477 VI . STANDBY POSITION WITH NEW APPROACHES: INTEGRATION POLICY 1970–86 1 . GENERAL INTRODUCTION: THE “NORTHERN ENLARGEMENT” AND EUROSCLEROSIS? COMMON LAW, DIRECT ELECTION, THE EMS, AND THE “SOUTHERN ENLARGEMENT” 1969–86 The EC Heads of State and Government were aware of the necessity for new ini- tiatives. Grand dreams of European unity have dimmed in the last years, buffeted by resurgent nationalism. The former EEC Commission President Walter Hall- stein (1958–1967) compared integration to a bicycle that falls over when it stops if it is not constantly being pedaled forward.1 After a growing phase (1958–68), the Hague Summit of December 1–2, 19692 represented a break. The transition under treaty to the finalization of the Trea- ties of Rome was passed (the creation of an economic and monetary union and the strengthening of community bodies). Against the background of the German Mark that was gaining in purchasing power and the growing economic power of the Federal Republic of Germany, post-de Gaulle France saw itself compelled to call in a second controlling power for Germany. It was a decision that was both political and rational. As a result of this, a break- through was achieved above all for the Northern Enlargement, but with a view towards a more efficient coordination of political cooperation. And a consensus could also be achieved regarding the financing of the Common Agricultural Poli- cy and the strengthening of the authorities of the parliament. The negotiations for accession with Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Norway commenced in 1970, made possible under the Georges Pompidou government after the resig- nation of the enlargement policy opponent, Charles de Gaulle (April 28, 1969). 1 “Integration is like a bicycle. [...] You either move on or you fall.” Quoted after Pulling Apart, in: Time 2/14/1969, Vol. 93, Issue 7, 38; for this chapter see the documents 69–78 in appendix “Documents”. 2 Jan VAN DER HARST, The 1969 Hague Summit: a New Start for Europe?, in: JEIH 9 (2003), 2, 5–9; Franz KNIPPING – Matthias SCHÖNWALD (Hrsg.), Aufbruch zum Europa der zweiten Generation. Die europäische Einigung 1969–1984 (Europäische und Internationale Studien, Wuppertaler Beiträge zur Geisteswissenschaft 3), Trier 2004; Jan VAN DER HARST (Ed.), Beyond the Customs Union: The European Community’s Quest for Deepening, Widen- ing and Completion 1969–1975 (Groupe de Liaison des Historiens auprès de la Commission Européenne/European Liaison Committee of Historians), Brussels – Paris – Baden-Baden 2007. 478 VI. Standby Position with New Approaches: Integration Policy 1972–86 The accession treaties could be signed on January 22, 1972, with the exception being Norway, where a national referendum failed (by 53%).3 With the neutrals (Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, and later Finland) and the other EFTA states (Portugal, Iceland, and Norway), the EC concluded bilateral free trade agreements. With these, there was no longer any application of the common EC external tariffs for commercial or industrial products for these coun- tries, and a free trade zone was possible for those goods. The Western European trade gap thus came to an end. The accessions became final and conclusive begin- ning on January 1, 1973. The EC thus became a Community of Nine and was per- ceived more strongly as an international actor and participant. The EC also now viewed itself in its world policy function. At the European summit in Copenhagen on December 14–15, 1973, the Heads of State and Government of the future nine members reaffirmed their desire to introduce the concept of European identity into their common external relations.4 The negotiations for accession during the first round of enlargement (1961–72) were the most prolonged and, in the case of the United Kingdom, the most prob- lematic up to that point – de Gaulle’s reservations and obstructions just added to this – particularly as the British were constantly making difficulties and contin- ued to do so after attaining membership. They were closely linked with domestic political controversies. The issues of the share of the EC budget and the member- ship fees but also the fishing policy provided the potential for conflict. In 1974–75, the conditions for accession had to be renegotiated as the reelected Labour Party of Harold Wilson demanded. In a June 1975 referendum, the British public voted to remain in the EC. But to the very end, “Albion” remained a difficult partner (specially reduced fees, distance from the social policy, maintaining of its national currency, and a security policy that was euroskeptic and pro-american), and this also held true in a slightly modified form for ‘stubborn’ Denmark. The negotia- tions with Norway showed that accession is not possible if it has to be based upon a weak or fragile consensus of domestic policy. The example of Norway also shows, however, that an economically well performing and independent country that is a strong exporter does not need full EU membership, which also holds true for Switzerland. In the mid-1970s, the situation in Europe was characterized by increasing un- employment, the slowing of growth, and crises in various sectors, such as in the textile industry, but especially in the iron and steel industry. The emotional state of stagnation with regard to integration policy that prevailed in the EC as a result of monetary, energy, and economic crises in the 1970s was again and again des- ignated in an oversimplified manner as “Eurosclerosis” which, however, does not 3 See document 75 in the appendix “Documents”. 4 https://www.cvce.eu/de/obj/dokument_uber_die_europaische_identitat_kopenhagen_14_ dezember_1973-de-02798dc9–9c69–4b7d-b2c9-f03a8db7da32.html (called on September 23, 2019). 1. General Introduction 479 correctly characterize this decade. In the most turbulent postwar phase with the collapse of the international monetary system, the escalating Vietnam War, and virulent international terrorism, it was nevertheless possible to introduce the pro- cess of the reduction of tensions between East and West in Europe with the CSCE final agreement and to scrutinize the cohesiveness of the EC states.5 For the new approach to integration policy, it was a decade of proving itself and of the concentration of powers. The Werner Committee, named for the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Pierre Werner, was already working on a step-by-step plan for a monetary union that was then to be picked up later and realized another decade after that. From the 1960s to the 1980s, in a period of a putative standstill in integration, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) had already played an impor- tant role in the broadening of the common corpus of legislation (acquis commu- nautaire) with a multitude of decisions and judgements.6 The European Council was composed of the Heads of State and Government and met two to three times a year on an extraconstitutional basis, that is, “above” the EC. A Meeting in Rome on December 1, 1975, decided upon the direct and immediate election of the representatives to the European Parliament. More than twenty years had passed until the Community finally made up its mind to make the decision that had already been taken into consideration in the Treaties of Rome to begin partial democratization. From June 7 to 10, 1979, the citizens of the nine EC Member States voted for the first time for the representatives in a general and direct election. The principal winners were the socialists, the christian democrat- ic European People’s Party (EPP) and the European Democrats (EPP-ED). The Parliament’s modest authorities were expressed in the limited opportunities for influence in the central areas of EC decision making (agricultural and trade pol- icy). The representatives shied away from budgetary matters and the legislative process, but not from debates with the Council, and they dealt with the ECJ and its matters.7 5 Michael GEHLER, Europa. Ideen – Institutionen – Vereinigung – Zusammenhalt, Reinbek/ Hamburg 2018, 304–309. 6 Ibid. 301, 1075 (footnotes 261–263). 7 For the path to direct election, see Wilfried LOTH, Europas Einigung. Eine unvollendete Geschichte, Frankfurt am Main – New York 2014, 211–218. 480 VI. Standby Position with New Approaches: Integration Policy 1972–86 1978: Caricature of the German-French tandem Helmut Schmidt – Valéry Giscard d’Estaing The economic policy objectives from the early 1970s remained current. The Eu- ropean Council met in Paris on March 9 and 10, 1979 and put into force the Euro- pean Monetary System (EMS) which had already previously been conceived the year before in Bremen. It was based upon four fundamental elements: a European Currency Unit (the ECU), an exchange rate and intervention mechanism, and mechanisms for credits and transfers. The United Kingdom did not fully par- ticipate in the EMS, which had to be borne by a corresponding convergence of economic policy by the member states and furthermore required the support of the economic potential of the less well-to-do countries of the EC. The EMS, the nucleus of the later European Monetary Union (EMU),8 was the work of Helmut Schmidt and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, the Bonn-Paris axis, and a decision that was both highly political and rational after the disintegration of the international monetary system that was dominated by the dollar. The EMS was also a European response to the monetary crisis of international proportions in the 1970s as a re- sult of the United States’ military disaster in Vietnam and the resource and supply problems in the energy sector. Keywords are the oil shocks of 1973–74 and 1979.9 It was also a result of an American lack of political interest in European attempts at organization in connection with new outlines for world monetary policy. After applications for full EC membership were made by Greece (in 1975) and Portugal and Spain (in 1977), the EC, in the face of intentions for deepening that had not yet been realized, was confronted with new desires for enlargement.