THE 1954 FLOOD AND THE ASCENDANCE OF MONARCHY IN NEPAL | 57 THE 1954 FLOOD AND THE ASCENDANCE OF MONARCHY IN NEPAL Sharad Ghimire In late July 1954, when Nepal was still an apprentice in democracy (Baral 2012), a massive flood inundated the central and eastern Nepal. The episode of the flood is mentioned in the country’s political and development history literature (Joshi and Rose 1966: 118; Shaha 2001: 310; Isaacson et al. 2001: 9; Shrestha 1990: 185; Mihaly 2002[1965]: 80). Writings on Nepal’s natural hazards and disasters have also cursorily looked at the incident (Dixit 2003; Shakya et al. n.d.). However, its significance has remained relatively unexplored. The story of 1954 flood is important for three reasons. First, it sheds light on Nepal’s tryst with foreign aid-led development. The disaster attracted US aid for relief and recovery that became a basis for the resettlement program in Nepal’s southern plains, the Tarai, particularly in Chitwan valley. Second, the saga is helpful in understanding the dynamics of state response to natural disasters when the state itself was modernizing. The incident triggered the first state-sponsored rehabilitation efforts in the aftermath of a natural disaster in Nepali history (Dixit 2003: 173). Third, as this chapter shows, the story links the aftermath with the emergence of a particular political order in Nepal. This article locates the disaster in the political context of the 1950s Nepal. It analyzes the relationship between the nature of disaster response by the Nepali state and the reconfiguration of its political landscape in the aftermath of the 1954 flood. The overwhelming state response to the flood created various institutional structures for relief and recovery. These new structures and relations reconfigured the political space and led to what some historians have called ‘the monarchy in ascendance’ (Whelpton 2005). Like Olson and Gawronski (2010) have noted, disasters originate as a natural event, but become political. By focusing on the political consequences of the 1954 flood, this article aims to add a natural factor to the disintegration of the democratic platform and the ascendancy of the monarch. Standard literature has attributed the political development in the 1950s to the ambitions of the new monarch, division among political elites, lack of significant socio- Studies in Nepali History and Society 18(1): 57–80 June 2013 © Mandala Book Point 58 | SHARAD GHIMIRE economic change, frictions among the political orientations, and the external interventions and geopolitics of that time (Baral 2012). This essay argues that the challenges posed by the massive scale of the disaster management helped change the government by accelerating erosion of its legitimacy. When people lose confidence over the capacity of their government to respond to the disaster, their support to the government dwindles. The popular perception of failed management will further erode its credibility. This is Olson and Gawronski’s 5C+A framework which seeks to explain the link between disaster management and state’s legitimacy to rule. The 1954 flood also overwhelmed the new post-1951 regime, and forced it to find a reactive and top-down approach to disaster management. Yet, unlike in India, the massive institutional response of the state failed to put in place policy mechanisms to deal with such incidents in the future.1 The absence of an anticipatory mechanism and the incompetence of the incumbent coalition government meant that the politics around its response, while massive, turned into liabilities and triggered its collapse. This chapter acknowledges other political factors for the political changes in the 1950s, such as the downfall of political parties’ government in 1955. However, it claims that an analysis of the relationship between a natural crisis and politics in 1954–1955 provides a fresh perspective on that downfall. This analysis aims to establish the significance of studying environmental issues like natural hazard, deforestation and land degradation in the political context. This chapter is divided into three sections. It first provides a snapshot of the impact of the flood in different parts of Nepal as covered in the state- owned national newspaper Gorkhàpatra. Then, it describes how various governmental agencies, including the Advisory Assembly (AA), non- governmental agencies and political parties responded to the flood for immediate rescue and relief. Then the chapter attempts to relate flood crisis to the consequent political crisis. It also sheds light on the popular understanding of the flood by comparing it briefly with the great 1934 earthquake. The latter conjecture warrants further exploration. 1 In India, the same 1954 flood led to the launching of the National Programme of Flood Management (Mohapatra and Singh 2003: 138). In Nepal, such policy statement would come after three decades in the shape of the Natural Disaster Relief Act, 1982. THE 1954 FLOOD AND THE ASCENDANCE OF MONARCHY IN NEPAL | 59 The Flood and Its Impact The 152-mm daily average of heavy rainfall from 24 to 28 July 1954 caused an immense flood in central and eastern Nepal. The second bout of rainfall after a month devastated Kathmandu valley, East No. 1 and 2, and central Tarai. The first downpour claimed hundreds of lives and caused extensive damage to infrastructures and crops in and around Kathmandu valley, in the region connecting the valley to southern plains and several cities in the eastern mid-hills, and the Tarai belt (Shaha 2001: 310). The extent of the damage can be gleaned through the official media coverage of the disaster. The river Bagmati and its tributaries cut off the city of Kathmandu from the town of Sankhu and the north-eastern ridges of the valley. Consequently, the supplies of firewood and grains from the region were affected.2 In the city itself, a house in Gyaneshwor suddenly collapsed, burying ten people under the rubble.3 While the newspapers only briefly reported the damage outside the valley, one report is helpful to assess the destruction caused by the second rainfall. A government official’s field account (Amatya 2011 v.s.) indicated that the valley was also cut off from the southern plains. The road linking the valley to Bhimphedi, and thereafter to Amlekhganj, the railway track from Amlekhganj to Raxaul, and the ropeway from the valley to Dhursing ropeway terminus were unusable. The entire stock at Dhursing was destroyed. The city of Birganj was nearly washed away. In the central western hills, a landslide killed nine people in Harkapur area of Nuwakot.4 It displaced dozens of households in Jhiltung. Three were killed in Katunje Torke village where the entire cropland was washed away. The downpour also hit the eastern hill region from East No. 1 and 2, Sindhupalchowk, Dolakha, Ramechhap, Sindhuli through Bhojpur, Dhankuta to Ilam. News about the loss of property and life in the eastern hills arrived late. Nevertheless, a delegation from far-eastern district of Ilam arrived in Kathmandu to inform the extent of destruction in that area.5 In Ramechhap, the cloudburst and subsequent pre-winter drought hit hard. Most arable 2 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Sƒkhu Jàne Saóakmà Varùàko Prabhàv. 2 Bhadau, p. 4. 3 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Da÷ Janà Mànis Mañomunã, Duã Janà CahŒ Marisake. 2 Bhadau, p. 4. 4 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Pa÷cim Pahàómà Pairo ra Bàóhã: 9 Janà Mànis ra Kehã Ghar Samet Noksàn. 2 Bhadau, p. 4. 5 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Ilàmko Pratinidhimanóal Kañhmànóaumà. 2 Bhadau, p. 4. 60 | SHARAD GHIMIRE lands were left barren. Trails and bridges were damaged. Productivity of the regions plummeted.6 In East No. 1, the deluge affected 3,689 households, killed 104 persons and 187 cattle, and destroyed 2,247 houses and about 40,000 màñomurã land.7 In the western hills, the damage was sporadic but severe. In Chisapanigadhi, 13 maujàs (villages) were affected. At least 48 people (the highest in Pangre maujà) and hundreds of cattle lost lives. Goods worth about NRs. 300,000 were lost.8 In Gorkha, the loss of 73 persons, 342 cattle, 80,000 màñomurã land area and 700 houses was reported. Devastation in the Tarai was more severe. The central Tarai, particularly Bara, Parsa, Rautahat, Sarlahi and Mahottari districts were hit most. For example, the river Bagmati wrecked havoc in Malangawa region submerging many villages, displacing hundreds of families, putting children and elderly in a severe distress and covering the agriculture land with silt.9 Memories of the devastation still describe extensive sedimentation, loss of paddy, collections of floating tree trunks, disruptions of the daily routine and the exodus of people to India in search of the menial jobs (Dixit et al. 2007: 145). The eastern Tarai saw breaking of the riverbanks. The landscape looked like an expanse of waters with scattered islands of huddled houses. The precipitation subsided on 26–27 July, but soared again on 21 August.10 A 15-member relief committee of Advisory Assembly estimated a loss of NRs. 1–1.5 crore, 300 human lives and 2,000 domestic animals. About two lakhs people in the Tarai were robbed of their means of livelihood, while about 10,000 people had their lands silted. Two hundred villages were washed away in the eastern Tarai only.11 The flood disrupted whatever communication 6 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Pårva 2 Nambarko Bàóhãjanya Vivaraõ Sthanãya Janatàdvàrà De÷vàsisanga Sahayogko Apãl. 2 Pus, p. 2. 7 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Pårva 1 Na. ra Pa÷cim 2 Na. mà Ativçùñile Dhanjanko Pra÷asta Kùati: Dubai Jillàko Nirãkùaõ Garã Kami÷an Farkyo. 2 Pus, p. 4. Land area: 4 màñomurã = 1 ropanã and 1 ropanã = 5476 sq.ft. or 521 sq.m. or 0.1289 acre. 8 Gorkhapatra. 2011 v.s. Ci.I.