CHAPTER 6 Cajoling the Chinese Communist Party, Uniting with the Guomindang Sneevliet returned to China to ensure that the members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would accept the tactic of working with the Guomindang (GMD) but the precise nature of the cooperation was not yet decided. In his absence, important changes had taken place that affected the work environment. 1 The Changing Scene in China: the Chinese Communist Party Shifts its Stance In the short war of April–May 1922, the Zhili Clique defeated Zhang Zuolin’s Fengtian Clique. The victors proposed a “government by good men,” an idea that appealed to many in China, including some of the communists in Beijing. Further, they proposed that both the Northern President, Xu Shichang, and the Southern President, Sun Yat-sen, resign with Li Yuanhong taking over as President of a unified China and with the old parliament restored. On the night of June 15, Chen Jiongming’s supporter, General Ye Ju, drove Sun Yat-sen out of the Presidential Palace in Guangzhou. This followed his return on June 1 to deal with the growing opposition to his policies. After the coup d’état, Sun sought sanctuary on a gunboat but troops loyal to Sun were swiftly defeated by those loyal to Chen Jiongming. Subsequent negotiations failed and Sun moved to Hong Kong where, on August 9, he boarded a ship bound for Shanghai (Wilbur, 1976, pp. 71–72). Sneevliet was aware of Sun’s defeat but still told the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) that Guangzhou offered the best place to promote his tactic. This played into the debates about the most suit- able nationalist with whom to collaborate. Even after the Hangzhou Plenum (August 1922) had clarified support for Sun, communist party members in Guangzhou supported Chen Jiongming (Cai Hesen, 1926 [1980], p. 39). Despite the best efforts of the Central Bureau to change their preference, they per- sisted even after Chen Gongbo, a key supporter, was expelled from the party (Cai Hesen, 1926 [1980], p. 60; Chang Kuo-t’ao, 1971, vol. 1, p. 249; and Chen Gongbo, 1943). © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004423459_007 Cajoling the Chinese Communist Party 115 Finally, the Second Party Congress (Shanghai, July 16–23, 1922) began the pro- cess of shifting from the original hostile stance to cooperation.1 The Congress Manifesto abandoned the sectarian position and recognized the need to coop- erate with the nationalists. This shift did not yet align fully with Sneevliet’s tactic and was not only the result of Sneevliet’s promptings before returning to Moscow. Dalin, a representative of the Communist Youth International in China also applied pressure amidst the changing political landscape. In April– June 1922, Dalin was in Guangzhou to help arrange the Congress of the Socialist Youth League (SYL) and his memoirs mention a CCP meeting held in late April, early May that discussed establishing a united front with the GMD. Debate was lively, lasting several days and the Guangzhou group clearly supported Chen Jiongming rather than Sun.2 Zhang Guotao and a few others denounced the proposed cooperation but eventually, the majority, including Chen Duxiu, came to the realization that a united front was necessary (Xu Hang, 2013).3 With so many reservations aired, the Central Bureau refrained from adopting a resolution to allow further discussion (Dalin, 1975 [1981], p. 91). Dalin took the opportunity to discuss the political situation with Sun Yat-sen. Their conversations were dominated by discussion of the Soviet view that, given China’s current development, it was necessary to organize a united national-revolutionary front (Wilbur, 1976, p. 122). Dalin (1975 [1981], p. 101) noted that their earliest meeting took place on April 27, 1922 but the June 15 coup interrupted further meetings although Eugene Chen’s interme- diation kept them in contact. Chen informed Dalin that for Sun, Russia was the only friend of the Chinese revolution and that because of this belief, Sun had decided to go to Shanghai to continue the struggle and should this fail, he would go to Russia.4 While Dalin’s and Sneevliet’s promptings encouraged CCP members to shift their isolationist position, the changing domestic envi- ronment was also influential. Zhang Guotao mentioned that the Zhili Clique’s 1 Twelve delegates represented 195 party members. Chen Duxiu attended as did Zhang Guotao but Li Dazhao from Beijing, Mao Zedong from Hunan and the delegates from Guangzhou did not arrive. 2 They were not alone, Vilensky-Sibiriakov in the Appendix to the letter he sent to Lenin went to great lengths to explain Chen Jiongming’s background as a great revolutionary who had served the GMD for over twenty years. He was the “most popular figure in bourgeois-national China” and “one of the greatest personalities in young China,” March 15, 1922, Doc. 19. 3 Given later evidence, clearly Zhang was a consistent opponent of close cooperation. 4 Wilbur, 1976, p. 123. According to another of Dalin’s memoirs, Sun told him that “I have been disappointed in almost everything I previously believed in. But now I have become convinced that the only real and sincere friend of the Chinese Revolution is Soviet Russia.” S.A. Dalin, In the Ranks of the Chinese Revolution, 1926, p. 115, quoted in Holubnychy, 1979, pp. 182–83..