Naval War College Review Volume 59 Article 15 Number 4 Autumn 2006 The hieldS and the Cloak: The ecS urity of the Commons Richmond M. Lloyd Gary Hart Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review Recommended Citation Lloyd, Richmond M. and Hart, Gary (2006) "The hieS ld and the Cloak: The eS curity of the Commons," Naval War College Review: Vol. 59 : No. 4 , Article 15. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss4/15 This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Color profile: Disabled Composite Default screen Lloyd and Hart: The Shield and the Cloak: The Security of the Commons BOOK REVIEWS 141 nations would guarantee oil flow. Hart’s economic agenda would reward savings, investment, and productivity Hart, Gary. The Shield and the Cloak: The Security of the Commons. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, and penalize borrowing, debt, and 2006. 194pp. $22 consumption. Gary Hart offers a bold grand strategy Second, “America’s role in the world is to deal with the complexities of security to resist hegemony without seeking he- in the twenty-first century. He states gemony by the creation of a new global that America will fail in defining its role commonwealth focused on stability, in the world if it does not recognize a growth, and security.” Hart proposes broader definition of security. Security reforming international institutions, fo- narrowly defined as “prevention of cusing global development assistance physical harm by creating a protective on individuals, and increasing control shield” is insufficient. The “cloak” of of weapons of mass destruction. He economic, environmental, health, en- suggests an international “peace-making” ergy, educational, and government se- force that would be “part constabulary curity provides “genuine security.” and part special forces...inserted into zones of violence.” Hart argues against the Bush adminis- tration’s “narrow” focus on the war on Third, “to respond to this century’s new terrorism, the promotion of democracy, threats, the U.S. military shield must be and its emphasis on unilateralism and comprised of these principles: flexibility, preemptive use of military force. reform, and intelligence.” Hart recom- mends appreciation of fourth-generation Hart’s cooperative security strategy warfare and establishment of a human embraces liberalism expanded to deal intelligence corps within the CIA. He with a multidimensional security envi- consolidates all special forces into a ronment. A major theme is securing fifth service, and brings the National the “commons.” “Central, is a sense Guard home to reassume its traditional that we are not alone, that our secu- duties of guarding the homeland. rity, in an age of global integration, is reliant on a global community—a One minor weakness is repetition in commons—with increased opportu- successive chapters. nity and responsibility.” Hart has served as a U.S. senator for Three principles inform Hart’s grand twelve years, serving on the Armed Ser- strategy. First, “Our economic cloak is vices Committee—the first congressio- the basis of our strength, and our nal committee to investigate the CIA. strength is the basis for our world lead- Most important is his work as co-chair ership.” Hart calls for investment in of the U.S. Commission on National knowledge through a new national se- Security for the Twenty-first Century, curity education act to increase scien- which in 1999 predicted catastrophic tists, engineers, and teachers. His terrorist attacks on the United States, energy policy would encourage moves and in January 2001 recommended a toward independence (zero imports). department of homeland security. A Persian Gulf treaty alliance compris- Readers will do well to consider his ing oil-producing and consuming proposed grand strategy. It is rare to Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2006 1 C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Autumn2006.vp Tuesday, October 10, 2006 8:31:22 AM Color profile: Disabled Composite Default screen 142 NAVAL WARNaval COLLEGE War REVIEW College Review, Vol. 59 [2006], No. 4, Art. 15 find a single plan laid out in such com- expected to produce an atomic bomb is plete detail. mid-1950 and the most probable date is mid-1953.” RICHMOND M. LLOYD William B. Ruger Chair of Turner recounts subsequent intelligence National Security Economics failures, but because the manuscript was Naval War College submitted to the CIA for security review, few readers should be surprised by this history. While most facts are familiar, Turner’s Turner, Stansfield. Burn before Reading: Presidents, thesis is that the director of Central In- CIA Directors, and Central Intelligence. New York: telligence serves the president in two ca- Hyperion, 2005. 319pp. $23.95 pacities: leading the CIA in providing Presumably Stansfield Turner did not unbiased intelligence; and heading the devise the nonsensical title of this history intelligence community, “fifteen federal of the DCI’s (Director, Central Intelli- agencies, offices, and bureaus within the gence) relationship with the president of executive branch.” Turner evaluates the the United States. eighteen DCIs before Porter Goss on how each performed both tasks, includ- In twelve chapters on chief executives ing his own service under Jimmy Carter. from Franklin D. Roosevelt through George W. Bush, Turner discusses the If Turner is frank about errors he made, nineteen men who headed America’s in- he excoriates his successor, Bill Casey. telligence organization. “Within six “Overall, I found this transition group to months of Pearl Harbor, FDR’s enthusi- be as unbalanced, opinionated, and un- asm for ‘Wild Bill’ [Donovan’s] ‘innova- willing to listen as any group I have ever tive thinking’ had evaporated,” Turner encountered. They came to their task writes, noting that Donovan was never with their minds made up, and no facts given access to the ULTRA/MAGIC were going to change their conclusions.” code-breaking program, and he regularly Fifteen blistering pages recount Casey’s lost struggles with the Joint Chiefs of politicization of the agency and obses- Staff and J. Edgar Hoover. sion with covert actions, culminating in his leading Ollie North to undertake In January 1946, Harry Truman created “two highly illegal operations—selling the Central Intelligence Group and ap- arms to Iran and funneling the money to pointed Sidney Souers as the first direc- the contras in Nicaragua.” tor of central intelligence, with simple expectations: “to keep him personally Turner devotes the final chapter to re- well-informed of all that was going on in flections on the 2005 Intelligence Re- the outside world.” By September 1949, form Act. “The big question, then, is however, the CIA had not been privy to whether President Bush will line up with Atomic Energy Commission informa- the presidents since FDR who have fa- tion, so the day after Truman learned vored giving more authority to the DCI that the Soviet Union had exploded its or whether he will give in to the Defense first atomic bomb, he read Intelligence Department’s persistent efforts to keep Memorandum 225: “The earliest possi- the DCI’s authority limited.” Noting that ble date by which the USSR might be “the CIA’s reputation in the country is at https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol59/iss4/15 2 C:\WIP\NWCR\NWC Review Autumn2006.vp Tuesday, October 10, 2006 8:31:22 AM.