THAILAND: THE EVOLVING CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH Asia Report N°241 – 11 December 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. STATE OF THE INSURGENCY .................................................................................... 2 A. THE INSURGENT MOVEMENT ....................................................................................................... 2 B. PATTERNS OF VIOLENCE .............................................................................................................. 4 C. MORE CAPABLE MILITANTS ........................................................................................................ 5 D. 31 MARCH BOMBINGS ................................................................................................................. 6 E. PLATOON-SIZED ATTACKS ........................................................................................................... 6 III. THE SECURITY RESPONSE ......................................................................................... 8 A. THE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY FOR THE SOUTHERN BORDER PROVINCES, 2012-2014 ......... 10 B. SPECIAL LAWS ........................................................................................................................... 10 C. SECURITY FORCES ..................................................................................................................... 12 IV. ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES ................................................................................ 15 A. THE SOUTHERN BORDER PROVINCES ADMINISTRATIVE CENTRE (SBPAC) ............................... 15 B. FIXATION ON BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE ................................................................................ 16 V. STEPS TOWARD A POLITICAL SOLUTION .......................................................... 18 A. DECENTRALISATION .................................................................................................................. 19 B. DIALOGUE WITH INSURGENTS .................................................................................................... 20 1. The NSC process ........................................................................................................................ 21 2. Thaksin’s initiative ..................................................................................................................... 22 C. CIVIL SOCIETY ........................................................................................................................... 23 VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 25 APPENDICES A. MAP OF THAILAND .......................................................................................................................... 26 B. MAP OF THAILAND’S SOUTHERNMOST PROVINCES .......................................................................... 27 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 28 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2009 ......................................................... 29 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 32 Asia Report N°241 11 December 2012 THAILAND: THE EVOLVING CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS After a decade of separatist violence in Thailand’s Malay/ became a hot topic for editors, bureaucrats and politicians, Muslim-majority southern provinces, insurgent capabili- but this renewed attention has not yet prompted fresh ties are outpacing state counter-measures that are mired in thinking or new will to tackle the problem. complacency and political conflict. While Bangkok claims to make a virtue of patience, more sophisticated and brutal The Yingluck Shinawatra administration, which came to insurgent attacks increase the death toll. Successive gov- office in August 2011, placed its hopes for progress on ernments have opted to muddle through South East Asia’s Police Colonel Thawee Sodsong, a Thaksin loyalist cho- most violent internal conflict, their responses hostage to sen to lead the reinvigorated Southern Border Provinces outmoded conceptions of the state, bureaucratic turf bat- Administrative Centre (SBPAC). Through determination tles and a bitter national-level political struggle. In 2012, and unstinting cash hand-outs, Thawee won a degree of a new security policy for the region acknowledged for the personal approval within in the region. But the 31 March first time the conflict’s political nature and identified de- bombings coincided with first reports of Thaksin’s fum- centralisation and dialogue with militants as components bled attempt to start a peace process with exiled militant of a resolution. But fulfilling this policy demands that Thai leaders and allegations that the two events were linked. leaders depoliticise the South issue, engage with civil so- With Thaksin denying he talked with rebel leaders and ciety, build a consensus on devolving political power and violence and recriminations mounting, the dialogue pro- accelerate efforts toward dialogue. Dialogue and decentral- cess appeared to be back at square one. Faced with contin- isation may be difficult for Bangkok to implement, but the ued insurgent violence, the cabinet approved a high-level necessary changes could become even more challenging “war room” to coordinate the work of seventeen minis- over time. tries with responsibilities in the Deep South. This did not blunt the bureaucratic impulse to tinker with organisational The intractable power struggle between supporters of for- charts, however, as security officials called for re-subor- mer Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, deposed in a 2006 dination of the civilian SBPAC to the military-dominated coup d’état, and his opponents in the army, bureaucracy Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC). and palace has overshadowed the conflict in the South. Yet, the region remains another arena for political games- The contours of a political resolution to the conflict in manship. Civilian officials there and in Bangkok have southern Thailand have long been in the public domain, been hamstrung by the need to respect military preroga- but Bangkok has been unable to commit to a comprehen- tives and have searched in vain for a formula that can tamp sive and decisive approach. A promising three-year poli- down the violence without committing to political reforms. cy issued by the National Security Council in early 2012 Deployment of some 60,000 security forces, special secu- recognises a political dimension of the violence and codi- rity laws and billions of dollars have not achieved any fies decentralisation and dialogue as official strategy, but appreciable decline in casualties or curbed the movement. its implementation is likely to be impeded by political and bureaucratic infighting. The government should reverse For the past two years, violence has largely persisted be- the militarisation of the Deep South, lift the draconian se- low a threshold that might have generated public pressure curity laws and end the security forces’ impunity, all of for new approaches. Periodically, though, spectacular at- which help stimulate the insurgency. Thai leaders should tacks thrust the conflict into national consciousness. A also forge a broad national consensus for bold action to number of these have taken place in 2012, including the resolve the conflict, including decentralisation of political 31 March coordinated car-bombs in Yala and Hat Yai. power, earnest engagement with civil society and sustained Media broadcast of closed-circuit television (CCTV) video efforts to cultivate a peace dialogue with the insurgency. showing an audacious daylight strike that killed four sol- Talking to its representatives, changing the way the Deep diers in July in Mayo District, Pattani Province, confronted South is governed, delivering justice, and recognising the the public with brutal images that challenged official assur- region’s unique culture are all elements of a comprehen- ances that the government was on the right track. As overt sive approach to reducing the violence. political turmoil in Bangkok receded, the Deep South again Thailand: The Evolving Conflict in the South Crisis Group Asia Report N°241, 11 December 2012 Page ii As Bangkok dithers, the insurgents are growing bolder and 6. Recognise that self-determination and maintenance more capable. They are conducting attacks that are attract- of Thailand’s territorial integrity and sovereignty are ing, if not deliberately seeking, more attention. Thailand compatible and prepare to respond to initiatives by has been fortunate that the military have considered it in state representatives and civil society to pursue dia- their strategic interest to contain the fight within their pro- logue on peaceful conflict resolution. claimed territory, but the violence has evolved at a pace that is starting to challenge the ability of the government to To Civil Society Organisations: respond on its own terms. Without more creative thinking and deft action, Bangkok risks losing the initiative. 7. Expand bases of popular support through continued community outreach, while maintaining channels of communication