct so many United States resources to an improvements in education, medical care, and housing, and the elimi- u9'41\ unrelenting campaign to monitor, harass, isolate, and ultimately de- nation of the island's infamous corruption that once had been the ■ 4/‘, 41). 4\'' stroy Havana's radical regime? One answer springs from a candid American Mafia's domain. Instead, Kennedy officials concluded that CILL remark by Robert F. Kennedy. Looking back at the early 196os, he Cuba's was a "betrayed revolution."" ete. itti4; tGs W1\141 wondered "if we did not pay a very great price for being more ener- Richard N. Goodwin, the young White House and State Depart- pu, gene than wise about a lot of things, especially Cuba."7 The Kenne- ment official with responsibilities for Latin America, provided another explanation for the Kennedy fixation with Cuba. He remarked that 141' dys' famed eagerness for action became exaggerated in the case of Cuba. They always wanted to get moving on Cuba, and Castro dared "the entire history of the Cold War, its positions and assumptions, Lat, them to try. Some Europeans thought that "we kept slapping at Cas- converged upon the 'problem of Cuba.' "" Indeed, the Cold War ;t, tro because he'd had the effrontery to thumb his nose at us," recalled dominated international politics, and in the zero-sum accounting of the one American diplomat. time, a loss for "us" meant a gain for "them." As Cuban-American aldu; (A4/1411-" 8 The popular, intelligent, but erratic Cuban leader, whose barbudos (bearded ones) came down from the Sierra relations steadily deteriorated, Cuban-Soviet relations gradually im- MA) ktiffrt z,Maestra Mountains in January 1959 to overthrow the United States proved. Not only did Americans come to believe that a once-loyal ally t p-vy0 ally Fulgencio Batista, hurled harsh words at Washington and defi- had jilted them for the tawdry embrace of the Soviets; they also grew i antly challenged the Kennedy model of evolutionary, capitalist devel- alarmed that Castro sneered at the Monroe Doctrine by inviting the Jo" opment so evident in the Alliance for Progress. As charismatic figures Soviet military to the island. When Castro, in late 1961, declared him- .1).0(p ., AL charting new frontiers, the President and Jefe Maximo often personal- self a Marxist-Leninist, Americans who had long denounced him as a C ized the Cuban-American contest. Kennedy harbored a "deep feeling Communist then felt vindicated. American leaders began to speak of V 3 4- against Castro," and the Cuban thought the American "an intelligent Cuban membership in the "Sino-Soviet bloc," thus providing Commu- 011 and able leader of American imperialism," and, after the Bay of Pigs nists with a "spearhead" to penetrate the Western Hemisphere.'3 cti)X From the moment of victory, Castro had called for Cuban-style revolu- S invasion, he branded him a new Hitler.9 To Kennedy's great annoy- , once, Castro could not be wheedled or beaten. tions throughout Latin America, and Havana had sent agents and arms 111U ) Kennedy's ardent war against Fidelismo may also have stemmed to other nations to kindle radical fires. Castro's revolutionary mission 0,4_ from his feeling that Castro had double-crossed him. As a senator, happened to coincide with Nikita Khrushchev's alarming statement Kennedy had initially joined many Americans in welcoming the Cu- that the Soviet Union supported wars of national liberation worldwide. ban Revolution as a decided advancement over the "oppressive" Ba- It mattered little to Americans that the two appeals appeared indepen- (014 y1^ tista dictatorship. Linking Castro to the legacy of Bolivar, Kennedy dently or that Havana and Moscow differed markedly over the best urged a "patient attitude" toward the new government, which he did method for promoting revolutionary change—the Soviets insisted on '(\(i\kvnot" see as Communist. utilizing Communist parties within political systems, whereas the Cu- 10 Denyinkrepeatedly that he was a Commu, 'PA^ AN L nist, Castro had in fact proclaimed his allegiance to democracy and bans espoused peoples' rebellions. Cuba came to represent the Cold private property. But in the process of legitimizing his revolution and War in the United States's backyard, and, as such, one senator ex- ity resisting United States pressure, Castro turned more and more radi- plained, it became a "target for our national frustration and annoyance 111 cal. Americans grew impatient with the regime's highly charged anti- with Moscow and the whole Communist conspiracy."14 '.'.t' AP I Yankeeism, postponement of elections, jailing of critics, and national- In addition to the Kennedy style and the Cold War, American (ArkkJ/ /ft ization of property. The Cuba olice state s stem remindectraaty of politics influenced the Administration's Cuba policy.