Persons—Their Identity and Individuation Roger Melin SWEDISH SCIENCE PRESS, UPPSALA, SWEDEN Roger Melin PERSONS—THEIR IDENTITY AND INDIVIDUATION Umeå, 1998 Institutionen för filosofi och vetenskapsteori Umeå universitet 901 87 Umeå Akademisk avhandling som med vederbörligt tillstånd av rektorämbetet vid Umeå universitet för avläggande av filosofie doktorsexamen offentligen försvaras i Hörsal F, Humanisthust fredagen den 27 november 1998 kl. 13.15. ISBN 91-7191-519-2 ISSN 0345-0155 ABSTRACT This study is about the nature of persons and personal identity. It belongs to a tradition that maintains that in order to understand what it is to be a person we must clarify what personal identity consists in. In this pursuit, I differentiate between the problems (i) How do persons persist? and (ii) What facts, if any, does personal identity consist in? In chapters 2-3,1 discuss matters related to the first question. In chapter 2,1 discuss 'identity' and 'criterion of identity'. I argue that we ought to understand 'identity' as numerical identity. A 'criterion of identity', I argue, should be understood as a specification of the essential conditions for being an object of some sort S. In chapter 3,1 distinguish between two different accounts of how persons persist; the endurance view (persons persist three-dimensionally through time), and the perdurance view (persons persist four-dimensionally in virtue of having numerically distinct temporal parts). I argue that the endurance view of persons is ontologically prior to the perdurance view; on the ground that objects must always be individuated under some substance sortal concept S (the sortal dependency of individuation), and that the concept person entails that objects falling under it are three-dimensional. In chapter 4-8, I discuss the second problem. I differentiate between Criterianists, who maintain that it is possible to specify a non-circular and informative criterion for personal identity, and Non-Criterianists, who deny that such a specification is possible. In chapter 5-7,1 consider in turn Psychological Criterianism, Physical Criterianism and Animalism. I argue that none of these accounts is adequate on the ground that they are either (i) circular, (ii) violate the intrinsicality of identity, or (iii) do not adequately represent what we are essentially. In chapter 8, I discuss Non-Criterianism. I consider in turn Cartesianism, The Subjective view and Psychological Substantialism. Against these accounts I argue that they wrongly assume that 'person' refers to mental entities. In chapter 9,1 formulate a biological Non-Criterianistic approach to personal identity; the Revised Animal Attribute View. Person is a basic sortal concept which picks out a biological sort of enduring persons. A person, then, is an animal whose identity as person is primitive in relation to his identity as an animal. I claim that the real essence of a person is determined by the real essence of the kind of animal he is, without thereby denying that persons have a real essence as persons. Persons-Their Identity and Individuation © Roger Melin Series-Editor: Per Råberg Faculty of Arts Umeå University S-901 87 Umeå Distributed by Swedish Science Press Box 118 S-751 04 Uppsala, Sweden Printed in Sweden by Eländers Gotab, Stockholm, 1998 ISSN 0345-0155 ISBN 91-7191-519-2 ACTA UNIVERSITATIS UMENSIS Umeå Studies in the Humanities 143 Persons—Their Identity and Individuation Roger Melin Umeå University 1998 Roger Melin, Persons—Their Identity and Individuation. Department of Philosophy and Philosophy of Science, Umeå University, S-901 87 Umeå, Sweden. Monograph 1998, Acta Universitatis Umensis, Umeå Studies in the Humanities 143 ISSN 0345-0155 ISBN 91-7191-519-2 Distributed by Swedish Science Press, Box 118, S-751 04 Uppsala, Sweden. ABSTRACT This study is about the nature of persons and personal identity. It belongs to a tradition that maintains that in order to understand what it is to be a person we must clarify what personal identity consists in. In this pursuit, I differentiate between the problems (i) How do persons persist? and (ii) What facts, if any, does personal identity consist in? Concerning the first question, I argue that persons persist three-dimensionally (the endurance view), and not four-dimensionally (the perdurarne view), on the ground that objects must always fall under some substance sortal concept S (the sortal dependency of individuation), and that the concept person entails that objects falling under it are three-dimensional. Concerning the second question, I differentiate between Criterianists, who maintain that it is possible to specify a non-circular and informative criterion for personal identity, and Non-Criterianists, who deny that such a specification is possible. I argue against Criterianist accounts of personal identity on the ground that they are either (i) circular, (ii) violate the intrinsicality of identity or (iii) do not adequately represent what we are essentially. I further criticise three Psychological Non-Criterianist accounts of personal identity on the ground that they wrongly assume that 'person' refers to mental entities. Instead I formulate the Revised Animal Attribute View where person is understood as a basic sortal concept which picks out a biological sort of enduring animals. In this, I claim that the real essence of a person is determined by the real essence of the kind of animal he is, without thereby denying that persons have a real essence as persons. Keywords: person; personal identity; criterion of identity; sortal concept; individuation; perdurance view; endurance view; Criterianism; Animalism; Non- Criterianism; animal attribute view; basic sortal; real essence; sort; natural kind. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would like to thank my supervisor docent Sten Lindström. He has always taken his time to discuss philosophical matters with me, and has been of invaluable help in structuring my philosophical thoughts. Most ideas in this thesis are, in one way or other, inspired by the discussions we have had over the years. I would also like to thank Professor Martin Edman who was my supervisor in the early stages of the work on this thesis. I would like to thank Mr Paul Snowdon who supervised me when I was at Exeter College, Oxford during the academic year 96-97. Many ideas which are defended in this thesis are inspired by the discussions we had during that time. I am grateful to the department of Philosophy and Philosophy of Science for enabling me to stay at Exeter College for a year. I am also very grateful to all participants of the seminars at the department of Philosophy and Philosophy of Science. The comments given to me on earlier drafts of this thesis have been of highest importance for me. Especially, I would like to thank Bertil Strömberg who, besides being my assistant supervisor, also has been of invaluable help in practical as well as philosophical matters. Anders Berglund also needs mentioning. He has always been keen on discussing philosophical questions concerning persons and personal identity. Anders also needs a special mention, since he has helped me with problems concerning the layout of my thesis. I would also like to thank Jayne Waterworth for helping me make my English more idiomatic. Most of all, though, I am forever in debt to my family. Without the love, care and patience from my girlfriend Helena and our children Aron, Nils and Isak this work would never have been completed. This thesis is dedicated to all of them, and to all the persons who are no longer with us. TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 1. INTRODUCTION 1 1.1 Introduction 1 1.2 The problem of personal identity over time 3 1.3 A methodological remark 10 1.4 The content and structure of the work 16 2. IDENTITY AND CRITERION OF IDENTITY 21 2.1 Introduction 21 2.2 Identity 22 2.3 Numerical and qualitative identity 26 2.4 Identity and change 27 2.5 Cases of fission and fusion 32 2.6 Criterion of identity 34 3. SORTAL INDIVIDUATION AND PERSONS 41 3.1 Introduction 41 3.2 Sortal individuation, sortal terms and sortal concepts 42 3.3 Substance sortal terms and phased sortal terms 47 3.4 Identity, sortal individuation and criteria of identity 49 3.5 The sortal term 'person' 50 3.6 Ontological priority 52 3.7 The persistence of persons: the Perdurance view 54 3.8 Criticism of the perduring understanding of persons 57 3.9 The persistence of persons: the Endurance view 60 3.10 The ontologically priority of the Endurance view 64 4. CRITERIANISM AND NON-CRITERIANISM 67 4.1 Introduction 67 4.2 Criterianism 68 4.3 The specifiability thesis 70 4.4 The complexity thesis 72 4.5 The derivativeness thesis 74 4.6 The essentiality thesis 75 4.7 Different versions of Criterianism 76 4.8 The indeterminacy thesis 77 4.9 The reductionist thesis 79 4.10 Non-Criterianism 84 5. PSYCHOLOGICAL CRITERIANISM 87 5.1 Introduction 87 5.3 The circularity-objection 93 5.4 Quasi-memories and personal identity over time 97 5.5 Criticism of Psychological Criterianism 102 6. PHYSICAL CRITERIANISM 109 6.1 Introduction 109 6.2 The Brain criterion 110 6.3 Revised Brain criterion 113 6.4 Criticism of the Brain criterion 115 6.5 The intrinsicality 117 6.6 The Body criterion and the Physical Realiser criterion 122 6.7 The embodiment of persons 126 6.8 Criticism of the Body criterion 133 7. ANIMALISM 137 7.1 Introduction 137 7.2 General ideas of Animalism 137 7.3 Different versions of Animalism 141 7.4 Two remarks on Animalism 146 7.5 Criticism of Animalism 149 8. PSYCHOLOGICAL NON-CRITERIANISM 157 8.1 Introduction 157 8.2 Cartesianism 157 8.3 The person as soul 158 8.4 The Subjective View 160 8.5 The subjective person 162 8.6 Criticism of Cartesianism and the Subjective View 164 8.7 The necessity of physical embodiment 167 8.8 Psychological Substantialism 171 8.9 Criticism of Psychological Substantialism 177 8.10 One interpretation and one remark 185 9.